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This thesis presents a theory of how U.S. special operations forces (USSOF) build partner 
capacity. Building partner capacity (BPC) is a cornerstone of America’s post-9/11 
security strategy and a signature mission of USSOF. However, USSOF lacks a theory 
that articulates how capacity is built or the keys to its success.   
This thesis explores BPC from the top down, through national security 
documents, doctrine, and case studies. It identifies that BPC is not a single act, but rather 
a series of tactical, operational, and strategic engagements carried out over an extended 
period of time in a dynamic and unpredictable partnership environment. The partnership 
environment is the aggregate of factors and conditions that influence the partnership and 
ultimately bound capacity-building potential.   
Given these antecedent conditions, USSOF requires a BPC enterprise to provide 
the continuous synchronization, vertically from the policy level to the tactical level and 
horizontally with the partner nation, to ensure the right skills and equipment arrive in the 
right place, at the right time, for the duration necessary to achieve the capacity-building 
objective. This thesis constructs and examines the BPC enterprise, the actors that can 
bring it to life, and offers seven principles likely to be associated with capacity-building 
success. 
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A. LOOKING FORWARD FROM AFGHANISTAN 
The close of major American involvement in the war in Afghanistan leaves the 
United States in a precarious situation but also with some unique opportunities. Looking 
forward, it is important to take stock of the threats and challenges the United States faces 
today, the method it has chosen to address them, and the potential points of failure. 
1. The Challenge: The Threat and the Operating Environment 
The United States faces a wide array of threats that are geographically and 
ideologically dispersed. A majority of these threats are from non-state actors that 
capitalize on ungoverned or under-governed spaces to establish safe havens from which 
they can launch terrorist attacks aimed at weak states, U.S. interests, or potentially the 
U.S. homeland. Civil strife can also exacerbate fragile stability, resulting in a number of 
second- and third-order effects that pose a threat to security interests. A dramatic example 
would be the rise of the Islamic State group that seized on the chaos of Syrian civil war 
and the deep societal rifts in a fragile Iraq to capture large swaths of land that straddles 
both countries in 2014. Similar turmoil with the very real potential to cause the same 
hazardous results is present elsewhere in the world—most notably in Africa. Take, for 
example, ongoing coalition operations in the Horn of Africa, and France’s 2013 
intervention in Mali to beat back the expansion of Islamist fundamentalists that were 
threatening to capture the entirety of the country.1   
Despite all the public attention on non-state actors and terrorists since 9/11, the 
United States still has to concern itself with traditional threats from state actors. 
Although, these threats may not pose a clear and present or existential threat to the U.S. 
homeland, they certainly pose a very real threat to U.S. national security interests abroad, 
                                                 
1 Special Warfare, “Q&A Colonel John Deedrick, Commander, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne)” Special Warfare 26, no. 1 (2013): 22. http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/11420; Hugh 
Schofield, “France Confirms Mali Intervention.” BBC News. January 11, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20991719. 
 2
and to the partners and allies who share those interests. Russia’s 2014 incursion and 
subsequent annexation of Crimea clearly illustrates the state threats the United States 
must still address as a global superpower. Although not directly affecting the United 
States, this action certainly gave visible credence to the concerns of the Baltic States, and 
put NATO and the defense of its members back on the security agenda. Russia is only 
one state actor on the radar, Iran, North Korea, and China all present their own unique 
challenges that require their due diligence of thought, resources, and decisions.   
Compounding these physical threats are the realities of the modern age. Conflict 
in the information age is defined by the Information, Communication, and Technology 
(ICT) Revolution. Affordable and commercially available technologies, social media and 
instantaneous communication have not only diffused a noticeable degree of power from 
the state to the individual, but these advancements have also increased the number and 
nature of threats that states must face.2  Additionally, as the ICT Revolution shrinks 
aspects of space and time, nefarious interests have become more intertwined. For 
example, the lines between nacrotrafficking, human trafficking, and terrorism have 
become more and more blurred in recent years.3  
Some scholars and analysts suggest the most dangerous potential threat the United 
States, its allies, and partners may have to face is one that coalesces asymmetric tactics 
and actors, organized crime, and state sponsorship into a coherent functioning threat, a 
hybrid threat.4 These threats would be able to leverage the elements of national power 
that a state can bring to bear in conjunction with the asymmetric advantage that is the 
strength of a non-state actor. Such a threat would pose a significant challenge to any 
state, requiring the country or coalition to counter simultaneous assaults across the 
spectrum of conflict and along all elements of national power.5       
                                                 
2  Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 113–122. 
3  Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006) 101–160, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG430.pdf. 
4 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2009): 34–
39. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-52.pdf. 
5  Ibid., 36–39. 
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Finally, after over more than a decade of combat, the United States and many of 
its allies and partners are faced with substantial economic challenges and war-weary 
populations. As a result, the United States and many of its staunchest military allies are 
drastically reducing their defense budgets, while others like Russia and China increase 
theirs.6 The most sobering fact, however, is that even though major U.S. and allied 
involvement in Afghanistan is ending, the long war against Al Qaida and its affiliates is 
far from over. Global and transnational threats still remain—still threatening the United 
States, its interests, allies, and partners.7   
2. The Strategy: Building Partner Capacity 
Combined, these challenges will inform the United States’ security concerns in 
the coming decade and shape how the military is able to address them. These challenges 
are broad, complex, and exceed the ability of the United States to solve alone. To meet 
these challenges and their global scope, the United States has made it clear that it will 
have to rely on partners, and on building capacity in those partners.8   
Building partner capacity (BPC) as a term is relatively new in the U.S. military 
lexicon, although the concept is anything but new.9  A remarkable example of U.S. led 
BPC is the Marshall Plan implemented by the United States in Europe after World War 
II. The effects of the war left Europe devastated and in great need of assistance. As a 
                                                 
6 Angelo Young, “Which Countries Are Spending More On Defense?,” International Business Times, 
February 6, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/global-defense-budget-seen-climbing-2014-first-total-increase-
2009-russia-surpasses-britain-saudi; Leon E. Panetta, “Building Partnership in the 21st Century” (speech, 
Dean Acheson Lecture, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, June 28, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?Speec
hID=1691. 
7 Rabasa et al., Beyond Al-Qaeda, 164; National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030: Alternative 
Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012), viii–ix.  
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends; Panetta, 
“Building Partnership in the 21st Century.” 
8 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2010); Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2014; Rabasa et al., Beyond Al-Qaeda, xxix. 
9 Catherine Dale, In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security (CRS Report 
No. R42516) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2012), 1, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42516.pdf 1. 
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result of the Marshall Plan “from 1948 through 1952 European economies grew at an 
unprecedented rate. Trade relations led to the formation of the North Atlantic alliance. 
Economic prosperity led by coal and steel industries helped to shape what we know now 
as the European Union.”10  This whole-of-government approach helped to rebuild Europe 
and was, in a very real sense, a capacity-building effort, although the term BPC was not 
used in Marshall’s day. 
In the wake of 9/11, BPC has become a buzzword to define the broad, and 
sometimes vague, American enterprise to build stronger partners with the ultimate 
objective of achieving shared and U.S. national security interests. The effort has run 
continuously in the background of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan receiving much 
funding, but little public attention.11  United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) has played a major role in this effort; which is not surprising given the 
command’s charter.   
As then-USSOCOM commander, Admiral William H. McRaven, highlighted to 
the House Armed Services Committee in 2013: “SOF focuses intently on building partner 
capacity and security force assistance so that local and regional threats do not become 
global and thus more costly—both in blood and treasure.”12   U.S. special operations 
forces’ (USSOF) connection with BPC is not a post-9/11 development; USSOF has a 
long history of building partner capacity. Over the past seven decades, by design and by 
chance, USSOF has found itself building partner capacity all over the world and across 
the range of military operations. As a result, they have become the American capacity-
building force of choice. The results of some of USSOF’s more recent capacity-building 
efforts can be easily seen in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
10 “The Marshall Plan,” The George C. Marshall Foundation, accessed November 27, 2014, 
http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/. 
11  Catherine Dale, In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security, 1.. 
12 Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, United States Special Operations Command: 
Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 113th Cong. 4 (2013) 




As of 2013, 17 NATO nations contributed special operations forces (SOF) to train 
and advise a high-end Afghan police force as part of International Security Assistance 
Force Special Operations Forces (ISAF SOF).13  Additionally, United Arab Emirate and 
Jordanian SOF have trained other Afghan forces alongside American and allied 
partners.14  These countries’ participation in this conflict not only demonstrate a 
willingness to work with the United States on operational missions, but also reflect the 
amount of capacity USSOCOM was able to build in some of these partners over the 
years. 
Afghanistan provides a tangible output of SOF BPC, but it only illuminates one 
aspect of the USSOF capacity building enterprise. On any given day, USSOF elements 
are working in approximately 75 countries around the world.15  This trend is expected to 
continue as USSOCOM has made it clear that it will conduct and resource long-term 
persistent engagement with its partners around the globe in support of the Global SOF 
Network.16  Most of these missions, if not all of them, have a capacity-building 
component.   Examples include persistent engagements in Columbia, El Salvador, 
Estonia, the Philippines, Uganda, and Romania, just to name a few.   
Every one of these missions presents a unique set of challenges.   Such endeavors 
are normally characterized as having numerous stakeholders, extremely long time 
horizons, and are easily frustrated by personalities and organizational differences—in 
short, they are not easy. But the fact remains; the capacities these engagements build 
represent a capacity in being—a capacity to achieve both partner nation and U.S. national 
security objectives. Therefore, the degree to which USSOF is able to build capacity 
efficiently and comprehensively directly impacts the United States’ national defense. 
                                                 
13 Brigadier Mark Smethurst, “ISAF SOF” (briefing, Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict 
Symposium, Washington, DC, January 29, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2013SOLIC/Smethurst.pdf. 
14 Logan Tuttle, “Commandos Train for Afghanistan’s Future” (ISAF Joint Command Public Affairs, 
January, 2010), http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/commandos-train-for-afghanistans-future.html. 
15  U.S. Special Operations Command, “SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear.” (MacDill Air 




3. The Void: Theory and Doctrine 
Despite the United States’ strategic focus on building partner capacity, USSOF’s 
long history with the task, and the fact that BPC is something that SOCOM “focuses very 
intently on,” no theory or doctrine exists that examines or explains how USSOF actually 
builds partner capacity. USSOCOM has be criticized lately, most notably by long-time 
SOF chronicler, Linda Robinson, for USSOCOM’s lack of articulation when it comes to 
explaining and educating outsiders on how USSOF carries-out, manages, and gauges its 
non-kinetic, indirect approaches, to include building partner capacity.17  
Other literature, both doctrinal and professional, seems to indicate that USSOF 
insiders—commanders, planners, and operators—may not have the full picture either. 
Doctrine approaches different aspects of capacity building in various volumes, but does 
not address the topic in its entirety; JP 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms does not even define the term “building partner capacity.” 
Contemporary professional works like Going Big By Getting Small by career Special 
Forces officer Colonel Brian S. Petit indicate that undertakings such as BPC “requires 
competencies that are beyond standard professional military education and training…a 
challenge that requires tremendous knowledge outside of one’s professional domain 
knowledge.”18  Discussions with other senior USSOF leaders echo the sentiment that 
there is a lot of on the job training at the operational level when it comes to capacity 
building in environments short of war.19  As the United States’ reliance on this indirect 
approach increases and available resources to conduct them decreases, USSOF will not 
only need to better articulate how it carries out these missions, but also better prepare and 
resource its formations to conduct them more efficiently and effectively.     
                                                 
17 Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Special Report (Washington, DC: 
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013), 13–15. 
18  Brian S. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special 
Operations in Phase Zero (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013), 108–109. 
19  Colonel (retired) Greg Wilson, interview with the author, Monterey, CA, October 29, 2014. 
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to help fill this gap, and advance a more 
comprehensive understanding of how USSOF actually builds partner capacity, and how 
USSOF’s BPC efforts fit into the larger U.S. national security strategy. Given the 
observations above, BPC will remain a critical component of U.S. national defense for 
the foreseeable future, and USSOF will likely remain the force of choice to achieve those 
ends. Therefore, it stands that a greater, more holistic understanding of SOF capacity 
building is necessary to ensure that USSOCOM and its formations are meeting the 
nation’s defense needs as effectively and efficiently as possible, especially in an 
increasingly resource constrained environment. To extend the usefulness of this research, 
this work will also advance an adaptive planning model that will assist Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC) commanders and staffs when considering and designing a 
BPC enterprise in order to best apply scarce BPC resources within their areas of 
reasonability (AOR).   
C. SCOPE 
This thesis will focus on the challenges and tensions of building partner capacity 
as they apply to special operations forces in environments short of war; a domain 
increasingly referred to as Phase Zero.20  It will analyze two case studies from Special 
Operations Command South’s (SOCSOUTH) AOR: Colombia, and Paraguay.  These two 
cases were selected because they both represent a classic bilateral partnership between 
USSOF and a partner nation (PN) over an extended period of time, and because the same 
operational headquarters managed them. Despite these similar characteristics, these two 
cases produced very different results. Subsequently, they provide an opportunity to 
determine what makes this type of partnership tick, and to identify the potential pitfalls 
and operational opportunities of such partnerships. This thesis will also draw on 
doctrinal, historical, and contemporary sources to develop a comprehensive picture of 
                                                 
20 “Phase Zero” is a non-doctrinal term advanced by Colonel Brian S. Petit in Going Big By Getting 
Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero.  The term defines, “both 
the actions taken and the environment involved in maintaining US access and influence through foreign 
engagements with means and methods below the threshold of war.” (p. 53) 
 8
capacity building writ-large as a tool of U.S. national security, and how SOF fits into the 
picture. This analysis will identify key trends and components of capacity building as 
they pertain to USSOF, and provide a roadmap for a more comprehensive approach to its 
application. This work will be primarily directed at the operational level, but any 
discussion of capacity building would be incomplete without also mentioning certain 
policy and tactical level aspects of the topic. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research will seek to answer the question: how does USSOF build partner 
capacity?  In support of that question, three additional supporting research questions are: 
1. What is building partner capacity, and how is it intended to achieve U.S. 
national security objectives?   
2. What are the guiding principles and governing factors of capacity 
building? 
3. How does USSOF fit into the larger U.S. BPC context, and what 
differentiates USSOF BPC efforts from other Department of Defense 
efforts to build partner capacity? 
E. APPROACH 
USSOF BPC will be explored through an examination of existing national 
strategic guidance and doctrine, historical and contemporary literature, and through the 
analysis of two case studies.   The examination will begin by establishing what exactly 
BPC is and how it fits into the larger national security framework. The intent is to 
provide meaning, context and identify the principles of U.S. BPC and the factors that 
influence these efforts. The focus will then turn to USSOF’s role in capacity building. 
This examination will include USSOF’s history with capacity building, and the unique 
skills, qualities, and tools that inform USSOF’s approach to BPC. Analysis of the two 
USSOF capacity building case studies of will illuminate how these factors coalesce to 
create a partnership environment, and how USSOF operates within these environments to 
actually build partner capacity.     
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F. AUDIENCE 
This work was written with several audiences in mind. First and foremost, this 
thesis was written for planners and principals at the Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOC), particularly those that have just transitioned from the tactical to the 
operational level. The TSOCs are the action arms of USSCOCOM, and are truly where 
the rubber meets the road when it comes to initiating, synchronizing, and sustaining 
USSOF capacity-building efforts. To that end, if such an endeavor is to be successful, it 
has to be successful there first. The BPC planning model presented at the end of this 
document is specifically intended to assist TSOC planners in identifying the most suitbale 
partners, approaches, and methods to best apply the TSOC’s limited capacity building 
resources.   
This work is also intended for international SOF partners. As our world grows 
smaller, our national interests more closely aligned, and common threats more widely 
dispersed, we will all find ourselves working together to solve increasingly complicated 
and urgent challenges. These challenges are, and will continue to be, too large and too 
costly for anyone one nation to adequately address alone. We are each other’s best 
options. This thesis identifies that frank and candid discussion and communication 
between partners increases the effectiveness of a partnership. Transparency and 
understanding decreases frustration and distrust—the cancers of partnership—while 
simultaneously increasing potential and efficiency. To that end, this thesis is intended as 
a step towards a more open and frank discussion. The rules and policies that govern U.S. 
military partnerships and capacity building are complex and confusing, but they are, 
nevertheless, the rules the U.S. military and USSOF are required to abide. Identifying and 
recognizing these factors, both on the part of USSOF and our partners, will go a long way 
to better understanding each other, where we are coming from, and how we can best 
achieve our common goals. 
Finally, this work may be of use to those interested in wading through the 
muddied waters of U.S. BPC efforts. Given the vast literature, disparate components, and 
somewhat intangible nature of BPC, developing a comprehensive understanding of what 
BPC is and how it works. This thesis was also written with these readers in mind, and in a 
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manner that attempts to provide a comprehensive, yet still navigable, picture of capacity 
building and its components as they apply to U.S. national security.   This research may 
also be of interest to those seeking to gain a better understanding of the unique challenges 
that beset USSOF in capacity building endeavors and how they go about handling them. 
G. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Building partner capacity is a complete government approach employed by the 
United States to achieve national security objectives. At the macro level of policy and 
strategy BPC is a concept; it refers to and describes the act of helping others—partners—
to get better at something. Who the partners are, and what they are getting better at vary 
greatly, but they are all linked by the common theme of using one partner’s strengths to 
compensate for the other’s weakness in an effort to achieve a mutual security benefit. 
BPC requires a complete government approach because the challenge that contemporary 
threats pose requires solutions that are beyond the ability of any one U.S. agency or 
department.   
While a neat and tidy concept at the macro level, BPC is anything but neat and 
tidy at the micro level. The military does not build partner capacity as a singular act; it 
actually builds partner capacity through various disaggregated operational tasks, 
programs, and activities. The military carries these tasks out under various national 
authorities and with the approval of various, and often numerous, decision makers. As a 
result military capacity-building efforts are complicated to resource, plan, and execute.   
Further complicating matters is the nature of a partnerships itself. An international 
partnership is dynamic. Primarily, the partner states’ national interests drive these 
partnerships, but they are greatly influenced by world events and other phenomena that 
may cause those interests to change instantly, and without warning. The aggregate of 
factors and conditions that influence the partnership comprise the partnership 
environment. Ultimately, any BPC endeavor is bound by the limits of the partnership 
environment.  
USSOF has built partner capacity since the inception of its oldest formations, and 
capacity building remains an integral component of the majority of USSOF’s core 
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activities today. USSOF’s unique capabilities allow them to employ specialized tactics 
and techniques to achieve their capacity building ends. Additionally, USSOF’s nimble 
force structure allows them to create a noticeable degree of resiliency to better operate in 
the fluid and unpredictable partnership environment. Collectively, these factors allow 
USSOF to achieve capacity building success in situations where conventional DOD 
formations cannot; making USSOF the United States’ capacity building force of choice.   
To overcome the points of friction induced by legal and programmatic hurdles, 
the dynamics of the partnership environment, and the challenges imposed by the long 
time horizons of BPC, USSOF requires the use of an entire enterprise to build partner 
capacity. The SOF BPC Enterprise is a system of actors, activities, and programs that 
capitalizes on the unique techniques and procedures of USSOF to achieve BPC objectives 
under conditions that conventional BPC efforts would find untenable. The enterprise 
serves to provide the continuous synchronization vertically from the policy level to the 
tactical level, and horizontally with the partner nation necessary to ensure the right skills 
and equipment arrive in the right place at the right time for the duration necessary to 
build the requisite capacity. 
Despite SOF’s inherent, almost subconscious, ability to build partner capacity at 
the tactical and personal level, there are significant institutional shortfalls with regards to 
SOF BPC. These theoretical, doctrinal, and educational gaps pertain to the dynamics of 
partnerships and capacity building at the operational, strategic, and policy levels. This 
lack of common understanding has left TSOCs reliant on creativity and adaptable actors 
to find capacity-building solutions on the fly. It has also left USSOF and USSOCOM 
flatfooted when it comes to articulating, justifying, and resourcing their BPC efforts and 
approach. As the demands on TSOCs increase and available resources decrease, 
developing a coherent understanding of how capacity is built, and imparting their 
formations with that understanding will become of increasing importance in order to best 
meet the security requirements of the nation.    
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The subsequent chapters are organized as follows:  
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 Chapter II presents a comprehensive picture of U.S. capacity building and 
the factors that influence the Department of Defense’s efforts to build 
capacity. This chapter examines the dynamics of international 
partnerships, defines BPC as a term, reviews the lexicon of terms 
associated with capacity building, and introduces the concept of the BPC 
enterprise.   
 Chapter III is focused solely on USSOF and its relationship to BPC. An 
overview of USSOF’s capacity building history is provided before 
identifying where capacity building can be found in present-day USSOF 
core activities and operational approaches. This chapter also offers some 
of the most common authorities and resources USSOF applies in support 
of capacity building, and introduces the chain of actors that bring USSOF 
BPC enterprises to life.   
 Chapter IV presents two case studies of SOCSOUTH’s BPC efforts in 
Colombia and Paraguay from 2001 through 2010.   
 Chapter V analyzes these two cases studies to identify key factors and 
trends about USSOF BPC enterprises and USSOF’s operational 
approaches to BPC.   
 Finally, Chapter VI concludes the work by presenting findings, to include 
seven principles of capacity building that are requisite components of any 
successful capacity-building endeavor. This chapter also presents an 
adaptive planning model for designing BPC enterprises, identifies the 
implication of these findings, and offers recommendations and potential 
areas for further research.    
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II. BACKGROUND: U.S. CAPACITY BUILDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2010 National Security Strategy clearly states the reason and purpose the 
United States builds partner capacity: 
Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs 
and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, 
the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American 
people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying 
political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization 
and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to 
manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing 
common challenges.21 
The document, however, offers little guidance or explanation as to how the United 
States goes about building partner capacity or the dynamics at play; this chapter is 
dedicated to exploring just that topic. 
The United States’ capacity-building efforts could easily be characterized as 
nebulous, unwieldy, and largely un- or under-defined—and often are by policymakers 
and even by some in the military.22  Without question these efforts are confusing, 
complicated, and complex in nature, but it must also be understood that they are also 
directly reflective of the confusing, complicated, and complex security challenges facing 
the United States today. Deeper analysis of how and why the United States employs 
capacity building as a means of achieving security objectives provides some 
understanding why the United States’ BPC is so intricate.   
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the nature and key components of U.S. 
capacity building with a particular focus on the Department of Defense. This examination 
will begin with an exploration of international partnerships as they pertain to the military 
                                                 
21 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (2010) 26. 
22 Dale, In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security; Sharon, Pickup, 
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Command and 
Service Efforts. (GAO-12–556) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590768.pdf.  
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before turning to an analysis of BPC as both a concept and as a term, in addition to a 
review of key terms that are relevant to capacity building. The chapter will conclude by 
defining the concept of a BPC enterprise. 
B. SECTION I—PARTNERSHIPS 
Partnerships are tricky. They are intangible, constantly evolving, and dangerously 
susceptible to any number of internal and external factors. At the international level 
tensions can escalate quickly as issues regarding national sovereignty, national pride, and 
domestic political approval tend to raise the stakes for the heads of state and their 
subordinates charged with managing these relationships. The focus of this section is on 
how these tensions manifest themselves and impact military partnerships, ultimately 
bounding any capacity-building effort.  
1. National Interests 
In 1948, then-Chief of Staff of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, delivered a 
lecture to the Army War College on the “Problems of Combined Command.”  The first 
“problem” the former Supreme Allied Commander chose to address was the fact that 
there is “no charter that can be written for an allied commander and made to stick. As 
long as nations are sovereign they always have the right to reverse a prior decision, get 
out of any situation they think they can when they can cut their losses.”23  This clearly 
presents a significant challenge to anyone charged with working in or with a military 
partnership, but clearly, given the outcome of World War II, Eisenhower figured 
something out. So the question then becomes, what drives a partner nation to implore 
their sovereign right to change course, and what is there to do about it?  
The answer to the first part of that question is national interests. Joseph Nye, the 
noted scholar of international relations, has referred to national interests as “a slippery 
                                                 
23  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Problems of Combined Command” (lecture, National War College, 
Washington, DC, June 18, 1948), 5. 
 15
concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy.”24  Sometimes referred to as 
raison d’état, national interests represent what national leaders put forward as being in 
the state’s best interests.25  “In a democracy,” noted Nye, “the national interest is simply 
the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than 
strategic interests, though they are part of it.”26  As the “fundamental building blocks in 
any discussion of foreign policy,” national interests play a critical role in understanding 
how international partnerships form and function.27   
States form partnerships for different reasons and in the pursuit of different 
interests. Ultimately, argues Larry M. Wortzel of The Heritage Foundation, “We form 
partnerships to combine our strength with the strength of like-minded nations in the 
preservation and advancement of core values.”28  By matching strengths with like-
minded partners, states gain the advantage of numbers and size; increasing their potential 
for success beyond what they would have been able to accomplish alone.  
There are also different types of partnerships; for example, the United States 
pursues relationships to further security, economic, and diplomatic interests.29  This does 
not imply, however, that all of these interests reside in the same partner. Take for 
example England, Wortzel observes the United States “may have no closer ally than 
England in political and security relationships, but when it comes to agricultural policy or 
arms sales, there may be stiff competition between the two nations over economic 
issues.”30  Likewise, security and diplomacy competitors may make for good bedfellows 
                                                 
24 Joseph S. Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 22, 
doi:10.2307/20049361. 
25  Kevin Dooley, Why Politics Matters: An Introduction to Political Science (Stamford, CT: Cengage 
Learning, 2014), 288. 
26 Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” 23. 
27 The Commission on America’s National Interests, America’s National Interests (Cambridge, MA, 
July 2000), 13. 
28 Larry M. Wortzel, “Change Partners: Who Are America’s Military and Economic Allies in the 21st 





in other areas. China, for example, is clearly a security competitor and often at odds 
diplomatically with the United States. Yet China was the United States’ number two 
trading partner in 2013 indicating the strong economic interests the two states share.31   
As these examples suggest, the alignment of national interests along one line of 
national power may inhibit the alignment of interests along another. It is a rare 
occurrence, if ever, that states’ national interests along any line would overlap one 
hundred percent. As a result, friction is going to occur. But as historian Forrest Pogue 
notes, this type of friction is okay, reminding readers, “It is important to remember that 
different nations, although Allies, have divergent interests, and that they are not being 
unfriendly if they pursue those interest.”32  Pogue’s statement indicates that these points 
of friction between partners are just hurdles that need to be overcome in order to attain 
the true pay-off potential of the partnership. 
2. “The Sweet Spot” 
The Security Force Assistance Handbook uses the illustration in Figure 1 to depict 
the area where two partners’ security interests overlap. It is within this area of overlap 
that partners work best; this area is sometimes referred to as “the sweet spot.”33  With the 
emergence and growth of NATO and the increasing overlap of the national interests of 
states around the world, the number of members in coalitions has grown significantly 
since Eisenhower’s time.  
                                                 
31  U. S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Top Trading Partners-November 2013.” Foreign Trade, accessed 
August 13, 2014, http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/statistics/highlights/top/top1311yr.html. 
32  Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command: The European Theater of Operations; United States 
Army in World War II. (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 
Army, 1954), xii. 
33 Ed McFarland, “Security Cooperation Planning: Are You a Planner?,” DISAM Online Journal and 




Figure 1.  Aligning Common Interests34  
Since the end of the Cold War, multinational operations have gradually become 
the norm over bilateral and unilateral operations. For example, the multinational 
headquarters in Iraq and Afghanistan saw troops from 37 and 48 countries respectively, 
each one with their own national interests and reasons for being there.35  Collectively 
these interests dictate how much risk the nations, and their troops on the ground, are 
willing to assume. This issue inherently increases the tensions of military leaders caught 
between the mission at hand and the politics at play. As Figure 2 suggests, as the number 
of stakeholders increase, the size of the “sweet spot” tends to decrease, as divergent 
interest, however slight, decrease the common ground between partners. As the coalition 
becomes larger it is also increasingly more difficult to attain the level of political unity 
necessary for effective military cooperation.   
                                                 
34 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Security Force Assistance Handbook 
(Washington, DC: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2012.), II-2, 
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil. 
35 Stephen A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 2011), 1, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/059/59–3-
1/CMH_59–3-1.pdf; “Troop Numbers and Contributions,” International Security Assistance Force 




Figure 2.  National Interests of ISAF-A Partners36 
3. The Dynamics of National Interests 
National interests are influenced by an innumerable list of tangible and intangible 
factors—even the weather. For example, as Scott Borgerson observes, “Global warming 
has given birth to a new scramble for territory and resources among the five Arctic 
powers.”37  The Arctic was not really on the American security agenda during the 1990s 
and certainly not after 9/11, but this change in climate prompted the White House to 
publish a National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013, and a subsequent 
implementation plan for that strategy in January 2014.   
These observations indicate that national interests are dynamic, not static. They 
are constantly in motion influenced heavily by world events and natural phenomena. 
Therefore, as these interests shift over time, facts change and occasionally may cause a 
partner to “reverse a prior decision” as Eisenhower observed. As a result, the “sweet 
spot” of national interest is actually a moving target. As far as the military planner is 
                                                 
36 Note: this is a random sampling of the 37 members of ISAF-Afghanistan and the relation of national 
interests depicted here are purely notional for illustrative purposes. 
37 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global 
Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 63. 
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concerned these factors greatly increase the complexity of long-range planning and 
resource forecasting for military partnerships. 
The dynamism of national interests can wreak havoc on military planning. For 
example, the United States planned on basing 62,000 troops in Turkey as a temporary 
staging base for the ground invasion of northern Iraq in March 2003.38  However, after 
war plans were already drawn, and just days before the invasion, the government of 
Turkey changed its mind. As a result the northern invasion of Iraq was scrapped, setting-
off a subsequent chain of events both militarily and politically. There are several reasons 
why Turkey reversed their decision, all of which Turkey assessed as being better options 
than allowing the United States—a partner and fellow member of NATO—to stage part 
of their attack from Turkish soil.39   For planners and commanders, however, the reason 
why Turkey changed its mind was a moot point. The only thing that mattered at that point 
was that the truth had changed; what was a yes yesterday, had become a no overnight, 
and now it was on them to come up with a new plan. The level of flux induced by the 
legitimate right of a state to change its mind is a constant source of frustration—a 
frustration that must be overcome. Because it is on these shifting sands that all military 
partnerships must build their foundations. 
4. Politics: Always in Play 
Any student of conflict is familiar with Carl von Clausewitz’s axiom that war is 
“the continuation of policy by other means,” but applying this notion to military 
partnerships goes a long way to understanding how and why these partnerships function 
the way they do.40  “We see, therefore,” Clausewitz said, “that war is not merely an act of 
policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on 
with other means.”41   It is essential to understand that as a military activity conducted 
                                                 
38 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: U.S.-Turkey Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2003, 
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-us-turkey-relations/p7795. 
39 Ibid. 
40  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 87. 
41 Ibid. 
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across the range of military operations, BPC abides by the same aphorism. Therefore, it 
follows that partnerships required by the military to fight wars or build capacity are 
subject to politics and policy. This point is implied in a number of DOD publications, 
such as this excerpt from the Security Force Assistance Handbook, which informs 
readers: “Planners must remember that the decisive effect of security force activities is 
political and linked to U.S. national security objectives.”42   
Ultimately, all military actions are subordinate to political decisions. As 
Clausewitz instructs his readers “war should never be thought of as something 
autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war 
would contradict us.”43 As a result, military partnerships are bound by the political 
relationship that joins the two nations. It follows, therefore, that a military relationship 
may fall short of, but cannot exceed the level of cooperation reached at the political level.  
As noted above, states form partnerships along various lines of national power in 
order to achieve diplomatic, economic, and security objectives; cumulatively the overall 
product of these efforts result in political cooperation. Expressed as a function, this 
relationship can be understood as follows: 
஼ܲ ൌ 	ܦܥ ൅ܯ஼ ൅ ܧ஼ ൅ ܺ஼ 
where the overall level of political cooperation is expressed as ஼ܲ. 	ܦ஼,ܯ஼, 	ܧ஼, which 
represents the levels of diplomatic, military and economic cooperation, respectively, and 
ܺ஼ serves as a catch-all, for the sake of this argument, to represent the various other types 
of cooperation that states pursue.   
This expression denotes that military cooperation may be equal to, but never 
exceed the level of political cooperation, because ܯ஼	cannot be greater than ஼ܲ. It also 
indicates the stronger the political relationship, the greater potential for the military 
relationship. Equally, it holds that the lower the political relationship, the lesser the 
potential for the military relationship.   
                                                 
42  Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Security Force Assistance Handbook, II-6. 
43 Clausewitz, On War, 88. 
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As a result, it is true that a positive military relationship can serve as a catalyst to 
increase the overall level of political cooperation between two states, but it is equally true 
that it can serve as a detractor to political cooperation. Such an occurrence would impinge 
on the levels of cooperation along diplomatic (ܦ஼), economic (ܧ஼) and other lines of 
cooperation (ܺ஼). This is a point that the U.S. Department of State is very sensitive to, as 
will be addressed in the following section, and causes some of the friction between the 
Departments of State and Defense over cooperative military efforts such as BPC. 
C. SECTION II—BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 
1. A Whole-of-Government Approach 
Although this work focuses on SOF capacity building, it is important to note that 
BPC is not singularly a DOD task. It is a “whole of government approach and a central 
tenet of national policy and strategic guidance.”44 To that end, the United States 
Government primarily leverages the Department of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to promote and protect U.S. interests abroad and 
to build partner capacity.45  It is important to note DOD has clearly staked its claim as the 
U.S. lead on BPC. In 2008, Secretary Gates stated to Congress, “In my view, building 
partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement, irrespective of the capacity of 
other departments, and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that 
reality.”46   
Despite DOD’s clear claim on BPC, Gates recognized that BPC efforts “must be 
implemented in close coordination and partnership with the Department of State.”  
Although this statement is in line with the whole-of-government approach, it is 
particularly true because “most [threats] will emerge from within countries with which 
we are not at war;” in other words, in environments where the State Department will be 
the lead agency for day-to-day activities and operations in a particular country—not the 
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Department of Defense.47  This reality presents its own set of challenges for the military 
and USSOF that will be addressed later.  
For now, recognizing that BPC is a complete government approach is sufficient to 
highlight that DOD’s efforts are only a part of a much larger endeavor by the United 
States. This broad approach allows the United States to address a wider range of 
interconnected challenges, but it is not without its tradeoffs. The broad approach requires 
the coordination of various U.S. BPC efforts in time and space, a task that requires 
constant attention. It also creates confusion for policymakers and planners, as all agencies 
involved are using similar, but different terminology to describe their BPC efforts, often 
within the same country. As the following section will highlight, the DOD has enough 
trouble keeping its own BPC terms straight. Moving forward this work will focus solely 
on DOD BPC efforts, terminology, and approaches.   
2. DOD’s Definition of Building Partner Capacity 
In its simplest form, former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated in 2010 
that building partner capacity means “helping other countries defend themselves or, if 
necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or 
other forms of security assistance.”48  Although the premise is simple enough, 
government authorities, appropriations, and politics all play a part in accomplishing this 
seemingly simply notion. This point lends validity to the adage “words matter.”  This 
section will focus on analyzing those words, how they came to be, and what they mean.   
BPC is a neither a doctrinal term nor a task within the military. Although military 
leaders regularly refer to BPC as a goal, a mission, and a task it is not officially codified 
in U.S. military canon.49  The Department of Defense first printed a definition for 
Building Partnership Capacity in the 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap Building 
Partnership Capacity. The document states building partnership capacity consists of 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” 
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 2. 
49  Charles W. Hooper, “Going Farther by Going Together: Building Partner Capacity in Africa” Joint 
Forces Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2012): 8–9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-67.pdf. 
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“targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the 
Department of Defense and its partners.”50   
The same document defines a DOD partner as “all those with whom it cooperates 
to achieve the national goals.”51  This is an extremely broad definition that incorporates a 
large number of actors. The list of partners the publication offered included other U.S. 
departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, allies, coalition 
members, host nations, and other nations, international and non-governmental 
organizations, and even the private sector.52  Equally broad, capacity is defined in a 
separate publication as “the measurement of an organization to employ a capability.”53  A 
capability is defined as “the ability to execute a specified course of action.”54 These 
broad definitions illustrate the large nature of the enterprise at the macro level, but are so 
broad that they offer poor resolution and little detail at the micro level; detail and 
resolution that are important to tactical and operational level planners and commanders.  
DOD has narrowed its definition of BPC over time. It also dropped the –ship and 
began using the term partner instead. In 2011, the DOD published the Security Force 
Assistance Lexicon Framework in an effort to clarify some of the confusion surrounding 
its BPC efforts and its supporting terminology.55  Based on the guidance and direction 
given in that document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Center for International Security 
Force Assistance (JCISFA) published the Security Force Assistance Handbook the 
following year in 2012. This publication dedicates an entire chapter to “Building Partner 
Capacity”56 and offers the following definition of BPC:   
                                                 
50  Department of Defense, QDR Execution Roadmap Building Partnership Capacity. (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, May 22, 2006), 4. 
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54 Ibid. 
55 Pickup, Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant 
Command and Service Efforts, 7. 
56 Note this term reads “Building Partner Capacity,” not “Building Partnership Capacity” as 
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Assisting domestic and/or foreign partners and institutions with the 
development of their capabilities and capacities—for mutual benefit—to 
address U.S. national or shared global security interests. Also called BPC. 
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, Joint 
Capability Areas). An outcome of SFA57 activities, it is the development 
of capabilities and capacities among foreign partners for the mutual 
benefit of the partner and U.S. national or shared global security interests. 
(Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)58 
This definition focuses DOD efforts more tightly than the 2006 definition, but it still 
indicates that BPC can be used to aid both domestic and foreign partners. Another aspect 
of this definition that stands out is the fact there are two different definitions taken from 
two different sources that are combined to comprise this single glossary entry. This 
difference may indicate an ongoing debate within the Pentagon about what the definition 
or purpose of BPC should be. While the validity of that observation remains unclear, the 
split definition is certainly reflective of the dual nature of capacity building—the fact that 
it is simultaneously used as both a noun and a verb.   
As strange as it may seem, the English language is partly to blame for the dual 
usage that afflicts BPC. Building partner capacity as a singular term is a gerund—a verb 
that turns into a noun by adding an -ing.59  A gerund “has the function of a substantive 
and at the same time shows the verbal features of tense, voice, and capacity to take 
adverbial qualifiers and to govern objects.”60  Gerunds are rooted in Latin, and are fairly 
common in English. For example, one could say, “We are building a new Empire State 
Building.”  Likewise, one can say, “The United States is building partner capacity in 
Uganda as part of its larger Building Partner Capacity efforts in Africa.”   
The first definition taken from the policy memorandum describes BPC as an 
activity or process—a verb, with a lower case b, p, and c—that can be directed internally 
or externally to the United States. Whereas the definition taken from the Security Force 
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Assistance Lexicon Framework clearly states that BPC is an outcome of Security Force 
Assistance—a noun, with a capital B, P, and C—that can only be directed at foreign 
partners. This in part explains what it is so difficult to neatly categorize BPC. The term 
BPC simultaneously encapsulates the act of assisting partners, both domestic and 
international, and the outcome of a military task. It seems grammar is also lending to the 
confusion and in part explains how the terms BPC and partnership have “spread like 
wildfire through official U.S. national security guidance documents and rhetoric.”61  
These attributes make BPC the perfect and handy catchall term. 
3. DOD’s Approach to BPC 
To address the broad nature and requirements of capacity building, the DOD has 
taken an equally broad approach. A 2013 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report found that DOD’s efforts intended to build the capacity of foreign partners include 
“military-to-military training, military exercises in cooperation with partner nations, 
knowledge sharing from subject matter experts, visits between senior military leaders, 
providing military equipment and supplies, and counter-narcotics activities.”62   A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report found that what the military considers a 
partnership or a partnership activity is equally expansive. These activities have included 
schooling foreign military officers at U.S. military schools; sending U.S. military officers 
for foreign military schools; working toward major platform interoperability with 
equipment such as the F-16; training security forces to participate in multilateral 
operations, and efforts to enhance governance, the rule of law, and development at the 
provincial and district level as is the case in Afghanistan.63  Such a broad categorization 
of what constitutes a partnership further explains how the term has significantly increased 
in usage.   
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4. DOD’s BPC Objective 
Although defining exactly what building partner capacity is and what is required 
to accomplish it is a difficult task, the desired end state is fairly clear. Functionally, the 
DOD BPC efforts pursue one of two objectives: to “help our allies and partners to 
confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their borders;” 
or to “assist [a host nation] defend against external threats or help contribute to 
multinational operations; and help develop or reform another country’s security forces or 
supporting institutions.”64  The objective of the United States’ capacity building approach 
is to “stop festering problems and threats” at the local level before they grow into 
regional and global crises. Ultimately, these efforts are intended to address these issues 
early and indirectly in order to prevent “U.S. military intervention at substantial financial, 
political, and human cost.”65 
5. History to Date 
Although many contemporary American military professionals view capacity 
building as a one-way street—efforts managed and provided by the United States to 
someone else—it is important to remember that the United States has been the recipient 
of such efforts in the past, and may be again in the future.66 It is often forgotten that, 
while the United States was able to bring its economic and industrial capacity to bear to 
provide Great Britain with much needed capabilities in the form of ships, vehicles and 
armaments through the Lend Lease Act during World War II, the British were able to 
provide much needed assistance to help enhance the capacity of the operationally 
inexperienced American forces.   Specifically, the British provided operationally 
seasoned trainers from the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to help establish the 
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training program for the original classes of the U.S. Office of Strategic Service (OSS), 
the precursor organization to the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special 
Forces.67 
Following World War II, the United States employed a strategy of containment 
against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This strategy saw the dispatch of 
“conventional and special operating force advisors to assist Greece, Korea, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, and other partner nations to improve security forces” 
in an effort to counter Soviet supported insurgencies seeking to destabilize the 
governments of these countries.68  Following the Cold War these efforts continued with 
similar capacity-building efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, and the Philippines.69  
Despite the number of capacity building examples, this assistance generally ran quietly in 
the background of other DOD efforts garnering little public attention. 
a. A Shift over Time 
What is new with regard to BPC is the breadth and nature of the security 
problems facing the United States. Concerns over global and regional problems are 
surpassing those of conflict with single actors inside of defined borders; although recent 
challenges by Russia to the status quo in Europe serve as a vivid reminder that rebuffing 
state sponsored challenges are still critical. Concurrently, the threat has changed; today 
the United States is presented with an increasing number of asymmetric threats nested in 
the challenging gray area of conflict known as irregular warfare.70  During testimony to 
Congress, then-Secretary of Defense Gates observed that in the years to come “America 
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will be grappling with a range of challenges to the international system and our own 
security from global terrorism to ethnic conflicts to rogue nations and rising powers.”71   
Under the old defense construct based on the idea of state on state, high-intensity 
conflict, capacity building was as straightforward as the tasks the military was asked—
and constructed—to conduct. For example, “U.S. strategy during the Cold War called for 
working with formal allies, through combined planning and the development of 
interoperable capabilities, in order to deter and if necessary defeat a Soviet threat.”72 
Today, however, capacity building has become as complicated and complex as the nature 
of the problems themselves. These threats include terrorism, nuclear weapons 
proliferation, and drug and human trafficking just to name a few. As Gates remarked 
most of today’s emerging threats “cannot be overcome by military means alone and they 
extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or 
department.”73  They are complicated; countering instability requires the ability to 
promote the rule of law, supporting good governance, and training and employing local 
law enforcement. These tasks are far removed from defeating the Soviets on the fields of 
Europe; unfortunately most of the mechanisms that enable U.S. capacity-building efforts 
have not kept pace with current events. 
b. The Impact of Iraq and Afghanistan 
After a decade of sustained operations globally, the military has made it clear that 
it needs to evolve in order to address the security concerns of the future.74  In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the military established entire commands dedicated to facilitate that 
capacity building of host nation security forces.75  In his 2012 Capstone Concept for the 
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Joint Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, recognized that it 
will take more than structural and organizational change to succeed in these complicated 
capacity building endeavors. He observed that these challenges will require a 
fundamental change in how the Joint Force thinks and operates. Such a fundamental shift, 
he stated, “must pervade the force and drive leader development, organizational design 
and inform material acquisitions.”76  General Dempsey’s observations are reflective of 
how deeply different the tasks the military is expected to accomplish today and will be in 
the future from what they were expected to due in the past.  
Equally clear is the need to advance the mechanisms necessary to build capacity 
in this new security environment. To meet these challenges, colossal efforts were made 
from the tactical level to the policy level to modify what existed in military doctrine and 
authorities to address immediate problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.77 They 
were also made to address long term capacity building shortfalls and institutional 
incorporation of these tasks within the military.78  As the military gets more efficient 
operating in this evolving security environment, it is fair to assume that its ability to build 
capacity in these areas will also improve. However, the military’s ability to carry out 
these tasks is only part of the equation; the military cannot act without the authority or 
appropriations to do so. Many of the laws and authorities that govern such activities are 
outdated, and have proven slow to change. 
c. BPC Policy: Slow to Change 
As then-Secretary Gates testified to Congress, despite the need for change at the 
policy-level “the U.S. Government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and 
pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of a 
Second World War.”79  To further his point, Gates later noted, “the last major legislation 
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structuring how Washington dispenses foreign assistance was signed by President John F. 
Kennedy, and the law governing U.S. exports of military equipment was passed in 
1976.”80  On top of the complicated and thorny nature of stability and capacity building 
operations in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas around the world, these 
outdated authorities have resulted in additional, self-inflicted, points of friction that have 
to be overcome.  
For all of the challenges and setbacks, there have been some successes the most 
noteworthy being the establishment of Section 1206, the so called “Global Train and 
Equip Program” of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2005. 
Successfully lobbied under Gates’ tenure as the Secretary of Defense, Section 1206 
“provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military 
forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and 
foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations.”81  The passage of this act, 
initially as a temporary provision, marks a major shift away from the old way of doing 
business at the policy level. As reported by the Congressional Research Service, “For 
nearly 50 years, since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended 
(FAA82), the Secretary of State has exercised the leadership role for foreign assistance, 
including military assistance, specifically military education and training.”83  Section 
1206 enables the Secretary of Defense “a means to fill long-standing gaps in the effort to 
help other nations build and sustain capable military forces.”84  
Global Train and Equip authorities authorize the Department of Defense to 
“organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise foreign security forces and their 
                                                 
80 Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” 4. 
81 Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RS22855) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2014), i. 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf. 
82 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
83 Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, 2. 
84 Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 6. 
 31
supporting institutions from the tactical to the ministerial level.”85  These tasks are 
referred to as OTERA and they are at the very heart of how the DOD actually builds 
capacity on the ground. As Gates informed Congress in 2008, this authority “allows 
Defense and State to act in months rather than in years. The program focuses on places 
where we are not at war, but where there are both emerging threats and opportunities.”86  
Just shy of a decade old, this authority has expanded incrementally over time and resulted 
in substantial security engagements not previously seen before the 2006 NDAA was 
passed. From 2006 through 2014, “Section 1206 funding supported bilateral programs in 
over 40 countries, several multilateral programs, and an associated global human rights 
program.”87  The preponderance of 1206 resources went solely to counterterrorism 
during the early years, but since 2010 there has been an increase in training and 
equipping forces, namely from Central and Eastern Europe, to deploy to Afghanistan in 
support of the International Security Assistance Force.88 There has also been a sharp 
increase in funding and resources to support capacity building in Africa.89  In total, there 
are currently 18 Building Partner Capacity Programs90 funded by the NDAA and the 
Department of State/Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act 
(S/FOAA). A list of the programs and their purposes can be found in the Appendix. 
                                                 
85 Pickup, Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant 
Command and Service Efforts, 9. 
86 Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 6. 
87 Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, 6. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs refer to SC [Security Cooperation] and SA [Security 
Assistance] activities funded with U.S. Government (USG) appropriations and administered as cases within 
the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] infrastructure. When executing BPC programs authorized by law, DoD 
may enter into agreements for provision of defense articles and/or services to other USG departments and 
agencies under the authority of the Economy Act or other transfer authorities for the purpose of: a. Building 
the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism, 
counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations; or b. Supporting U.S. military and stability operations, 
multilateral peace operations, and other programs.  See SAMM, Chapter 15, Building Partner Capacity 
Programs, for a detailed discussion of BPC programs. (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 
Financial Management Regulation Volume 15: “Security Cooperation Policy.” DoD Regulation. Financial 
Management Regulation. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2013.) 
 32
Despite the advances there is still work to be done, as Gates reflected towards the 
end of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, “for all the improvements of recent years, the 
United States’ interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements 
constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in 
resources, and unwieldy processes.”91   To date, building partner capacity remains a key 
tenant of the U.S. national security strategy, and one of the three pillars of national 
defense as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.92  It also remains a 
challenging endeavor, with broad objectives arrayed against diverse threats. 
6. Key Components and Terminology  
There are several key components and terms that both drive and limit U.S. BPC 
efforts. The terms themselves have caused a tremendous amount of confusion. In 2012, 
the Government Accountability Office found that the U.S. military Global Combatant 
Commands “continue to lack a common understanding of the term [Security Force 
Assistance] and therefore some were unclear as to what additional actions were needed to 
meet DOD’s intent.”93 Agencies within the DOD themselves admitted that the terms 
were not only confusing, but also commonly misused within the department perpetuating 
further confusion and operational inefficiency.94 
Although challenging, understanding these terms and how they relate to one 
another is essential in understanding U.S. BPC efforts and how and why they function the 
way they do. This chapter has already addressed several of these key terms to include 
BPC itself, partner, capacity, and capability, but this section will turn to a new set of 
terms. The terms are organized in groups based on the first letter of the terms, because 
these words tend to be the closest in relation to each other and are also the most 
commonly misused in common usage.     
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a. The “A” Words: Authorities, Approvals, and Appropriations 
These terms are used often within the USSOF operational community.  
Unfortunately, however, a sufficient degree of understanding of these terms, and how 
they relate to each is not always realized at the tactical level and among those who have 
recently transitioned from the tactical level to the operational level.95  This section is 
intended to provide a working understanding of these terms, particularly to those who are 
preparing to, or have recently transitioned into an operational level position. 
(1) Authorities 
Authorities delegate legal authority to entities within the United States Government 
to carry out certain activities; these powers ultimately originate from the U.S. Constitution. 
As a term, authority is “commonly used by government lawyers and military personnel to 
describe statutory and delegated powers.”96  As stated frankly by Colonel Brian Petit, 
“Authorities determine whether one has the statutory or delegated authority to conduct the 
activity in question.”97  For example, the U.S. Constitution vests the president with authority 
as the Commander in Chief to “direct military operations and intelligence activities against 
external threats.”98  National level authorities are codified in the U.S. Code (U.S.C.)—the  
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aggregate of the general and permanent laws of the United States. The U.S.C. is divided into 
50 general subject areas99 referred to as “titles.”100   
The two titles that most directly impact BPC are Title 10 and Title 22. Title 10, 
Armed Forces, established the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and “assigned the 
Secretary of Defense all ‘authority, direction and control’ over DOD, including all 
subordinate agencies and commands.”101  Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 
directly refers to all matters pertaining to U.S. foreign relations, to include security 
assistance as prescribed by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976.102   
As mentioned previously, authorities can be statutory, or they can be delegated 
from a higher authority. For example the “President, in his role as Commander in Chief, 
may delegate through the Secretary of Defense additional responsibilities or “authorities” 
to USSOCOM, just as the Secretary of Defense may delegate certain statutory authorities 
vested in him to USSOCOM.”103  Authorities, legally permitting, can potentially be 
further subdivided, delegated, and controlled by policy directives and other means by the 
entities in which the authority is vested.104  This point indicates that authorities for 
different activities and programs can reside at different levels within an organization. 
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This factor makes it incumbent on planners and commanders to know where these 
authorities reside when seeking authorization or approval to conduct an activity. 
(2) Approvals 
Just because an entity has the authority to conduct an activity does not implicitly 
mean it has approval to conduct that activity. With regards to the military, Petit states, 
“‘approval’ connotes concurrence of said activity from the requisite military or civilian 
leaders overseeing military activities.”105  Elements within the military need approval of 
higher headquarters to conduct activities, programs, or missions prior to conducting them. 
With regard to military internal decisions and activities, such as training, doctrine, etc., 
the approval authority for those actions will reside at some level within the military. In 
times of war, the Department of Defense is also the lead agency within the particular 
theater of conflict. However, short of war, diplomacy, not military action, “is the lead 
discipline for the attainment of U.S. foreign policy interests.”106  Statutorily, the 
Department of State is the lead agency for all foreign affairs, and as such “coordinates, 
represents, and implements U.S. foreign policy,” abroad.107   Within each country the 
chief of mission, typically the ambassador, is the approval authority for any U.S. activity 
that will take place in that country.108  Through the whole of the U.S. embassy country 
team, the Department of State oversees and approves all “commercial, resource, and 
financial issues; defense issues; agricultural matters; legal and immigration matters; and, 
developmental and humanitarian aid matters.”109  
Ultimately, short of war, the Department of State is the approval authority for all 
military activities within any given country. This often requires seeking approval at both 
the country team level and also from the larger regional desks at the State Department 
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proper in Washington, DC.110   However, prior to seeking the State Department’s 
approval the military unit or command in question needs to secure approval to conduct 
the desired mission or activity from its own chain of command. How high the approval 
has to go will be determined where the authority to make that decision resides.  
(3) Appropriations 
The third component of BPC that needs to be attained is funding. An entity may 
have the authority and approval to conduct an activity, but they are moot points in the 
absence of the appropriations from Congress to pay for it. There are two key bills passed 
annually with regards to defense appropriations: the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act (DODAA), and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 
The appropriations bill provides defense funding, whereas the NDAA sets policies and 
informs Congress how exactly the money will be spent.111  It was through the 2006 
NDAA that the Department of Defense secured appropriations for the Section 1206 
“Global Train and Equip Programs” mentioned previously. Likewise, the Department of 
State has to manage its appropriations and authorizations through Congress. The State 
Department’s equivalent of the NDAA is the Department of State/Foreign Operations, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S/FOAA).112  Appropriations from this act 
fund Title 22 Security Assistance programs and activities.  
Appropriations are the manifestation of Congress’ “power of the purse”—the 
vested authority to tax and spend money on behalf of the federal government.113  As one 
article addressing the 2015 NDAA stated, the NDAA “remains key congressional 
legislation through which Members of Congress can influence U.S. defense and foreign 
policy. Congressional oversight is an essential element of the constitutional responsibility 
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to provide for the common defense.”114  The ability to appropriate funds is often 
considered the most significant check and balance vested in the Congress, and another 
substantial gate that must be crossed in U.S. BPC efforts. 
In his commencement address at the United States Military Academy in May 
2014, President Obama stated that he called “on Congress to support a new 
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund of up to $5 billion, which will allow us to train, build 
capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines.”115  The President asserted 
that these resources would provide the flexibility necessary to more efficiently 
accomplish the breadth of capacity building tasks facing the United States, such as 
“training security forces in Yemen… supporting a multinational force to keep the peace 
in Somalia; working with European allies to train a functioning security force and border 
patrol in Libya; and facilitating French operations in Mali.”116  Such a move is in-line 
with what Gates had called for years earlier with regard to streamlining the “hodgepodge 
of jury-rigged arrangements” that currently exist. Such a fund is also clearly in-line with 
the National Security Strategy and all of the policy and strategic guidance that cascade 
from it. However, calls for programs and nested guidance mean little in the absence of 
the appropriations from Congress to fund them. It is at exactly this point where the 
American system of checks and balances very directly impacts the United States ability 
to build partner capacity. 
It is important to note that there are some programs and activities conducted 
within Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) areas of responsibility (AORs)117 that 
are not explicitly appropriated by Congress. Such activities are generally carried under 
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117 GCC AORs represent the entirety of the Earth’s surface area divided into six Combatant 
Commands.  GCC commanders are ultimately responsible for all DOD operations within those areas.  
These divisions and the duties and responsibilities of the GCC are outlined in the Unified Command Plan.  
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authorities that are “less directive, giving the COCOM [Combatant Commander] or 
service the flexibility to design programs under broad authority that permits engagement 
with foreign partners.”118  These particular programs are “typically the result of 
commanders’ projects that leverage existing authorities to work with partner nations 
(PNs). Such non-programmed programs are usually implemented through an ad hoc 
collection of funding sources (for example, operations and maintenance budgets).”119  
These points indicate that there are multiple levels of ad hoc solutions. At the 
tactical and operational level, these types of solutions can produce rapid results compared 
to the alternative of seeking programmed programs through the NDAA. However, they 
make it challenging at the strategic and policy level when trying to capture, standardize, 
and synchronize these efforts.120  
b. The “S” Words: Security Assistance, Security Cooperation, and Security 
Force Assistance 
These terms focus on activities, programs, and tasks carried out by the DOD and 
DOS that serve as the ways and means through which the Department of Defense enables 
and conducts capacity building. All three of these terms begin with the word security; in 
addition to sounding very similar they are often used incorrectly and interchangeably. 
The first two terms, Security Assistance and Security Cooperation, are the two sets of 
activities and programs that promote security relationships between foreign governments 
and the United States. Activities are defined as the “methods used by a particular program 
that are directed, funded, or supervised by program managers, such as training courses, 
workshops, exercises, and transfers of equipment or supplies to PNs.”121  Programs are 
understood as a “set of activities coordinated to achieve a certain set of objectives. 
Programs have the following defining characteristics, at a minimum: specific objectives 
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or purposes; activities; authorities; funding sources and other resources.”122  Combined, 
they represent tools of both foreign policy and national defense. The third term, Security 
Force Assistance (SFA), is a military task that “equates to those activities (organize, train, 
equip, rebuild/build and advise –OTERA) that support the development of [Foreign 
Security Force] capability and capacity.”123    
(1) Security Assistance 
As defined in the 2014 JP 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Security Assistance is used to refer to a group of programs “by 
which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-
related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and 
objectives.”124  These programs are authorized under FAA and AECA, and codified in 
Title 22 U.S.C.125 Security Assistance is only one subset of foreign assistance 
administered by the Department of State. ForeignAssistance.gov organizes DOS foreign 
assistance into five broad categories as depicted in Figure 3. Although, the Department of 
State categorizes how they administer foreign aid a little differently, these categories 
serve the function of more clearly illustrating where Security Assistance resides in the 
larger DOS foreign assistance picture. 
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Figure 3.  U.S. Foreign Aid and the Major Security Assistance Programs 
through Fiscal Year 2014126 
Of the 15 major SA programs, five are administered by the Department of 
Defense through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). They are:  
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS);  
 Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP);  
 International Military Education and Training (IMET)127;  
                                                 
126 “Frequently Asked Questions” ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed September 8, 2014. 
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 Lease of Defense Articles;  
 Excess Defense Articles (EDA).   
Although DOD administers these programs on the behalf of DOS, the DOS 
remains the ultimate approval authority. These programs are commonly referred in the 
DOD as Title 22 Programs, and constitute part of the Department of Defense’s Security 
Cooperation activities. This relationship is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  The Relationship between Security Assistance and Security 
Cooperation128  
                                                 
128 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “Security Cooperation Programs Through 
Fiscal Year 2014”; Doug Jordan, “Funding Authorities and Security Cooperation” (video teleconference, 
Monterey, California, September 4, 2014). 
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(2) Security Cooperation 
Security Cooperation is another umbrella term that encompasses all “activities 
undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the 
United States to achieve strategic objectives.”129  The DOD carries out the majority of 
these activities under its own Title 10 authorities; however, the five Title 22 programs 
depicted above are also critical components of DOD’s Security Cooperation efforts. As 
an umbrella term, the number and types of activities categorized under security 
cooperation are large and broad. These activities include:  
All DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, 
including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build 
defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security 
interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and 
security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military 
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operation; and provide U.S. 
Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.130 
The amalgamation of activities and programs that comprise SC are the means through 
which the Geographic Combatant Commander can shape and influence their AORs.131  
These tools allow the GCC to employ military forces and material to support and advance 
the other instruments of national power.132  The collective of programs and activities that 
comprise SC are depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  The Collective of Programs and Activities that Comprise Security 
Cooperation133  
 It is important to note that SA and SC are not solely purposed to build partner 
capacity. As stated above, some of these programs are designed to provide U.S. access to 
host nations; others merely provide a capability to a partner nation such as the Excess 
Defense Articles (EDA) and Global Lift and Sustain programs.134  At their core, SA and 
SC are tools to apply the elements of national power to achieve U.S. national interests.   
 
                                                 
133 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “Security Cooperation Programs Through 
Fiscal Year 2014”; Doug Jordan, “Funding Authorities and Security Cooperation” (video teleconference, 
Monterey, California, September 4, 2014). 
134 Excess Defense Articles (EDA): 22 U.S.C. § 2321j.  Purpose: to offer, at reduced or no cost, lethal 
and non-lethal defense articles declared as excess by the military departments to foreign governments or 
international organizations in support of U. S. national security and foreign policy objectives.   
Global Lift and Sustain: 10 U.S.C. § 127d.  Purpose:  (a) To provide LSSS, including air-lift and sea-
lift, to partner nation forces worldwide in support of the combined operations world-wide (defined below) 
with U.S. armed forces. (b) To provide LSSS to allied forces solely for enhancing interoperability of 
logistics support systems of those military forces participating in combined operations with the U.S. 
Logistical supplies, support and services may also be provided to nonmilitary logistics, security, or similar 
agency of an allied government if such provision would benefit the U.S. Armed Forces. 
 44
(3) Security Force Assistance 
 SFA is the newest of the three terms and came into being at the height of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a recent Rand report observed, SFA emerged “out of the 
morass of military assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan,” recognizing that, “those 
charged with conducting such activities no doubt saw the need to account for the fact that 
the U.S. military in these countries was ‘building the capacity’ of not just military forces 
but also national police and other nonmilitary security forces.”135   
How SFA came into being is a prime example of operational needs and tactical 
solutions post-9/11 developing faster than policy and doctrine could keep pace. As the 
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance bluntly stated, “in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the U.S. military found itself doing something where it had no existing terms 
that described what they were doing or doctrine on how to do it.”136  The lack of doctrine 
problem still exists. Although the term SFA has been in use since at least 2006 when 
JCISFA was established and three years after the Security Force Assistance Lexicon 
Framework was published in 2011, there is still no joint publication137 that governs 
SFA.138 
There are several key differences that separate SFA from SA and SC. First, SFA 
is specifically and solely directed at building the capacity and capability of foreign 
security forces and the institutions that support and enable them. The pre-doctrinal SFA 
publication, JDN 1–13 refers to SFA as “the set of Department of Defense (DOD) 
activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to 
support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and 
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supporting institutions.”139  As discussed above, SA and SC can be wielded to build 
capacity and capability within a host nation, but they also serve other functions that have 
little or nothing to do with capacity building.   
SFA efforts revolve around OTERA tasks—organizing, training, equipping, 
rebuilding/building, and advising FSFs.140  These tasks serve as the engine that drives the 
SFA activities conducted by U.S. forces “with, through, and by the FSF to improve their 
capacity and capabilities.”141  In many ways, SFA serves as the connection that links the 
programs and activities authorized under SA and SC to the end user—the recipient FSF. 
Another significant difference is that SA and SC are umbrella terms used to 
categorize a set of programs and activities; whereas SFA is actually a military task, “a 
clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization 
that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority.”142  With regard to 
building a partner’s capacity, SA and SC are a set of tools that can be applied, but SFA 
represents the coherent application of those tools—among other tools, resources, and 
forces—specifically to the end of capacity building. In other words, SA and SC programs 
and activities represent potential energy to build capacity—tools at rest.   Conversely, 
SFA is representative of the transfer of that potential energy into kinetic activity—the 
application of the potential energy resident in those tools in a logical and synchronized 
manner to build partner capacity “on the ground.” 
A third difference is that historically SA and SC have been oriented at military-to-
military efforts. The nature of the post-9/11 challenges have made it clear to the United 
States and its partners that the military will be required to work with and enhance the 
capacity of non-military organizations and elements. SFA broadens the types of partners 
the U.S. military can work with. JDN 1–13 defines foreign security forces (FSF) as: 
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All organizations and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a 
mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as 
external threats. Elements of FSF normally include full-time, reserve, or 
auxiliary military forces, police, corrections personnel, border guards (to 
include the Coast Guard) or other similar capabilities.143 
 SFA does not just stop at building the capacity at the unit level; building an 
exceptional capacity at the tactical level is a futile effort if the capacities to manage, 
apply, and sustain that force are absent at the institutional level. To that end, SFA also 
incorporates working with “institutions that support FSF [which] include government 
ministries or departments, academies, training centers, logistics centers, and other similar 
activities from the local through national levels.”144  Working with these elements is 
critical as “they provide the supporting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy for the FSF.”145  
The final aspect of SFA that is important to highlight is that it also includes 
training and preparing foreign military forces to “defend against external threats or help 
contribute to multinational operations; and help develop or reform another country’s 
security forces or supporting institutions.”146  In this regard, SFA goes beyond the 
auspices of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability 
operations all three of which are oriented at maintaining stability and governance within a 
host nation’s borders.147  This aspect of SFA provides the military with the doctrinal 
grounding to build capacity intended for application beyond the host nation’s borders.  
(4) Common to All  
The previous section focused primarily on the differences between SA, SC, and 
SFA, but there are two important common traits among all three that need to be 
                                                 






mentioned. First, these terms are best understood as relational not hierarchical.148 This 
section only introduced the three major “S” words that relate to DOD capacity building, 
but there are other terms that will be introduced later, such as Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) that highlight the relational nature between the 
aggregate of these terms. This point also goes a long way to understanding why elements 
within the Department of Defense have had such a difficult time comprehending how all 
of these pieces fit together, as the tendency is to want to nest these terms neatly.149 
Figure 6 depicts the relational nature between the “S” Words. As a starting point, 
SA, SC, and SFA are all different forms of U.S. Foreign Assistance. Outlined the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, foreign assistance is described on 
ForeignAssistnace.gov as: 
The unilateral transfers of U.S. resources (funds, goods, and services) by 
the U.S. Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities (including 
international and regional organizations) without any reciprocal payment 
or transfer of resources from the foreign entities. Foreign assistance is not 
just confined to funds or commodities, it also includes the provision of 
technical assistance, capacity building, training, education, and other 
services, as well as the direct costs required to implement foreign 
assistance.150 
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Figure 6.  The Relationships between the “S” Words151  
A component of Foreign Assistance is Peace and Security Assistance.152  It is 
within this category that SA, SC and SFA reside.   Security Assistance currently includes 
fifteen programs and activities authorized under Title 22. Some of these activities are 
executed solely by the Department of State, but five of them are administered by the 
Department of Defense and comprise part of the DOD’s Security Cooperation. Security 
Cooperation “includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security 
establishments, including all DOD-administered security,” therefore the entirety of 
Security Force Assistance, since SFA inherently requires DOD interaction with FSF, 
resides within Security Cooperation.153  
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The second commonality between the three “S” Words is that they can be 
conducted across the range of military operations; making them threat/challenge 
independent as they can occur anywhere along the continuum of conflict, from peace to 
war.154  Other military tasks such as COIN and FID employ aspects and elements of SA, 
SC, and SFA, but COIN and FID can only be conducted under very specific 
circumstances. For example, COIN can only be conducted if there is an insurgency to 
counter, whereas SFA can be conducted in the absence or presence of an insurgency.155  
Similarly, FID can only be conducted to counter internal threats to a host nation, whereas 
SFA can be employed to train host nation security forces to conduct operations beyond 
their own borders.156 
D. THE CAPACITY-BUILDING ENTERPRISE 
All too often capacity building is portrayed and referred to at the macro-level as a 
singular task. This misrepresentation leads only to an increased misunderstanding on the 
part of policymakers, planners, and tactical level units. The reality of the matter is DOD 
requires the employment of an entire enterprise to build a partner’s capacity. To further 
complicate things the nature, form, and function of that enterprise is entirely dependent 
upon the partner, the capacity being built, the force doing the building, and the political 
dynamics involved. 
As the preceding pages have shown, achieving BPC objectives requires 
assembling and managing a system of authorities, approvals, funding, activities, 
programs, and people to get the necessary skills and equipment in the right place at the 
right time, and to sustain the undertaking until the desired objective is achieved. It also 
requires balancing the programmatic nature of a bureaucratic government with the 
unpredictability of an international partnership. The sentiment expressed by former 
Secretary Gates brings attention to how complicated and frustrating these tasks can be. 
This chapter has also illustrated the BPC enterprise requires action and coordination 
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vertically from the policy-level down to the tactical level and horizontally with the 
partner nation. Recognizing that a single BPC endeavor requires an entire system of 
disparate yet interdependent sub-systems and components—an enterprise—goes a long 
way to understanding “the nature of the beast,” reducing frustrations, and increasing the 
overall efficiency of the undertaking. 
E. SUMMARY  
Very simply, building partner capacity is a whole-of-government approach that 
refers to any activity to enhance a partner’s ability to provide security within or outside of 
their borders. To be blunt, there has to be some sort of mutual security benefit for the 
United States to partake in such an activity. Ultimately these efforts are intended to 
prevent or minimize U.S. military intervention and the associated costs by deterring or 
degrading threats to stability at a local level before they “fester” into regional and global 
problems. Although U.S. BPC requires a whole-of-government approach, the Department 
of Defense has clearly made the argument that it should be the lead agency for BPC 
within the United States Government.   
The term BPC is a new buzzword born out of the security challenges post-9/11, 
but the idea of strengthening your partners is logical, rational, and timeless.   The 
problem however, is that every BPC endeavor is different, and they all present unique 
challenges are requirements that often require new, adaptive solutions. There are three 
major factors that contribute to the uniqueness of any capacity building endeavor: the 
nature of international partnerships, they nature of the capacity being built, the ability of 
the authorities, policies, and laws to keep pace with capacity building emerging 
requirements.    
First, governments form partnerships for different reasons and to achieve different 
ends. Ultimately, the purpose of these partnerships is to achieve political results, results 
that are in line with a state’s national interests.   National interests are dynamic, not static. 
They are in constant motion, affected by domestic politics, international events, 
geopolitics, social and environmental changes, religious ideologies and cultural 
identities—and any other number of factors. Because a nation is sovereign, as 
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Eisenhower observed, it has the right to change course and reserve decisions as it sees fit 
in order to best act within its constantly evolving national interests. This is the volatile 
and unpredictable storm that the military planner and leader must weather in order to 
keep a military partnership afloat.  
Second, BPC endeavors usually require different capacities to be built, and not all 
capacities are equal. With regard to DOD capacity building, there appears to be a one-to-
one relationship between the how well the military is prepared to meet a given security 
challenge and how well it is able to build capacity to counter that challenge. During the 
Cold War, the military was designed to counter the conventional threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and during that period building partner capacity was rather straightforward. 
Today, U.S. BPC efforts are difficult to understand in part because of the wide array of 
threats facing the United States and its interests.   These are threats that the military is, as 
was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, learning how to deal with while on the job and 
literally “fighting through it.”157  
Third, law, policies, and strategies govern any and all military activities, and they 
are slow to change. This chapter has highlighted several instances where policies have yet 
to be developed and doctrine yet to be written. All the while commanders and planners 
continue to meet challenges head-on on a daily basis. A decade of developing 
workarounds to solve these immediate problems has created a self-reinforcing cycle of ad 
hoc solutions that further perpetuates confusion and inhibits streamlining the DOD’s 
overall approach to BPC. In short, BPC efforts since 9/11 could very accurately be 
likened to building a plane in flight. 
Confusing legal authorities and a mindboggling list of terms that undergirds the 
entire system further complicates BPC efforts in the United States. To understand the 
legal restraints that govern U.S. BPC efforts, one must keep in mind that the ultimate goal 
of these laws and authorities is not to make BPC more efficient—although that is 
certainly an intended outcome, it is most definitely a secondary one. These laws, 
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particularly the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act, are ultimately 
intended to protect the United States and the ideals upheld in the Constitution.   Change, 
as former Secretary Gates called for time and again, is possible, but slow and will remain 
that way for the foreseeable future. The quagmire of terminology is reflective of the first 
two problems. A number of these terms, like Security Assistance and Security 
Cooperation, were designed for a different time and a different threat. However, like the 
laws that ushered them in, these terms are so engrained that they are not going anywhere 
forcing new terms to grow out of and somehow relate to them. Many of these new terms 
emerged out of the height of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan where solutions were 
needed immediately; they sparked quickly and “spread like wildfire” before documents 
could be published to standardize them—furthering the plane in flight dilemma.158   
For these reasons, building partner capacity requires an entire enterprise of 
people, systems, authorities, resources, and skillsets—an enterprise that not only includes 
the American side of a BPC endeavor, but the partner nation’s side as well. 
Understanding BPC as an enterprise aids in accounting for the numerous joints and points 
of friction that exists in such an endeavor, and also helps to illuminate stakeholders and 
areas where external influences can have significant impacts on the entire undertaking. 
The following chapter will examine SOF’s history and role in capacity building, as well 
as investigate what makes the SOF BPC Enterprise unique. 
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III. THE SOF BPC ENTERPRISE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As Admiral McRaven, the former commander of U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) testified to Congress, “SOF focuses intently on building partner 
capacity and security force assistance so that local and regional threats do not become 
global and thus more costly—both in blood and treasure.”159  USSOF has a storied 
history of capacity building. SOF’s unique capabilities, missions, and operators not only 
make them the United States’ capacity-building force of choice, but also facilitate the 
creation of unique and dense BPC enterprises. This chapter is dedicated to examining 
SOF’s relationship with capacity building, the nature of the SOF BPC enterprise, and the 
actors and tools SOF employs to achieve their capacity building objectives. The focus 
will now shift from DOD BPC efforts writ-large to the peculiarities of SOF capacity 
building and the uniqueness of the SOF BPC Enterprise. 
B. SOF AND BPC: A DENSE HISTORY 
United States special operations forces have a long history with capacity building. 
The largest and oldest formation of SOF in the USSOCOM arsenal is U.S. Army Special 
Forces.160  The Green Berets, as Special Forces soldiers are commonly called, were born 
out of the remnants of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the 1st Special Service 
Force following World War II.161 Established in 1952, the Green Berets were created 
specifically to conduct unconventional and partisan warfare.162  As JP 3–05 Special 
Operations states, “UW [Unconventional Warfare] consists of operations and activities 
that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
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overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”163  At the core of this 
mission is the requirement to build the capacity of partners—in this case resistance 
members and insurgents. As early as the mid-1950s, USSOF operators found themselves 
in Korea training partisans during the Korean War, and in Germany preparing to conduct 
similar sabotage and subversion missions with resistance movements behind Soviet lines 
should the USSR advance on Western Europe.164  
While Green Berets continued to prepare for unconventional warfare in Europe, 
some were diverted to a growing conflict in Southeast Asia. Special Forces first put boots 
on the ground in Vietnam in 1957. Their initial mission: train the men that would serve as 
the nucleus of the first Vietnamese Special Forces units—a BPC mission in the truest 
sense.165  By the war’s end, Special Forces’ mission grew in size and scope. Increasing 
the number of Green Berets on the ground to four battalions worth, a total strength just 
shy of 1300 personnel, training and equipping local village defense and strike forces to 
turn back the tide of Communist advances in the highlands and rural lowlands of South 
Vietnam.166 
After Vietnam, SOF found plenty of work building capacity elsewhere around the 
globe. Notable examples include El Salvador in the 1980s167 where a group of 55 
advisors partnered very successfully with the El Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF) 
during nation’s struggle with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). 
This undertaking not only increased ESAF’s operational capacity in counterinsurgency, 
but it also included a concerted effort to professionalize the El Salvadorian military, 
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which was subject to “repeated accusations of human rights abuses throughout the 
1980s.”168   
The effort to professionalize the ESAF, indirectly, yet very purposefully, achieved 
significant results that were not directly in support of the military training objective, but 
absolutely essential to the overall capacity building enterprise in El Salvador. 
Counterinsurgency is population-centric; while the tactical capacity building objective 
was to increase ESAF capacity as a counterinsurgency force, that effort would have been 
pointless without garnering the support of the El Salvadorian people.169  Additionally, 
had human rights accusations continued it is entirely possible that the United States may 
have found itself, from a partnership perspective, in an compromising position given the 
political risk of been seen as sponsor of human rights violations.    
The El Salvador example highlights the multiple requirements that a BPC 
enterprise has to achieve in support of its primary objective. Although headed up 
primarily by U.S. Army Special Forces “there were also trainers for intelligence, ground, 
naval, and air operations, logistics, civil affairs, civil defense and psychological 
operations (PSYOP),” in order to meet the multiple requirements necessary to 
professionalize and enhance the ESAF to achieve their objectives.170  With regards to the 
professionalization component of the operation, PSYOP and civil affairs elements were 
critical to the BPC Enterprise as they worked to change the perception of ESAF in the 
minds of the El Salvadorian population.171  Ultimately assisting in garnering increased 
support for the ESAF from El Salvadorian population and the international community as 
well—indirectly increasing the ESAF’s and the government’s capacity to operate and 
bring the FMLN to the peace table in 1992.172  These observations indicate that building 
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partner capacity requires tactical, operational, and strategic capacity building objectives 
to work in harmony for the enterprise to be successful; this often requires a number of 
different USSOF components and activities.  
USSOF BPC efforts continued during the 1990s, but they were reflective of the 
turbulent nature of global instability and a transforming American foreign policy in the 
wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.   During this period “operations other than war 
became then norm.”173  Although, as Susan L. Marquis observes, in Unconventional 
Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, there was turmoil at the policy and 
strategy level as to how SOF should be employed in the new post-Cold War era of 
peacetime engagement.174  As a result, SOF found itself growing—sometimes falling 
into—new and expanded operational roles.  
As world dynamics changed in the 1990s, so too did the types and nature of 
capacity building that SOF was called on to perform.  The flexibility and ingenuity of 
USSOF formations allowed them “to respond in ways that conventional forces cannot 
because of their size, doctrine, and political implications,” and as a result USSOF found 
itself filling capacity building gaps in a wide array of scenarios.175  For example, within 
hours of the conclusion of hostilities during Operation Just Cause in Panama, Civil 
Affairs teams were training “a new police force and a reconstituted military.”176  Other 
examples of capacity building missions during this period included training and 
equipping CT security forces in the Republic of Georgia in 1993; establishing a long-
standing training program for game wardens in East Africa to protect from poachers; and 
Army Special Forces assisting in the creation of a military policing force to enforce a 
truce sanctions between Ecuador and Peru in 1996.177 The 1990s also provided an 
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opportunity for USSOF to demonstrate its ability as a coalition warfare enabler, training 
just shy of “30,000 coalition troops in 44 subject areas,” and reconstituting “a number of 
Kuwaiti military forces, both conventional and unconventional,” during Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm.”178  This brief list of examples illustrates the breadth and global 
scope of these various USSOF capacity building missions, and how USSOF managed to 
transform and keep pace with strategic needs, even in the absence of “a coherent post-
cold war policy for low-intensity conflict and peacetime engagement.”179 
After 9/11 the focus for USSOF and its capacity-building efforts shifted again, 
this time to countering terrorism, violent extremism, and towards maintaining stability in 
un- or under-governed spaces around the world.180 These efforts were, and are still, most 
visibly seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, but these efforts also include USSOF capacity 
building in Colombia, the Philippines, Africa, and the Middle East.181  They also include 
building capacity with partners that share similar security interests with the United States, 
and are willing to deploy beyond their borders, like several NATO SOF partners in 
Eastern Europe.182   
This brief synopsis has shown that USSOF capacity-building efforts over the 
years have grown and evolved along with the missions that USSOF elements have been 
handed. Although the locales and missions have changed over the past seventy years, 
building partner capacity has remained a constant, integral component of special 
operations. The following section will examine the core activities of USSOF as joint 
doctrine prescribes them today, and the approaches USSOF uses to achieve their diverse 
portfolio of objectives.  
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C. SOF MISSIONS WITH BPC COMPONENTS 
JP 3–05 Special Operations states that USSOF conducts twelve core activities; 
these activities are the aggregate of all activities conducted by joint USSOF, not of just 
any one particular Service or formation.183   These activities are:  
1. Direct action (DA),  
2. Special reconnaissance (SR),  
3. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD),  
4. Counterterrorism (CT),  
5. Unconventional warfare (UW),  
6. Foreign internal defense (FID),  
7. Security force assistance (SFA),  
8. Hostage rescue and recovery,  
9. Counterinsurgency (COIN),  
10. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA),  
11. Military information support operations (MISO),  
12. Civil affairs operations (CAO).184   
The descriptions of these twelve core activities in JP 3–05 indicate that eight of 
them—CWMD, CT, UW, FID, SFA, COIN, MISO, and CAO—all have inherent BPC 
requirements or directly enable BPC efforts.185  Additionally, it is important to note that 
although conventional military forces can also be tasked with the same missions, like FID 
or COIN, joint doctrine states that USSOF conducts all of these activities with 
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“specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in unique conditions and to different 
standards, but in a manner that complements CF186 capabilities.”187      
Although it is helpful that doctrine offers this list of missions, the list alone is 
insufficient to explain the true nature and methodology of special operations with regard 
to building partner capacity. As noted USSOF chronicler Linda Robinson observes, 
doctrine’s list of core USSOF activities includes “disparate and overlapping elements,” 
which make it difficult to clearly articulate what USSOF actually does.188   In a special 
report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Robinson went on to call this lack 
of articulation a “conceptual shortfall” of USSOF that has, at least in part, kept them 
limited primarily to tactical and episodic uses.189 
In an effort to better explain itself, USSOCOM has taken to describing what it 
does in terms of a direct approach and an indirect approach. According to former 
USSOCOM commander Admiral William H. McRaven, the direct approach is 
“characterized by technologically enabled small-unit precision lethality, focused 
intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitally networked 
battlefield.”190  These direct actions are most easily characterized as similar to the raid 
that killed Osama bin Laden. Whereas, explains McRaven, the indirect approach 
includes “empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to 
humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations. These long-term efforts increase 
partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs, 
and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.”191  
McRaven identifies the long-term, far less kinetic, indirect approach as USSOCOM’s 
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decisive effort, while the headline-grabbing direct approach is actually the supporting 
effort, which “only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader 
governmental elements to take effect.”192  
To provide some additional clarification that the broad terms direct and indirect 
approach leave wanting, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
began using the terms surgical strike and special warfare.193  In 2013, USASOC 
published ARSOF 2022 its campaign plan for the coming decade, which is constructed 
around the surgical strike/special warfare model. Although an Army-specific model, the 
concepts are general enough to apply to all of USSOF. ARSOF 2022 defines surgical 
strike as “the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ SOF in hostile, 
denied or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or 
damage designated targets, or influence threats.”194  It also defines special warfare as 
the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-
lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have a 
deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-
unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to build and fight 
alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or 
hostile environment.195   
USASOC’s model is illustrated in Figure 7 below. It should be reiterated that this is an 
Army-specific model, and therefore does not capture all twelve of the joint SOF core 
activities.  
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Figure 7.   “Foundation Concepts for ARSOF 2022”196 
Although the direct/indirect, surgical strike/special warfare explanations have still 
received some criticism for not adequately articulating how exactly USSOF goes about 
achieving objectives using the special warfare approach; they do serve to illustrate how 
BPC tasks permeate the range of special operations.197  Additionally, as noted in the El 
Salvador case, the observation that BPC enterprises often require supporting efforts to 
ensure their lasting success is further illuminated here.  
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This section has indicated that BPC components pervade the majority of USSOF 
core activities. It has also emphasized that USSOF BPC enterprises rarely consist of a 
single USSOF core activity. Success in BPC enterprises often require additional 
supporting efforts when building partner capacity either to cull out the time and space for 
the BPC efforts to establish themselves, or to garner support for the capacity built in 
order to sustain it into the future. Another point that this section highlights is that USSOF 
conducts these tasks in different environments, using different tactics, and to different 
standards than conventional forces. The following sections will examine the tools and 
actors that USSOF employs in its BPC Enterprises. 
D. THE TOOLS OF SOF CAPACITY BUILDING 
Chapter II introduced the wide range of authorized programs and activities that 
enable DOD capacity building.   In addition to some “SOF peculiar” authorities and 
funding, USSOF has access to all the same programs and activities offered under the 
umbrellas of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance as any other DOD entity 
would. However, what distinguishes USSOF BPC enterprises from other DOD BPC 
enterprises are the nature and method in which USSOF puts these tools to use.    
The full list of programs and activities is far too expansive to be captured here. 
Therefore, this section will focus on the primary tools that SOF employs in capacity 
building enterprises. For ease of understanding, these tools will be divided and examined 
in two categories: activities and programs. 
1. Key SOF BPC Activities 
An activity is defined as “a function, mission, action, or collection of actions;” it 
is something USSOF elements actually do.198  There are four primary activities that 
USSOF conducts in support of capacity building missions. They are: Joint Combined 
Training Exercises, Combined Exercises, Operations, and Key Leader Engagements. 
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a. Joint Combined Training Exercises (JCET)  
The JCET has long been the workhorse of USSOF engagement. According joint 
doctrine, a JCET is “conducted overseas to fulfill United States forces training 
requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between United States 
forces and host nation counterparts.”199  As Petit describes, “JCETs are usually four to 
six weeks in duration with intimate tactical interactions between USSOF and host nation 
partners.”200  TSOCs have also repurposed other funds to conduct exchanges and 
exercise that look and feel identical to JCETs, but are called different names since they 
are funded and governed by different authorities. An example would be Special 
Operations Command Europe’s (SOCEUR) Partnership Development Program (PDP).201  
Dedicated to the same purposes of capacity building, these pseudo-JCETs increase the 
TSOCs tactical engagement bandwidth, and can be more easily programmed since they 
are resourced directly out of TSOC funding. 
JCETs are not without their limitations. First, they are holdovers from the Cold 
War era and their primary purpose remains the training of U.S. personnel—not building 
partner nation capacity.202  JCETs are bound to what is referred to in the SOF vernacular 
as the “51/49% Rule,” because, according to U.S. Code, USSOF are required to receive 
the majority, at least 51%, of the training benefit.203  Second, they take a long time to 
program, sometimes up to two years prior to execution, presenting yet another 
bureaucratic hurdle for planners that are trying to meet the dynamic needs of 
partnerships.204  Third, they are episodic and subject to “wide variations in host nation 
hosting units, regions, and desired capabilities.”205   
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Despite these limitations, JCETs retain value in the USSOF toolbox for the 
following reasons: they are established, both in U.S. Code and in the minds of 
policymakers, country teams, and USSOF operators; they provide excellent access, 
placement, and resources to engage with partners at an “intimate tactical” level; and they 
can be planned and programmed in a coordinated manner—transforming single episodic 
engagements into multiple persistent engagements.206  
b. Combined Exercises 
Combined Exercises are authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and provide a 
venue to “promote influence, readiness, and interoperability.”207  Every TSOC conducts 
at least one major combined exercise a year, in addition to a number of smaller exercises 
that vary by TSOC.208  SOCOM also hosts its own combined exercise named Emerald 
Warrior that provides “a unique opportunity for components of U.S. Special Operations 
Command, conventional, interagency, partner nation and non-governmental agencies to 
train in a joint, realistic environment.”209  This observation is characteristic of other 
major TSOC exercises.210  As a Canadian Special Operations officer who participated in 
Emerald Warrior noted, such exercises provide “an outstanding operational framework to 
train within a realistic coalition construct which deepens interoperability between SOF 
elements,” adding that, “the scale and scope of the exercise also allows us to leverage and 
work with assets not normally available to us at home.”211   
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Combined Exercises provide USSOF the conditions to focus very intensely on the 
capacity building objectives at hand. They also provide the opportunity to effectively 
replicate the environment of stress and friction that define real-world operational 
conditions. The scale and scope of these exercises also allows USSOF to engage larger 
formations, more partners, and execute more tasks than JCETs allow. However, these 
exercises are very costly in time and resources; months of preparation, staffing, and 
coordination result in events that normally only last one to two weeks. These factors 
serve to limit the duration and frequency of these events.     
c. Operations 
Operationalizing a partnership is another tool at USSOF’s disposal for use in a 
capacity building enterprise. Partnership operationalization refers to the transition of 
passive capacity-building efforts, such as JCETs or exercises, to active real-world 
operations such as combat advising or combined tactical operations.212   Because 
capacity building occurs across the range of military operations, the operationalization of 
a partnership can take several different forms. For example, JP 3–05 states, “when 
authorized, SOF may also support HN combat operations” while conducting a FID 
mission. Sometimes the operationalization of a partnership may occur outside of the 
partner nation’s borders. As noted in Chapter II, SFA has several purposes, one of which 
is to build capacity in partner security forces that can “help contribute to multinational 
operations” beyond their borders.213  SOCEUR used this approach quite effectively by 
deploying USSOF to Afghanistan with partner nation SOF formations from Eastern 
Europe and conducting combined missions together under combat conditions as part of 
their capacity building enterprise.214 
Whereas an exercise attempts to replicate real-world operational conditions, the 
operationalization of partnerships is the real deal. Additionally, the singular focus and 
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pressing nature of an operation distills a number of personal and administrative 
distractions allowing partners to hone-in on critical skills and tasks with a heightened 
sense of urgency and attention on the part of all participants involved. Additionally, if 
approved, such approaches often come with additional authorities and resources, all of 
which coalesce to achieve a greater capacity building potential in a shorter period of time. 
Major General Michael S. Repass, the former Commanding General of SOCEUR, refers 
to this time reducing phenomenon as “the rapid transformational effect of combat.”215   
Like any investment, high-payoff potential is accompanied with a greater degree 
of risk. The operationalization of a partnership increases the political risk of both partner 
nations, as they are knowingly placing their forces in harm’s way. As a result, as the 
SOCSOUTH case study will illuminate, this level of commitment usually requires a high 
level of confidence between the military forces and an equally high level of political 
cooperation between the two partner nations. 
d. Key Leader Engagements 
Key leader engagements, or KLEs as they are more commonly referred to, 
increased markedly in usage during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, in practice, this form of engagement precedes those two conflicts, 
is considered a form of Security Cooperation, and is another useful tool that USSOF 
employs in BPC enterprises. Simply put, a KLE is an engagement—a meeting—between 
two influential actors. KLEs provide a venue to communicate on a personal-level, face-
to-face. These types of engagements are more diplomatic in nature than the tactically or 
operationally oriented JCETs, exercises, or operations.   
In Iraq and Afghanistan KLEs gained notoriety primarily at the tactical level, 
where platoon leaders through brigade commanders would meet regularly with influential 
police chiefs and village or tribal elders.216  The same was true for USSOF tactical units 
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working throughout the two countries. Less observed by the majority of USSOF 
personnel who serve below the TSOC-level are the strategic level KLEs that occur 
globally on a near-daily basis.217  These high-level engagements occur between high-
ranking officers from the GCC and TSOCs with partner nation heads of state, ministers 
of defense, chiefs of defense, and U.S. ambassadors and their country teams throughout 
the commands’ respective areas of responsibilities.   
Extremely low in cost and short in duration, in comparison to JCETs and 
exercises, KLEs serve to further relationships, signal American commitment, expedite 
resolution on issues that might normally languish in the staffing process, and, as the 
SOCSOUTH case study will illustrate, sometimes provide the opportunity to seize 
incredible—and fleeting—opportunities. These interactions are generally closed-door 
events, and therefore do not receive a lot of visibility from those not in the room, 
however, the outcomes of these meetings can be felt by everyone involved in the 
enterprise. As one former TSOC operations officer remarked, “KLEs are huge, and have 
a tremendous impact” when it comes to capacity building.218  Although, KLEs do not 
directly build capacity themselves, they very much enable capacity building, and, as the 
following case studies will come to show, they have been used with great success by 
senior USSOF leaders. 
e. Single SOF Advisors 
Single SOF advisors are not “activities” per se, but they comprise a critical tool 
employed by SOF to enhance partnerships and build capacity. The most prominent 
example of a single SOF advisor is USSOCOM’s Special Operations Liaison Officer 
(SOLOs). SOLOs are career special operations officers who serve as “in-country SOF 
advisors to the U.S. country team.”219  They provide excellent vertical and horizontal 
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communication between the SOF elements and commands, the U.S. country teams, and 
the partner nation. They are assigned to live in their partner nation full-time, which 
allows them to not only to advise and assist the development of partner nation SOF, but 
by virtue of their persistent presence they serve as an on-the-ground synchronizer for all 
USSOF activities within that country. As of 2013, there were SOLOs in: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, United Kingdom, Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France, Turkey, Kenya and 
Italy.220  TSOCs have established their own similar programs in smaller scale and scope; 
SOCEUR is one example. The command established a SOF Representative (SOFREP) 
position in Romania to assist the TSOC’s capacity-building efforts in that country.221 
2. Key SOF BPC Programs 
The following programs highlight some of the major programs that SOF uses to 
either build capacity directly, enable it indirectly, or resource the SOF BPC enterprise 
with funding and authorities. These programs include both DOD Security Cooperation 
(USC Title 10) programs and DOS Security Assistance (USC Title 22) programs. Given 
the broad nature and multitude of these programs, this section looks at these programs 
thematically in four categories: education, equipment, funding, and Global Train and 
Equip.   
a. Education 
As mentioned earlier, special operations forces employ specialized tactics and 
techniques, under unique and dynamic conditions, in situations where doctrine and policy 
are struggling to keep pace. As a result, those serving in SOF require unique training and 
education. To that end, educating individual officers, and increasingly non-commissioned 
officers, in specific techniques, or introducing them to broader theories and concepts 
relevant to political-military warfare is a powerful tool in the SOF capacity building 
arsenal. As a recent article in Joint Forces Quarterly observes, “the education offered to 
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students at PME [Professional Military Education] schools aims to bolster the leadership 
and strategic thinking capabilities of future leaders of partner nations.”222   
The majority of these opportunities are fielded and funded through the Title 22 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and Title 10 programs 
such as the Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and the various DOD 
Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS), such as the George C. Marshall Center in 
Garmisch, Germany.223  These education opportunities provide several benefits to a 
USSOF BPC enterprise: they educate partner nation officers in special operations theory 
and concepts which have the potential to pay dividends for the rest of that officer’s 
career; they demonstrate commitment to the partner nation; and they allow USSOF 
officers to connect with partner nation officers in low-stress environments, allowing them 
to hone their own understanding of various partner nations points of view, approaches, 
and experiences.        
b. Equipment 
An increase in capacity often requires an increase in capability. Some of the 
Global Train and Equip programs, addressed below, offer other authorities and 
appropriations to equip partner nation forces, but generally speaking equipment is fielded 
through Title 22 programs administered on behalf of the State Department by the Defense 
Security Cooperation Office. These programs are Foreign Military Sales, Foreign 
Military Financing, Emergency Drawdown, Leases of Equipment, and the Excess 
Defense Article programs.224  These programs can be cumbersome to manage, as they 
require a fair amount of administrative work and long lead times.     
                                                 
222 Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert, “Low Cost, High Returns: Getting More from 
International Partnerships,” Joint Forces Quarterly 75, no. 4th Quarter (2014): 71. 
223 Jordan, “Funding Authorities and Security Cooperation.” 
224 Ibid. 
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c. Funding Programs 
As mentioned in Chapter II, funding is an essential component of any capacity-
building effort.225  There are usually several programs that are used to fund a single BPC 
enterprise. Common programs include, Developing Country Combined Exercise Program 
(DCCEP), which provides funds to defray the costs of certain expenses incurred by 
qualifying countries to enable them to participate in combined exercises.226   The 
Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) that is a fund held at the GCC level that 
can be used for various operational, training, and military-to-military activities.227  There 
are also several counter drug programs executed under various U.S.C. authorities. These 
programs “provide unreimbursed support to selected PNs [partner nations] to stop the 
flow of illegal drugs.”228  
d. Global Train and Equip 
The 1200 Series of authorities are commonly referred to as the Global Train and 
Equip Authorities. Chapter II has already addressed how and why these authorities came 
into being, but it is relevant to note that these authorities are still relatively new, and are 
being watched very closely by Members of Congress, which means they have not been 
institutionalized to the degree of JCETs or combined exercises and are susceptible to 
significant change in the near future.229  Generally, these authorities allow the 
Departments of State and Defense to build partner capacity for “time-sensitive, ‘new and 
                                                 
225 These programs are categorized as “funding programs” here solely because they serve as 
authorized “pots of money” that can be used to help fund other activities; they are not referred to as 
“funding programs” anywhere else in legislation, policy, or doctrine. 
226 Jordan, “Funding Authorities and Security Cooperation.” 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Nina M. Serafino, Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview (CRS Report 
No. R42641) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2014) 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf; Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background 
and Issues for Congress. 
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emerging’ counterterrorist operations or to participate in or support military and stability 
operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant.”230   
 Section 1206 “Train and Equip” – “provides the Secretary of Defense 
with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified 
purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign security 
forces for counterterrorism operations. Section 1206 authority now 
extends through FY2017.”231 
 Section 1207 “Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)” –  is a pilot 
program jointly administered by the Department of Defense and the State 
Department. The purpose of this fund is to “carry out security and 
counterterrorism training, and rule of law programs.”232 
 Section 1208 – “provides authority and funds for U.S. SOF to train and 
equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations. Section 1208 is considered a key tool in combating terrorism 
and is directly responsible for a number of highly successful counter-terror 
operations.”233 
 Section 1233 “Coalition Support Fund” – authorizes “the Secretary of 
Defense to reimburse coalition nations for support provided to U.S. 
military operations, and provide other specified support to these 
nations.”234  
Again, the programs and activities listed above are merely a sampling of the 
numerous programs and activities that support SOF BPC programs. Often these programs 
are blended together within a BPC enterprise in order to attain broader authorities or 
increased funding in order to more efficiently achieve the BPC objective. It is important 
to note that all of these programs have their own series of requirements, timelines, and 
approval processes, which presents challenges for those trying to synchronize them.  
                                                 
230 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Section 1206 Train and Equip,” accessed October 30, 
2014, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/section-1206-train-and-equip. 
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E. THE CHAIN OF ACTORS  
Thus far, this chapter has examined the missions and tools of SOF BPC, now the 
examination will turn to the actors that bring the enterprise to life.   
1. The Tyranny of Time 
As addressed above and in the previous chapter, BPC efforts are long-term 
endeavors. In careers that normally last around twenty years, these mission sets are 
generational problems that can far outlast the career of a single USSOF operator, and 
certainly that of any one commander, planner, or rotational unit. The challenge USSOF 
has to overcome is maintaining unity of effort and focus over these long durations while 
simultaneously continuing synchronization of all of the tools outlined in the previous 
section.   While examining how USSOF employs operational art in pre-crisis 
environments—increasingly referred to as Phase Zero,235 career Special Forces officer 
Colonel Brian S. Petit observes that USSOF has adapted to the challenge imposed by 
time by employing a chain of operational artists.  
2. The Arranging Chain 
Petit argues that USSOF has, in practice, modified the elements of operational 
design as outlined in joint doctrine, to better operate within the environments they 
normally find themselves in, and for the extended durations these missions often require. 
Petit argues that USSOF’s arranging chain “combines the creative application of 
arranging operations with the logic of supply chain management.”236  The supply chain is 
the chain of organizations required to get a product from its point of origin into the hands 
of the end user.237 As Robert Handfield, the executive director of The Supply Chain 
Resource Cooperative, explains supply chain management “represents a conscious effort 
                                                 
235 In the SOF vernacular, environments short of open conflict are commonly referred to as Phase 
Zero.  (See: Brian S. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special 
Operations in Phase Zero (S.l.: Outskirts Press, 2013)). 
236 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 161. 
237 Robert Handfield, “What Is Supply Chain Management?,” Supply Chain Resource Cooperative 
(SCRC), North Carolina State University, January 11, 2011, http://scm.ncsu.edu/scm-articles/article/what-
is-supply-chain-management. 
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by the supply chain firms to develop and run supply chains in the most effective [and] 
efficient ways possible,” continuing, “supply chain activities cover everything from 
product development, sourcing, production, and logistics, as well as the information 
systems needed to coordinate these activities.”238   
In the past, noted Handfield, “most organizations have only paid attention to what 
was happening within their ‘four walls.’”239 Few businesses understood, much less 
managed, the entire chain of activities that ultimately delivered products to the final 
customer.”240  To be successful, the organizations, or nodes, in the supply chain need to 
be linked together both physically, through the flow of goods; and immaterially, through 
the flow of ideas in order to coordinate, manage, and enhance the efficiency of the 
chain.241 This business management approach facilitates operational efficiency over large 
spans of time and space; exactly the requirement, Petit argues, SOF needs to meet in the 
Phase Zero environment, to include capacity building endeavors. 
Petit credits the arranging chain with allowing USSOF to synchronize its efforts 
over time and in various geographic areas “at multiple levels by small forward-stationed 
teams.”242  “Within these formations,” articulates Petit, “small units exercised a 
distribution (materiel) and influence (ideas) chain to purposefully connect tactical actions 
to strategic outcomes.”243  Petit’s arranging chain also accounts for USSOF’s ability to 
maintain unity of effort and synchronization over the long duration of undertakings such 
as BPC.  
3. The Actors 
Petit describes the arranging chain, depicted in Figure 8, as “a USSOF posture of 
connected, distributed, nodes that are hierarchical for control and resources, yet are 





242 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 161. 
243 Ibid., 161–162. 
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networked for ideas and opportunities.”244  Figure 8 contains a lot of information that 
warrants specific consideration:  
1. The illustration highlights the difference between joint doctrine’s 
inferences of where operational art is applied, and where it is applied in 
the Phase Zero Domain 
2. It also illustrates the expansion from a singular artist to the chain of 
artists. 
3. In the War Domain, this figure indicates that the design and 
implementation of an operational plan is not only centralized, but directive 
as indicated by the one-way arrows. However, in the arranging chain, 
planning and implementation are decentralized, and all of the actors are 
connected by feedback loops. These feedback loops and the absence of 
one-way arrows indicate that ideas and information flow between actors. 
This illustrates the supply chain nature of this approach, and also indicates 
that all the actors share in the role of influencing a partnership. 
4. It is also important to re-emphasize in the War Domain, the operational 
artist is planning and executing operations over the span of weeks and 
months, whereas the operational artists in Phase Zero are orchestrating and 
operating over years and decades.   
 
Figure 8.  The Chain of Operational Artists245 
                                                 
244 Ibid., 172. 
245 Petit, Going Big by Going Small, 163. 
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4. Position on the Chain Matters 
By making some modifications to Petit’s chain one can better examine the actors 
and the skills and qualities they need to possess as members of a SOF BPC enterprise.246 
These changes are reflected in Figure 9. This section examines the actors in terms of 
qualities and skillsets. A quality is a characteristic of an actor, and a skillset encompass 
skills actors need to succeed at their position on the chain.   
a. Qualities 
This work has identified four qualities that are inherent in partnerships and 
capacity building endeavors; they are: visibility and authority; and speed and 
sustainability.   
(1) Visibility versus  Authority 
The previous chapter makes a point of noting that policy and strategy are the 
engines that drive the capacity building train—they are important. However, SOFs ability 
to make on the ground assessments of situations and intangible dynamics is one of their 
hallmark abilities that make them so valuable to senior decision makers.247  Equally 
important, authority and visibility on the ground share an inverse relationship. As Chapter 
II highlighted, authority resides at the highest levels of national power. Law and policy 
delegate authority down, but the farther down the chain it moves the narrower the 
authority becomes. Conversely, visibility of ground truth decreases as information is 
passed back up the chain. As it is reported up, each ascending actor is farther removed 
from the tactical level interaction than the actor below details and feel for the situation 
tend to get lost. 
                                                 
246 The first modification reduces the number of positions on the chain from eight to seven by 
eliminating “SOF Engagements,” since an engagement is an activity, not an actor.  Additionally, the term 
“Policy” was added to the “Strategy” position to reflect the extensive amount of action and friction that 
occurs at the policy level as noted in Chapter II.  It is important to note that this position on the chain does 
not reflect a single policy or strategy, but rather the numerous levels of commands and government above 
the COCOM level.  These actors include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Congress, and the President, as well as other entities at the national level that influence U.S. foreign policy 
and strategy.  Finally, the chain has been rotated into a vertical position, which will serve to better illustrate 
how position and perspective impact the form and function of a partnership.   
247 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 154. 
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Figure 9.   The Modified Arranging Chain 
(2) Speed versus Sustainability 
Chapter II offered insight into the problems that beset military planners and 
leaders during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely the emergent and urgent 
requirements to build the capacity of the two countries’ security forces. As the Joint 
Center for International Security Force Assistance notes on their website, “in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the U.S. military found itself doing something where it had no existing terms 
that described what they were doing or doctrine on how to do it.”248  Situations and 
requirements on the ground evolve faster than policy and strategy can keep pace.   
Actors at the lower end of the chain can act very fast, developing creative 
solutions with the resources at hand to solve immediate and localized problems. 
Conversely, changes in policy, strategy, and doctrine, are notoriously slow; a point 
reiterated by former Secretary Gates time and again. Although actors at the top of the 
                                                 
248 “Historical Context and Contemporary Understanding of SFA.” Joint Center for International 
Security Force Assistance. 
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chain lack speed they make-up for it in staying power. Law and policy are hard to 
change, but once they do change they stay on the books for a long time. Gates illuminated 
that point when he reminded readers the last major piece of legislation that governs 
foreign assistance was signed into law by John F. Kennedy.249   
The speedy actors at the bottom of the chain, however, lack this level of 
sustainability. To begin with, units and individuals continually rotate, so there is a time 
limit on their physical presence. Even single SOF advisors that live in the partner country 
full-time can really only hope to stay there for three to four years before being assigned 
elsewhere. As a result, the ideas and solutions that tactical level units are able to quickly 
implement to address localized problems may be as short-lived as that unit’s deployment 
cycle. Therefore, these solutions need to take root programmatically if they are going to 
survive and span the years and decades a capacity building mission may take.   That 
requires the sponsorship of a higher headquarters or policy decision, and the funding, 
resourcing, and approval—the protection and institutionalization—that come with them.   
b. Skillsets 
The skills the actors need to succeed vary at different levels as well. This work 
has combined those skills into two broad categories: Language and Expertise, although 
others may exist as well. These skillsets were apparent in research and operational 
experience, and are highly illustrative and are factors generally considered in all partner 
nation engagements.   
(1) Language  
Communication in a partnership is key. Language and cultural understanding 
therefore becomes extremely important. However, not all the actors need to speak the 
same language. For actors at the lower level being able to interact with the partner nation 
forces in their native language is very important.250  However, towards the top of the 
                                                 
249 Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” 4. 
250 Russell D. Howard and Joint Special Operations University (U.S.), Cultural and Linguistic Skills 
Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives (Hurlburt Field, FL: 
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chain the host-nation language becomes less important because counterparts at that level 
tend to speak English themselves, or have access to excellent interpreters.251  What does 
become important at the higher level, however, is the ability to speak the language of 
diplomacy and policy. Actors at the upper level of the chain are required to navigate the 
challenging waters described in Chapter II interacting with other heads of state, 
ministerial level leaders, U.S. ambassadors, and others. The language, culture, and 
nuances of these “high-level engagements,” are very different from the language and 
nuances exchanged between tactical level units training at an outstation somewhere in the 
hinterland.   
(2) Expertise   
The expertise required by different actors is very similar to the varying language 
requirements. Where a tactical USSOF unit had better be experts in weapons, 
communications, medical aid, and demolitions, they have little use or time for studying 
protocol, the delicate nature of gift exchanges, and political signaling. However, TSOC 
and COCOM commanders very much do. Likewise actors at the upper rungs also require, 
as Petit noted, the knowledge to program funding and forces, and how to seek requisite 
authorities and approvals. Tasks, when carried out in a Phase Zero environment, will 
most certainly bring them to the front door of a U.S. embassy where they will need to be 
well armed in the art of diplomacy.   
5. Influence: The Tie that Binds 
Influence is the singular constant between the actors in the chain. Whereas the 
relationships of qualities and areas of expertise vary inversely between actors along the 
chain, all the actors share influence over a partnership equally. Since supply chains, as 
Handfield explained, are dependent on the efficient flow of ideas and support the actors 
in the arranging chain are dependent upon each other to overcome inherent deficits in 
their own qualities or expertise.    
                                                 
251 Author’s personal experience at Special Operations Command Europe from 2011–2012. 
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For example, by virtue of his distance252 from the tactical level engagement, a 
TSOC commander is reliant on the forward deployed tactical USSOF unit for the ground 
truth about various aspects of a capacity building partnership; aspects on which he lacks a 
sufficient level of resolution as a result of his position on the arranging chain.   Likewise, 
the tactical USSOF unit is operating within in very restrictive parameters as determined 
by the authorities granted to them to conduct their missions. They may very well possess 
the ability to achieve greater success or effectiveness by leveraging their access, 
placement, speed, and feel for the situation, but lack the authority to do so.   As a result, 
they are in turn reliant on the authorities the TSOC commander possesses and his ability 
to go up the chain to secure additional authorities if necessary. 
Because the actors in the arranging chain are reliant on each other, their 
interaction with each other influences the overall effectiveness of the partnership. In the 
case of the TSOC commander and the tactical SOF unit, the effectiveness, tone, and 
content of the communication up the chain from the tactical unit via the feedback loops 
that exist between actors will have an impact on the TSOC commander’s decisions and 
actions regarding the future of the BPC mission.    
6. Why the Arranging Chain Matters to SOF BPC 
Petit’s notion of the arranging chain provides an excellent approach to examining 
the various actors that populate a SOF BPC enterprise. First, understanding the enterprise 
in terms of these actors helps to better understand how all the policy and programmatic 
hurdles of capacity building are interrelated and how they affect actors on the chain 
differently. Knowing who is involved in the process helps to increase understanding and 
                                                 
252 Distance here refers to both the physical distance which almost always separates a TSOC 
commander from tactical level engagements in his AOR by virtue of other pressing duties and 
requirements, and the location of his headquarters in relation to the location of the tactical level 
engagement.  But distance also refers to the distance that separates the TSOC commander, usually a two-
star flag or general officer, from a tactical level unit usually led by an O-3 captain or U.S. Navy lieutenant.  
This physical separation in rank and position creates an invisible wall, albeit not impenetrable wall, that 
inhibits the commander from getting a true feel for what is happening on the ground.  Commander visits are 
usually well-choreographed VIP visits which are designed to highlight strengths and minimize points of 
friction.  As a result, some commanders minimize such as events to allow the tactical units to better focus 
on the tasks at hand.   
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provide some transparency. Second, the chain helps identify the inherent strengths and 
weaknesses of the different actors, and underscores the point that effective capacity 
building requires all the actors to work together; compensating for each other’s 
weaknesses with each other’s strengths. Finally, as addressed in the previous chapter, it is 
impossible to build partner capacity without the partner. Additionally, partnerships are 
very dynamic. As illustrated in Figure 10, understanding the enterprise in terms of this 
chain also helps all members consider and account for the partners’ strengths, 
weaknesses, bureaucratic headaches and political dilemmas can help reduce friction 
within the partnership, and to function as a more resilient enterprise within the dynamic 
environment of international partnerships.   
 
Figure 10.  The Actors of the SOF BPC Enterprise 
F. SUMMARY: THE SOF BPC ENTERPRISE 
Building partner capacity is an integral part of what USSOF does. Since USSOF 
has been building partner capacity since their inception, one could say it is part of 
USSOF’s DNA. That is certainly one difference that separates USSOF BPC from other 
 81
DOD BPC efforts. But they also vary because of the nature of the missions USSOF is 
asked to accomplish; USSOF’s unique capabilities which allow them to employ 
specialized tactics and techniques to achieve their ends; and because of their ability, 
thanks in part to their nimble force structure, to construct resilient chains of actors. 
Combined, these qualities allow USSOF to build capacity in ways and in places that 
conventional DOD formations would exceedingly difficult. Additionally, the resiliency of 
their chain of actors allows USSOF to react more fluidly to the dynamic nature of 
international partnerships. 
The USSOF BPC enterprise is a system of actors, activities and programs that 
uses unique techniques and procedures under unique conditions and to exacting standards 
to achieve the BPC objective. The enterprise requires continues synchronization 
vertically from the policy level to the tactical level, and horizontally with the partner 
nation, in order to ensure the right skills and equipment arrive in the right place at the 
right time for the duration necessary in accordance with U.S. law. These activities are 
usually carried out in challenging and politically sensitive environments, which require 
USSOF to conduct their efforts in a very adaptive manner. The following chapter will 
present a case study comparison of two such enterprises carried out by Special 
Operations Command South in South America from 2001 to 2010. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: SOCSOUTH IN COLOMBIA AND PARAGUAY 
(2001–2010) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The examination of capacity building endeavors presents a number of challenges, 
the most difficult of which is how to gauge and measure just how effectively the capacity 
is being built. This is a significant challenge for a number of reasons, especially because 
BPC enterprises are tough to compare. Endeavors in capacity building are all unique, by 
virtue of when the capacity is being built, by whom, with whom, and for what purpose. 
For example, while recent USSOF BPC efforts in South America are focused on building 
counter-narcoterrorism capacity to address internal instability within partner nations, 
USSOF in Europe are focused intensely on developing more advanced and interoperable 
Eastern European SOF partner forces that can participate in multinational missions 
beyond their own borders.253  Although both are USSOF BPC endeavors they are very 
much different. As a result a clean comparison of those cases would be frustrated for a 
number of reasons, and ultimately hold little value or weight. The matter is further 
complicated because success in such endeavors is rarely defined, partly because the 
objectives are not clear enough from the outset, but also because the dynamic nature of 
partnerships can increase or decrease the amount of time necessary to build the desired 
capacity. Therefore, it becomes difficult to distinguish a case where capacity building 
worked from one that has not, because it could easily be said that in the former case the 
capacity building has simply not worked yet. 
To ensure a clean comparison of these two different endeavors, this case study 
will compare two post-9/11 BPC enterprises established and managed by the same 
TSOC, during the same period, with very similar capacity building objectives. This 
approach provides the opportunity to compare results between efforts while isolating 
constant factors in the partnership environment.  These factors include U.S. political and 
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for Global Security.” 
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military leadership, U.S. strategic objectives, U.S. law, authorities, and other external 
factors such as world events, etc., as they would be as similar as possible between any 
two cases taken from the same TSOC during the same period.  Given these criteria, 
SOCSOUTH’s efforts in Colombia and Paraguay from 2001–2010 were chosen for this 
thesis.  
These cases were selected for several reasons.  First, they meet the case selection 
criteria.  Second, SOCSOUTH’s campaign in Colombia is often portrayed in professional 
literature as the gold standard of contemporary USSOF capacity building outside of a 
warzone.254  Although SOCSOUTH’s efforts in Colombia garner the most attention, the 
command also gave a proportional255 amount of attention and level of commitment to 
Paraguay, yet these efforts are barely mentioned in professional literature, DOD 
documents, or congressional reports. The disparity in the level of success between 
SOCSOUTH’s efforts in Colombia and Paraguay provides an opportunity to identify the 
factors that determine success in such BPC endeavors. Third, the Colombia case study is, 
more than likely, already a familiar one to most of those reading this thesis. 
This chapter will first examine U.S. interests and objectives in South America, 
followed by an overview of U.S. Southern Command’s and SOCSOUTH’s perspective 
on South America and their operational approaches. The majority of this chapter is 
dedicated to the examination of Colombia and Paraguay, and SOCSOUTH’s BPC 
enterprises in both of these countries. The analysis of this examination will be provided 
in the following chapter. 
                                                 
254 Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego, Persistent Engagement in Colombia (MacDill Air 
Force Base, FL: JSOU Press, July 2014) http://jsou.socom.mil/PubsPages/JSOU14–3_Moyar-Pagan-
Griego_Colombia_FINAL.pdf; Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 125. 
255 Proportional here refers to the smaller size of the Paraguayan military and U.S. presence and 
embassy in Paraguay as compared to Colombia. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. U.S. Objectives in South America (2001–2010) 
The United States is “bound by proximity, integrated markets, energy 
interdependence,” with the nations in the Americas.256  As President Obama states in his 
2010 National Security Strategy, “our deep historical, familial, and cultural ties make our 
alliances and partnerships critical to U.S. interests.”257  Throughout the first decade of the 
2000s, the United States was focused on “bolstering security, strengthening democratic 
institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people,” in South America.258  
Although, the United States has long had interest in the on-goings in South America, 
specifically the drug trade, the United States’ security interest in the region took on a new 
dimension after 9/11. Following the attacks of September 11th, terrorism moved to the 
forefront of U.S. security concerns around the globe, to include South America.259 The 
mutual threat of nacroterrorism that confronts many South American countries and the 
United States brings the U.S. national interests in South America into sharper focus.   
Over the past decade the United States has grown increasingly concerned about 
terrorist and insurgent groups that are threatening several countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.260   A recent Congressional Research Service report indicates that  
“although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in 
the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist 
groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes.”261  These 
concerns served to drive the focus of efforts in U.S. Southern Command and 
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SOCSOUTH during this period. Two of the nations where SOCSOUTH focused its 
limited resources were Colombia and Paraguay. 
2. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is the GCC responsible for 
all DOD activities carried out in Central and South America, and the Caribbean. The 
command’s objective is simple: to ensure “the forward defense of the United States.”262   
Recognizing the increased interconnection and interdependence between all the nations in 
the western hemisphere, USSOUTHCOM published their ten year strategy in March of 
2007 under the motto of “Partnership for the Americas.”263  As the motto indicates, 
USSOUTHCOM was, and remains, clearly oriented on partnership and military-to-
military engagements whenever and wherever it can.264  However, there are several 
factors that inform the command’s strategy and approach.   
First, as the United States prosecuted the Global War on Terror (GWOT) around 
the world during this period, USSOUTHCOM was not a top priority.265  The majority of 
funding, resources, and personnel, during this period were being funneled to the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. As an economy of force theater, USSOUTHCOM, in the words of 
one of the command’s leaders, was left with “tough choices about where to put our 
strength and where to accept risk.”266   
The second factor is the diverse nature of USSOUTHCOM’s AOR, and the 
equally diverse nature of U.S. diplomatic relations throughout this area. As a study on the 
command observes, “American relations with individual nations in the region vary 
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dramatically from the highest levels of cooperation on trade agreements and security 
issues on one extreme to an absence of diplomatic relations and trade embargos on the 
other”267  
The third factor is the nature of the security threat. The SOUTHSOM strategy, 
Strategy 2016, states, “the potential for force-on-force military actions between two or 
more nations in the region is relatively low; however, we face many other conditions and 
challenges that threaten security, stability, and prosperity,” which include: poverty and 
inequality, corruption, terrorism, and crime.268  Although these security challenges, with 
the exception of terrorism, do not directly fall within the tradition realm of military 
issues, they certainly serve as the tinder for strife and conflict and warranted their due 
attention and effort.   
Combined, the lack of resources and forces, the diverse array of diplomatic 
relations throughout their AOR, and the non-traditional security challenges, served to 
present USSOUTHCOM with a challenging problem set. To best address the challenge 
before them, USSOUTHCOM divided their AOR into four sub-regions: the Andean 
Ridge (Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia), Central America, the Caribbean, and the 
Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay).269  Within these regions, 
USSOUTHCOM focused intently on partnership, engagement, and capacity building. 
Also, as a result of the limited resources allocated to the theater, the command made 
extensive use of various types of authorities to procure additional funding and operational 
latitude.270  This creative and adaptive approach was particularly true for 
USSOUTHCOM’s special operations component, SOCSOUTH. 
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3. SOCSOUTH     
SOCSOUTH is a sub-unified command directly subordinate to USSOUTHCOM. 
As such, SOCSOUTH was limited by the same constraints and faced the same challenges 
as its parent headquarters. In line with USSOUTHCOM’s overall strategy, SOCSOUTH 
developed its own approach to support the larger SOUTHCOM effort. In what 
SOCSOUTH referred to as its regional war on terror (RWOT), the TSOC sought to 
achieve a “layered defense of the homeland,” by simultaneously carrying-out three 
different types of campaigns in three different regions within the AOR.271  Those 
campaigns were: “disruption in the Southern Cone sub-region, stabilization in the Andean 
Ridge, and interdiction in the Caribbean and Central America.”272   
a. Layered Defense 
Naturally, given the different campaign objectives, SOCSOUTH employed 
different approaches in these different regions. As Averett, Cervantes, and O’Hara note, 
“The purpose of SOCSOUTH’s efforts in the Southern Cone (SC) is to disrupt 
transnational terrorist activities…Special operations forces in this area integrate their 
operations with other USG and partner nation government activities. These same SOF 
forces also serve as advisors in regional shaping operations.”273  Whereas, in the Andean 
Ridge (AR), the command “focused on maintaining or increasing the stability of existing 
governments within the sub-region through a sustained SOF presence, as well as the 
targeting of high value narco-terrorist leaders.”274  Activities in support of these 
objectives in the AR required SOF to “provide coordination, counterterror planning 
assistance, intelligence support, operational preparation of the environment (OPE), and 
inter-agency liaison to many of these Andean governments. In addition, Joint and 
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Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) are used to build relationships and maintain 
partner nation capacity.”275 
b. Four Integrated Ideas  
To achieve these objectives, SOCSOUTH’s approach contained four integrated 
ideas: 
1. A creative but transparent use of authorities and forward posture; 
2. A tactically focused engagement effort with appropriately missioned 
partner nation units; 
3. A forward-deployed headquarters to provide executive level interface; and  
4. Personal, private collaboration with strategic leadership including the 
USSOUTHCOM’s commander, U.S. interagency leaders, and key partner 
nation political and military leaders.276 
c. The SOC-Forward 
The third integrated idea listed above, a “forward-deployed headquarters,” took 
the form of the SOC-Forward (SOCFWD), a non-doctrinal approach to command and 
control, commonly attributed as the brain-child of SOCSOUTH’s former Commanding 
General, then-Brigadier General Charles T. Cleveland.277   The SOCFWD concept took 
shape in 2006, and was defined by SOCSOUTH as “a flat, networked command and 
control architecture that incorporates multiple, tailored C2 nodes, facilitates rapid 
decision making, interagency coordination and proper resourcing of special operations 
forces operating over vast geographic areas in support of the RWOT.”278  The SOCFWD 
served several key functions to include serving as an “in-country” synchronizing 
headquarters, conducting daily coordination and longer-term planning and coordination 
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with U.S. and partner nation officials, and providing effective “reach back” capabilities 
between units on the ground and the TSOC headquarters in Florida.279   
Additionally, as General Cleveland noted at the time “traditional military 
structures are optimized for unilateral action are neither necessary nor welcome by 
ambassadors and partner nations.”280  SOCFWDs also provided a solution to that 
problem because they were smaller and less invasive while still providing all of the 
advantages listed above. In all, SOCSOUTH established three SOCFWDs within 
SOCSOUTH’s AOR; one in Colombia, another in Paraguay, and the final one in the 
Caribbean.281  This examination will now turn to the two BPC enterprises in Colombia 
and Paraguay.  
C. SOCSOUTH IN COLOMBIA 
1. U.S. Interests and Relations with Colombia 
The United States has a very long relationship with Colombia, one that even 
includes the deployment of Colombian forces to Korea during the Korean War, the only 
Latin American country to do so.282  By the end of the 1990s, however, Colombia was on 
the verge of being a failed state. Plagued by violence and insurgencies ongoing since the 
1960s, the Colombian government was near collapse under the pressure of the Fuerzas 
Armandas Revolucionares de Colombia (FARC), the Ejercito de Liberacion (ELN), and 
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).283   
According to a 2003 report from the U.S. Department of State Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Colombia was the number one 
producer and distributor of cocaine in the world, and a “significant” supplier of heroin to 
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the United States.284  As Petit observes, “illegal drugs, principally cocaine and heroin, 
drive U.S. interests in Colombia.”285  However, after concerns about terrorism, and 
terrorism’s ability to breed in areas of unrest and instability, the United States began to 
look at Colombia from a new perspective in the early 2000s.  
In the first National Security Strategy published after 9/11, President George W. 
Bush addressed the problems in Colombia directly, stating, “In Colombia, we recognize 
the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and 
drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups.”286  These 
security concerns were nothing new to the members of Southern Command and 
SOCSOUTH, but the United States’ increased attention on countering terrorism would 
prove to bolster their efforts in the country. During this period Colombia and the United 
States forged a close partnership focused initially on, counter-narcotics and later 
counterterrorism which quickly broadened to “include trade, human rights, and 
development.”287 
2. Colombia: A Domestic Perspective 
Despite being one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, Colombia also 
holds the dubious record of hosting the longest armed conflict in the western 
hemisphere.288  Colombia is the third-most populous country in Latin America, but 50% 
of that population lived in poverty as of 2002.289  This factor, in addition to a “lack of 
state control over much of Colombian territory,” social-inequality, and political 
corruption have left Colombia “plagued by violence and a conflict that has lasted nearly 
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five decades.”290  It was not until the late 1990s, teetering on the verge of collapse, that 
Colombia began to turn things around. Change in Colombia began politically. Many see 
the election of President Andres Pastrana in 1998 and the implementation of Plan 
Colombia as the starting point of this change.291 The following sections will examine 
Colombia’s national security strategy, political leadership, and the Colombian military. 
a. Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, and the National Consolidation Plan 
Colombia initiated a series of national strategies in 1999, which have carried 
through to present day, and are seen as having been critical to Colombia’s rapid 
turnaround from a near-failed state. The first of these plans was Plan Colombia. Initiated 
under President Andres Pastrana, Plan Colombia was a “comprehensive civil, military, 
and development plan” although it was heavily weighted towards police and military 
operations and infrastructure.292  As Thomas A. Marks, a noted Colombian scholar 
observes, Plan Colombia allowed the Colombians to wrest the “strategic initiative” away 
from the FARC.293   
Plan Patriota was the follow-up to Plan Colombia, and was brought into action by 
Pastrana’s successor, Álvaro Uribe. As Petit observes, Partiota was a “muscularized 
version of Plan Colombia that capitalized on the expanded Colombian security 
capability.”294    Initiated in 2004, “Plan Patriota was the military component of a dual 
security strategy designed to secure rural populations and drive the FARC from their 
safehavens.”295 Not without its critics, Plan Patriota ultimately “reduced FARC ranks, 
recaptured land held by the FARC, and confiscated large amounts of material used to 
process cocaine.”296   
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In 2007 Colombia’s strategy was advanced further under what eventually became 
known as the National Consolidation Plan (PNC). The PNC was Uribe’s strategic plan 
for his second term and was “intended to consolidate the gains of the Democratic 
Security policies that were successful in reducing violence in the first term and to 
consolidate state presence in marginal areas where insurgent activity by illegal armed 
groups, drug trafficking, and violence converged.”297   The PNC, the third evolution of 
the original Plan Colombia, remains in effect today in Colombia.298 
b. President Álvaro Uribe (2002 – 2010) 
Uribe was elected in 2002 for his aggressive violence reduction plan that included 
components to “address the paramilitary problem, defeat leftist guerrilla insurgents, and 
combat narcotics trafficking.”299  After being elected, Uribe came out swinging. 
Increasing the size, capabilities, and roles of the Colombia military and police, Uribe was 
able to put significant pressure on the FARC.300  His quick and decisive action garnered 
him substantial political capital allowing him to pursue and attain additional legislation to 
support Plans Colombia and Patriota. The major piece of legislation was the Justice and 
Peace Law, facilitating the demobilization of paramilitary organizations by giving Uribe 
authority to grant amnesty to illegal combatants as part of peace negotiations.301  The 
success of Uribe’s actions can also be derived from the public mandate he received in 
2005 when Colombia amended its constitution to allow Uribe to serve a second term in 
office.302   
Uribe’s results were not only politically palpable; they are easily quantified as 
well. In 2002 the FARC exercised such freedom of action around the national capital of 
Bogotá, they were able to launch a mortar attack on the presidential palace during Uribe’s 
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first presidential inauguration. However, four years later, the FARC, despite their 
declared desire to do so, was completely unable to disrupt Uribe’s second 
inauguration.303  From 2002 to 2008, U.S. State Department figures indicate 
“kidnappings in Colombia declined by 83%, homicides by 40%, and terrorist attacks by 
76%,” and that, “police regained a presence in all of Colombia’s municipalities, including 
areas from which they had been ousted by guerrilla groups.”304  Supported by a detailed 
and decisive national strategy, Uribe achieved rapid security gains and is a central figure 
in the story of Colombia’s turn-around. 
c. The Colombian Military 
In 1999, a former U.S. Ambassador summarized the Colombian military as 
“basically a barracks military, not…organized to go after the guerrillas….[having] some 
brave and capable people, but…strictly a reaction force, and not a very mobile one at 
that.”305  Despite the decades of conflict in Colombia, the nation’s counterinsurgency 
capabilities were scant. In 1988 the Colombian Army only had three mobile infantry 
brigades, a four-battalion Special Forces Brigade, which was not created until 1996, and a 
minute army aviation brigade dedicated to countering insurgent threats throughout an 
entire country almost twice the size of Texas.306  Under Plan Colombia the military and 
national police went under drastic transformation “while in a pitched battle for 
Colombia,” as “the FARC, ELN, and AUC moved from guerrilla tactics to a war of 
movement against the Colombian government.”307   
In 1999, the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD) “took the initial steps in 
what would be a multiyear trial-and-error process to transform the Armed Forces through 
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institutional changes, new technologies, and new doctrine to address the internal security 
threats.”308  These changes were rapid, dramatic, and focused in three areas: reorienting 
the military apparatus from a garrison military to a military at war; transitioning its forces 
from a conscript military to a professional military; and retraining its military in counter 
guerrilla operations.309  By the time SOCSOUTH capacity-building efforts shifted to 
military forces in 2002, USSOF was walking into a transitioning force with a larger 
supporting apparatus in the MOD.  
3. SOCSOUTH ON THE GROUND IN COLOMBIA 
a. Overview 
SOCSOUTH’s capacity building engagement on the ground in Colombia was 
cautious at first, but not without reason. During the 1990s “U.S. Special Forces 
engagement with the Colombian military was prohibited due to U.S. policy objections 
over Colombian human rights issues.”310  As a result, USSOF engagement in Colombia 
was limited almost exclusively to counter drug units in the Colombian National Police 
(CNP) under the close eye of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and the U.S. 
Department of Justice.311  However, given the worsening nature of the conflict in 
Colombia, the promise that Plan Colombia showed to outsiders like the United States, 
and the United States’ changing view on terrorism post-9/11, the U.S.-Colombia 
partnership shifted in 2002.312  A report from the Congressional Research Service notes, 
“Because narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency had become intertwined 
problems, Congress granted the Administration flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds 
for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations.”313  With the 
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increased funding and operational latitude SOCSOUTH gradually began to expand its 
capacity building enterprise in Colombia. 
After the issue of Plan Colombia in 1999, “USSOF engagement focused on the 
Colombian National Police counter drug brigade, the Brigade Contra el Narcotrafica 
(BRCNA) and the Colombian Army Tactical Retraining Center (CERTE).”314 After the 
U.S. policy shift in 2002, however, “USSOF began engagements outside of the 
counterdrug-focused BRNCA elements. Consequently, USSOF assisted Colombian units 
that were increasingly operating in the FARC-dominated Southern Colombia regions.”315 
As the skill of Colombian forces increased, so too did the demand for additional 
capacity building bandwidth. In 2002 and again in 2004, the U.S. Congress authorized 
increases in U.S. military personnel caps in Colombia. These increases facilitated broader 
capacity-building engagement at the institutional level, efforts which resulted in the 
creation of a Colombian Army Special Operations Command (COESE) and eventually 
“the Colombian equivalent of [the United States’] Joint Special Operations Command 
(CCOPE).”316  The creation of these headquarters, aided by USSOF advisors and 
planners, demonstrate how this BPC enterprise required capacity building not only at the 
tactical level, but also at the operational level in order to achieve the desired objective. 
b. SOCFWD-Colombia 
SOCFWD-Colombia was established in 2006, and during steady-state operations 
maintained approximately 120 SOF personnel in Colombia at any given time.317  These 
operational forces included a persistent presence of multiple U.S. Army Special Forces 
Operational Detachments-Alpha (SFOD-A) and their headquarter elements Operational 
Detachments-Bravo (SFOD-B), in addition to elements from Naval Special Warfare 
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Group (NSWG), Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSE), Military Information Support 
Operations teams (MISO).318 
In addition to managing the activities of these multiple SOF entities within the 
country, the SOCFWD in Colombia also provided several intangible advantages that 
enhanced the overall effectiveness of the BPC enterprise in Colombia. A 2007 study on 
SOCFWD-Colombia draws the following conclusions:  
1. The colocation of an operational level headquarters in country with 
tactical level units significantly reduced communication barriers that had 
existed previously. 
2. The SOCFWD provided “top cover” for the tactical level units at the U.S. 
Embassy. This relieved the tactical level units of numerous administrative 
responsibilities allowing the units to focus more intently on their capacity-
building efforts. 
3. By virtue of their colocation at the U.S. embassy, and the SOCFWD 
commander being of commensurate rank, the SOCFWD was able to very 
effectively resolve issues and procure resourcing through the Defense 
Attaché (DAO) and the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) in a manner 
that junior, rotational units and officers were unable to.319 
According to Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Wilson, who commanded SOCFWD-Colombia 
twice during this period, the SOCFWD provided an additional intangible benefit which 
aided the capacity building enterprise in Colombia—trust building. The permanent 
presence of an O-6 headquarters in-country, a costly endeavor for a resource-strapped 
command, demonstrated the commitment of SOCSOUTH to both the U.S. country team 
as well as to their Colombian counterparts. Furthermore, the headquarters’ permanent 
presence provided a level of transparency and understanding among all parties that was 
not possible when the TSOC was operating solely from its headquarters in Florida.320 
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c. Operation Willing Spirit 
On February 13, 2003, Colombian and American interests were drawn closer 
together when three U.S. civilian contractors crash landed in a remote Colombian jungle 
and were taken hostage by the FARC.321  The captured Americans became 
USSOUTHCOM’s top priority in Colombia, and in 2005 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued an execution order for Operation Willing Spirit (OWS) to locate and recover the 
hostages.322  OWS drastically impacted SOCSOUTH’s BPC enterprise.   
First, as a named operation, OWS increased authorities, funding, and resources 
allocated to SOCSOUTH, which USSOUTHCOM designated “as the lead for all DOD 
hostage rescue and recovery actions.”323  This increased the tools at SOCSOUTH’s 
disposal, and broadened the rules within which SOCSOUTH had to operate. These 
additional tools and rules were greatly needed as SOCSOUTH determined that to rescue 
the hostages it would require a broader “mosaic of engagement and assistance programs 
in Colombia.” They would be needed in order to increase certain capacities they saw 
requisite for the hostage rescue such as U.S. Colombian planning and increased 
operational reach into the interior jungles.324  Second, OWS gave both the Colombians 
and Americans a sharp, common operational focus that heightened the sense of urgency 
and commitment between the partners.325  
Third, OWS also brought the American chain of actors closer together. Wilson 
notes that the staunchest ally that SOCSOUTH had in Colombia was William R. 
Brownfield, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia himself, stating “we would not have been 
able to do what we did in Colombia without the unbelievable support of Ambassador 
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Brownfield.”326  With the increased support on the diplomatic side, the BPC enterprise 
was able to operate more efficiently.   
Fourth, OWS provided SOCSOUTH a rare opportunity to seize on operational 
gains on the ground in Colombia. As the aperture opened on what SOCSOUTH was 
permitted to do in country, the Colombians were making consolidated gains on the 
FARC, ELN and AUC. Combined these factors allowed SOCFWD-Colombia to take a 
more aggressive approach, at first by providing USSOF experts in sensitive site 
exploitation to examine FARC prisoner of war camps immediately after Colombian 
forces had liberated them; then by embedding USSOF personnel with frontline 
Colombian reconnaissance units as the combined effort closed in on the hostages.327   
The hostages were finally rescued on July 2, 2008, in a daring rescue carried out 
unilaterally by Colombian SOF and Colombian interagency partners. Operation Jaque 
(Checkmate) rescued 12 other hostages in addition to the three Americans without firing 
a single shot. This operation is lauded as one of the great military deceptions of the 
contemporary era, and is often used as the proof-positive of SOCSOUTH’s BPC efforts 
in Colombia. However, the BPC efforts in Colombia did not end with Operation Jaque, 
and to assume so would be unfair to SOCSOUTH.   
In the days following Operation Jaque, numerous high level distinguished visitors 
traveled to Colombia to congratulate the Colombians on their stunning success, General 
Cleveland was one of those visitors. In a meeting with President Uribe, the Colombian 
president reaffirmed to the senior State Department officials and military leaders in front 
of him that the fight was not finished with the FARC, that the United States support was, 
and remained, essential to their success, and that he was very pleased with his new SOF 
capacity.328   The following day, General Cleveland met with the Minister of Defense 
and Service Chiefs of the Colombian military, and he was about to leverage the power of 
the key leader engagement to build some capacity of his own.   
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The success of all the effort that led-up to Operation Jaque and the president’s 
affirmations the day before presented General Cleveland a fleeting opportunity, and he 
seized it. Seated before the civilian and uniformed leaders of the Colombian military, 
Cleveland spoke, “Gentlemen, our special operations command was born out of the ashes 
of Desert One,329 you have the opportunity to build yours on the success of Op Jaque.”  
According to Colonel Wilson, who was in the room when Cleveland made the statement, 
the entire room was stunned.  
Given the jubilation surrounding the successful rescue and the president’s support 
of special operations, just the mention of a special operations headquarters, which the 
service chiefs were not supportive of, had enough momentum to carry it through to 
fruition. Until that point, all of Colombian SOF reported to the commander of CCOPE, 
an O-6 supported by a small battle staff, who reported directly to the Chief of Defense. 
Shortly after Cleveland’s proposition the Colombians established a two-star general 
officer, USSOCOM-like, joint, special operations headquarters.330  This headquarters not 
only bolstered the strategic and operational capacity of Colombian SOF, but also 
provided new BPC opportunities for SOCSOUTH. The command worked closely 
through staff integration and by bringing in subject matter experts from USSOCOM to 
help and assist in fashioning the new headquarters appropriately and to best meet the 
Colombian’s needs.331  Additionally, this act served to institutionalize and protect 
USSOF’s capacity building investment in Colombia. 
d. Results 
From top to bottom, the results of SOCSOUTH’s BPC enterprise in Colombia are 
impressive. In 2001, Colombian SOF lacked any sort of operational headquarters, by 
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2010 SOCSOUTH supported the creation of the Colombian Army Special Operations 
Command, followed by CCOPE, and ultimately the establishment of the SOCOM-like 
two-star joint SOF headquarters. The skill, operational reach, and capabilities required to 
successfully execute Operation Jaque serve as an easy yardstick to measure how far 
Colombian capacity had come since a former U.S. Ambassador referred to them as 
“basically a barracks military, not…organized to go after the guerrillas…. strictly a 
reaction force, and not a very mobile one at that” at the outset of this case study 
period.332  Colombian SOF elements can now operate jointly, a mark of skill and 
professionalization not easily achieved, and a capacity that U.S. observers noted as non-
existent prior to 2004.333   
More impressively, the combined effort of the Colombia government and military 
resulted in the FARC agreeing to a ceasefire and coming to the peace tables in 2012.334  
Additionally, Colombian SOF now operate beyond their own borders. As a 2012 
Congressional Research Service report observes, “Colombia has emerged as a regional 
leader providing training in security and counter-narcotics throughout the hemisphere and 
elsewhere.”335   Perhaps the most definitive measure of capacity is reflected in the level 
of trust the United States felt comfortable placing in their Colombian counterparts by 
completely imbedding USSOF personnel on the ground deep in FARC-held territory, and 
by remaining hands-off as Colombian SOF and their interagency partners successfully 
rescued the three American hostages that the United States had been searching for over 
five years.336   
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D. SOCSOUTH IN PARAGUAY 
1. U.S. Interests and Relations with Paraguay 
The United States maintains healthy relations with the nation of Paraguay. The 
two nations work together bilaterally on several issues particularly democratic and 
economic reforms, counter narcotics, and counter terrorism.337  Paraguay, like Colombia, 
has a troubled political past, and “observers maintain that corruption is a major 
impediment to consolidating democratic institutions.”338  Of particular concern to U.S. 
security interests in Paraguay is the Tri-border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay; and the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the region. Although, in stark 
comparison to Colombia, there appears to have been minimal U.S. political interest in 
Paraguay before 2009, since that time U.S. political interest has seemed to increase.339     
The TBA has long been “an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and 
human trafficking; counterfeiting; pirated goods; and money laundering—all potential 
funding sources of terrorist organizations.”340  As cited, by the Congressional Research 
Service, Argentinean officials have implicated “Iran has been working for decades in 
Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region by utilizing embassies, 
cultural organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment.”341   The same 
Argentinean report also implicated an Iranian as being Iran’s South American 
“coordinator for the export of revolution,” and operating out of the tri-border region.342  
There are also additional concerns about Hezbollah’s influence, recruiting, and 
fundraising efforts among sympathizers in the TBA.343  Although the security concerns 
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in Paraguay were not as grave as the situation in Colombia, the indirect threats posed by 
Iranian and Hezbollah influences, the trafficking capacity of the region, and the favorable 
environment for instability in the TBA, gave SOCSOUTH plenty of reason for concern 
and purpose in Paraguay.344 
2. Paraguay: A Domestic Perspective 
As a 2002 article in Military Review notes, “Paraguay is landlocked, poor, a long 
way from everywhere, and seldom appears in the drama of international events but is 
nevertheless emblematic of our global security challenge.”345  Paraguay, roughly the size 
of California, is much smaller in size and population than Colombia, but it has an equally 
checkered political past. Although the small state in the center of South America has 
maintained healthy political relations with the United States, “Paraguay’s turbulent 
political history and tradition of political authoritarianism have resulted in international 
isolation.”346   Paraguay does not face any direct external threats, as a result, and in 
addition to the number of domestic issues, Paraguay’s political and military focuses are 
mostly directed internally.347 
a. Paraguay’s National Security Strategy   
Paraguay’s national security strategy during this period sought to address the 
widespread inequality, poverty, and corruption that plagued the country. From 2003–
2008 President Frutos put his focus and efforts into battling corruption; in a broader 
approach, Frutos’ successor, Fernando Lugo,  “emphasized empowering the poor, 
agrarian reform, health reform, and ending endemic corruption, which he viewed as the 
legacy of decades of Colorado Party348 dominance.”349   
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There is no indication that ending the illicit trafficking that has permeated the 
TBA for generations, or countering the influence of terrorist organizations like 
Hezbollah, were at the top of Paraguay’s security agenda during the early and mid-period 
of this case study. As the producer of over half of South America’s marijuana, Paraguay 
still maintains a reputation of being “friendly to smugglers and traffickers.”350  In many 
ways, the transiting, trafficking, laundering, and smuggling that occur in the TBA, and 
the political corruption that turns a blind-eye to these activities, are very much a way of 
life in Paraguay. 
Despite Paraguay’s efforts to stiffen anti-terrorism and trafficking laws and 
enforcement, particularly at the regular prompting of the United States, the results have 
been sluggish and rather ineffective. These efforts are often impeded by “porous borders, 
a lack of surveillance, weak law enforcement, and pervasive local corruption,” in addition 
to the fact “its judicial system is weak and politicized, the police force is widely viewed 
as ineffective and corrupt.”351  
In recent years, there has been increased mention of an insurgent group operating 
in Paraguay, Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP). The EPP is a Marxist-Leninist group 
that is frequently compared to, and implicated as having ties with, the FARC in 
Colombia.352  As a recent article in recent The New York Times reports, the EPP “is 
evolving from a ghostlike irritant for the authorities in Asunción, the capital, into a 
broader security threat in a backcountry that is already a hub for traffickers of marijuana, 
defiantly cultivated here on sprawling plantations, and Andean cocaine smuggled into 
Brazil and Argentina.”353   
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In contrast to the recent attention, not much focus was given to the group during 
the Frutos and Lugo administrations.354  After a rash of targeted bombings and shootings 
during the latter part of the decade, Lugo “declared a state of emergency and sent nearly 
200 elite troops, some trained by the United States military, to find the rebels” which 
failed to produce any decisive or lasting result.355  Unlike in Colombia under Uribe, 
Lugo’s ineffectual political leadership was unable to galvanize any sort of new legislation 
to better address the insurgent threat. This type of legislative change did not actualize 
until after Lugo’s impeachment in 2012. Lugo’s successor was able to lobby for a change 
“to the law of national defense that enabled the military to take part in internal security,” 
promptly dispatching troops to address the problem with the EPP.356 
b. Paraguay’s Domestic Politics 
Political corruption has plagued Paraguay in the way insurgency plagued forward 
progress in Colombia for decades.357  As a former authoritarian government, Paraguay 
was under six decades of single-party rule, until 2008 when a former Roman Catholic 
bishop, Fernando Lugo was elected president.358  Lugo’s predecessor, Nicanor Duarte 
Frutos (2003-2008) had lead a fairly expansive crackdown on corruption, fraud, 
government spending, and illicit trade, which had some positive influence initially, but 
the gains quickly receded.359   
Lugo’s election gave hope to many, including the United States, that Paraguay 
would turn-around its political inertia.360  However, by 2010 Paraguay was tied with 
Haiti, and ahead of only Venezuela, as having the most corrupt governments in the 
western hemisphere, only a marginal increase from where the nation was ranked in 
                                                 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Fleischman, “The Case of Paraguay.” 
357 Mendel, “Paraguay’s Ciudad Del Este and the New Centers of Gravity,” 51. 
358 Beittel, Paraguay: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, 1. 
359 Ibid., 3. 
360 Ibid., 1, 12. 
 106
2002.361   Despite the hope that ushered Lugo in to office, his administration was beset 
by a number of problems from the very beginning. Unable to deal with the political 
challenges, Lugo reportedly “retreated from leadership and has left the problems facing 
his reform agenda in the hands of his ministers,” seriously bringing into question his 
ability to bring about the change people had hoped for.362  Within one year of taking 
office, Lugo’s popular support had plummeted from 38% in 2008 to less than 18% by the 
end of 2009; clearly a lame duck politically, a growing body of political opposition 
successfully impeached Lugo in 2012.363 
c. Paraguay’s Military 
Paraguay’s military is small, poorly funded, and very much informed by the 
decades of authoritarian rule and political corruption.364  During the years of dictatorship 
the military played “an important role in suppressing dissent.”365  It also has a long-
standing reputation of playing a very formidable role in national politics—in the form of 
coups. The single party that ruled the government from the 1950s until Lugo’s election 
came to power through a military coup, and during the late 1990s and early 2000s there 
were at least five coups attempts to topple the country’s leadership.366  The military’s 
track record for coups did not escape the politically unpopular Lugo, who shuffled 
Paraguay’s top brass on a regular basis—four times in all during the first two years of his 
administration.367   
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At the time, Lugo’s critics stated the president’s actions were “inflicting 
successive blows on the institutionality [sic] of the armed forces.”368 To be sure, such a 
constant change in leadership would inhibit and degrade any institution, particularly a 
hierarchical military, but this was not the only challenge facing the Paraguayan military. 
In 2005, the military, comprised of an army, navy, and an air force, totaled just over 
10,000 personnel, approximately 20% of which were conscripts.369  Receiving around 
1% of the nation’s GDP, the military was armed with 20 World War II era tanks and 
weapons, and zero combat capable helicopters at the outset of this case study period.370  
In addition to the equipment, most of the military’s efforts were focused on “quelling 
domestic uprisings than on protecting Paraguay from international threats.”371  
Additionally, the military was no exception to the corruption that permeated the rest of 
the Paraguayan government.372    Nascent in capability and capacity in comparison the 
Colombian military, ineffectual against the EPP, largely unconcerned with external 
threats, and beset by corruption, a questionable public image, and sporadic changes in 
leadership, the Paraguayan military at the outset of this case study was very much a tool 
in disrepair.   
3. SOCSOUTH ON THE GROUND IN PARAGUAY  
a. Overview 
SOCSOUTH’s engagement in Paraguay began as a counter drug mission. As in 
Colombia,373 USSOF were operating in an advisory only capacity in support of these 
efforts. However, the number of similarities between Colombia and Paraguay end there. 
Paraguay’s military was smaller, and not nearly as advanced as the Colombian military 
during the start of this case study period, as a result USSOF in Paraguay were required to 
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build a national SOF capacity from scratch.    Additionally, USSOF in Paraguay did not 
have the benefit of the long history of partnership with the host nation that they enjoyed 
in Colombia.374 
b. Partner Unit 
SOCSOUTH supported several operational lines of effort in the TBA, but their 
capacity-building efforts in Paraguay were focused solely on special operations 
designated to conduct counter terrorism and interdiction.375  USSOF built this force, the 
Batallon Conjunto de Fuerzas Especiales (BCFE) from the ground-up, starting with the 
assessment and selection of the unit’s members circa 2006.376  The mission of the BCFE 
is to “respond to grave emergencies and to confront terrorism as well as working with 
other Paraguayan forces to maintain security in Paraguay.”377  Although engagement was 
initially episodic, in 2005 the Paraguayan Congress “approved a measure allowing U.S. 
Special Forces to conduct a series of 13 military exercises at Mariscal Estigarribia,” 
which allowed SOCSOUTH to begin a more persistent and systematic engagement with 
the Paraguayans.378  These exercises were intended to, among other things, “consist of 
counter-terrorism and domestic peacekeeping exercises.”379 
c. SOCFWD-Paraguay  
SOCFWD-Paraguay was established in 2007 and designed to serve all the same 
functions as SOCFWD-Colombia. Elements that conducted missions in support of 
SOCFWD-Paraguay found the same advantages of having an in-country operational 
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headquarters that units in Colombia noted above, namely faster response times from 
higher, more operational flexibility, and enhanced coordination and integration.380  
SOCFWD-Paraguay was much smaller in size than its counterpart in Colombia. A former 
SOCSOUTH J3 Operations officer estimated its size at approximately 30 U.S. personnel 
at the SOCFWD with normally only one SFOD-A on the ground at any given time, in 
addition to some small slices of MISO and CMSE elements occasionally.381   However, 
the difference in size between the two SOCFWDs is more directly attributed to the size 
differences between the countries of Colombia and Paraguay, their militaries, and the size 
of the U.S. country team in both countries. 
d. Political Tension 
At the same time Operation Willing Spirit and the Colombian’s operational gains 
against the FARC were catalyzing SOCSOUTH’s elements in Colombia, domestic and 
international political tension served as an impediment for SOCSOUTH’s efforts in 
Paraguay. The primary source of tension arose from Paraguay’s neighbors who were very 
skeptical and suspicious of the United States’ true intentions in Paraguay. The rumors 
that swirled about that the United States’ intentions in Paraguay ranged anywhere from a 
desire to build a permanent base in the country, to threatening neighboring Boliva’s 
strategic gas reserve.382  As one BBC report from late-2005 observes “Paraguay’s 
rapprochement with the United States has unsettled neighbouring governments, as well as 
social and peasant organisations throughout the region.”383  Many analysts attributed 
these regional pressures to Paraguay’s Southern Common Market (Mercosur) trade 
partners, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. As The Washington Post reports, a Latin 
American specialist from the Inter-American Dialogue think tank opined, “My guess is 
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there was a lot of pressure on the Paraguayans to fall more in line with Brazil and other 
Mercosur countries in terms of not having a special military relationship with the United 
States.”384  
Whatever the reason, in 2006, just one year after agreeing to the series of 13 
military exercises, the Paraguayan government denied an extension of diplomatic 
immunity to U.S. military members not permanently assigned to the U.S. embassy in 
Paraguay. As result, an extension of the defense cooperation agreement that set the 
conditions for SOCSOUTH’s persistent engagement was not renewed for 2007.385  An 
agreement was eventually reached, but these types of political tensions only served to 
complicate SOCSOUTH’s efforts in the already volatile political environment in 
Paraguay.   
e. Results 
SOCSOUTH successfully established the BCFE from scratch, which finally 
received a $1.4 million dollar shipment of “high tech communications equipment, small 
arms, and night vision devices” in 2009.386  However, by 2010 SOCSOUTH was unable 
to achieve any of the longer-lasting institutional impacts that it was able to achieve in 
Colombia. Additionally, by the end of 2009, the situation in Paraguay had become too 
“politically untenable” to maintain the SOCFWD there, and as a result it was 
terminated.387   
After SOCFWD-Paraguay departed, the engagements in Paraguay returned 
mostly to episodic JCETs and the occasional combined exercise.388  However, in the 
absence of the SOCFWD “top cover” the capacity building potential of those exercises 
were further diminished as tactical units reassumed the administrative and coordination 
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burden the SOCFWD had previously handled. The Paraguayan military maintains 
positive relations with the United States and SOCSOUTH, and are also still committed to 
counter narcotics and counter terrorism operations.389  However, recent reports of limited 
effectiveness of the BCFE against the EPP provide a fair degree of certainty that there is 
much work still left to do to achieve the BPC goals that SOCSOUTH had pursued during 
this period.         
E. SUMMARY 
Given the dynamic and unique nature of capacity building, comparing cases is a 
difficult endeavor. However, this chapter has provided two examples of BPC enterprises 
carried out by the same operational headquarters, on the same continent, during the same 
period, and for very similar purposes. Although SOCSOUTH’s approach was almost 
identical in both cases, the results are strikingly different. In the case of Colombia, that 
nation’s SOF emerged from the last decade as an exporter of security, regionally and 
globally, with its own SOCOM-like headquarters. Meanwhile, Paraguay’s SOF capacity 
has only shown modest gains at best, and the close of the decade saw SOCSOUTH 
maneuvered out of position to provide the persistent engagement many believe critical to 
capacity-building efforts.390  The following chapter will analyze the sources of these 
differences.     
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V. ANALYSIS OF SOCSOUTH’S CAPACITY BUILDING 
ENTERPRISES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented two cases of capacity building conducted by 
SOCSOUTH from 2001–2010. Although these BPC missions were carried out at the 
same time by the same TSOC, they produced substantially different results. To determine 
the cause of these differences this chapter will analyze both cases against three 
categories: the nature of the partnership, the rules and tools that SOCSOUTH employed 
in each case, and the chain of actors that comprised the BPC enterprise in each country. 
B. NATURE OF THE PARTNERSHIPS 
This section will analyze the national interests of Colombia and Paraguay as well 
as the United States’ national interests in both countries. This analysis will take into 
account the domestic issues and politics, and the national security strategies of all three 
nations. This will be used to determine the overall level of political cooperation that 
existed between the United States and Colombia and Paraguay respectively, as well as the 
overlap of these nations’ national security interests during this period. 
1. Colombia and the United States 
Colombia and the United States have a long history of political and military 
partnership. Despite the lack of USSOF military-to-military interaction during the 1990s 
the two countries were partners together in the war on drugs, and politically as the oldest 
democracies on their respective continents. In addition to this long-standing connection, 
three significant political incidents occurred during this case study that brought the 
United States’ and Colombia’s national interests into closer alignment: Plan Colombia 
and the successive national security strategies that followed; the attacks of 9/11 and the 
United States subsequent focus on countering terrorism; and the capture of three U.S. 
hostages by the FARC in 2003.   
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a. Plan Colombia 
Plans Colombia, Patriota, and the National Consolidation Plan served a number of 
purposes that enhanced SOCSOUTH’s overall ability to achieve significant capacity 
building gains in the country. Specifically with regards to the nature of the partnership 
between the two countries, Plan Colombia demonstrated to the United States a 
commitment to win back their embattled country. Additionally, the rapid security gains 
that these strategies achieved demonstrated the potential for their success, encouraging 
additional American support. The United States’ belief and commitment to Plan 
Colombia can be seen monetarily. From fiscal year 2001–2010 the United States 
committed just shy of $6.7 billion dollars of foreign aid specifically to supporting Plan 
Colombia.391    
b. 9/11 
Prior to 9/11, the United States’ and Colombia’s security interests intersected 
primarily at countering narcotics. However, after the terrorist attacks in late 2001, U.S. 
interests shifted to include a greater focus on counterterrorism. In the wake of 9/11, 
Congress removed the legal barrier that differentiated narcotics trafficking and terrorism, 
this action resulted in an increase of authorities and funding that could be applied by 
agencies in Colombia. As one report observes, “This expanded authority provided the 
State Department and the Department of Defense flexibility in situations where there is 
no clear line between drug and terrorist activity” opening the aperture on the types of 
engagements that U.S. government agencies could conduct in Colombia.392  Petit cites 
that the aegis of Plan Colombia and the United States’ new focus on counterterrorism was 
the catalyst that reinitiated USSOF engagement with the Colombian military.393 
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c. Operation Willing Spirit 
When three American government contractors were taken hostage by the FARC 
in 2003 the United States found its interests being drawn even closer to those of its 
Colombian partner. To be fair, this incident did not result in a shift in either country’s 
national strategy; Colombia had dealt with FARC kidnappings and hostage taking for 
decades, and the United States was preparing to invade Iraq when the incident occurred. 
However, the event served as a catalyst that galvanized military and diplomatic 
cooperation between the two countries. As one Special Forces officer recounts, “the 
Colombians reacted to the U.S. pressure on finding the hostages…this generated 
momentum for better trained units and for a hostage rescue capability.”394  These new 
operational requirements generated additional capacity building opportunities, 
broadening SOCSOUTH’s overall capacity building enterprise. This was only one way in 
which OWS impacted this capacity-building effort in Colombia; several other instances 
will be highlighted shortly. 
2. Paraguay and the United States 
In 2001, Paraguay was a political backwater of American foreign policy. As the 
Congressional Research Service identifies, the United States paid little political attention 
to Paraguay for the majority of this case study period.395  Although Paraguay maintained 
healthy relations with the United States during this time, it is not surprising there was 
only a limited intersection of national interests between the two countries. There were 
several contributing factors that influenced the partnership with, and by extension 
SOCSOUTH’s capacity-building efforts in, Paraguay. They are: again, the 9/11 attacks; 
and Paraguay’s domestic political situation. 
a. 9/11 
The TBA has long been a hotbed of illicit trafficking and a node in the drug trade, 
however, mention of Paraguay in security and congressional literature is almost void until 
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after 9/11 when articles such as William W. Mendel’s Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este and 
the New Centers of Gravity, began appearing in places like Military Review and 
elsewhere.396  In the frenzy to counter terrorism following the attacks of 9/11, interest in 
under-governed spaces—the dark corners of the world—increased dramatically as they 
were identified as places where terrorism and instability breed.397  The primary concern 
for the United States in the TBA and Paraguay, as a 2014 Congressional Research 
Service report notes, was the influence of Iran and Hezbollah. The United States 
suspected that Iran and Hezbollah used the hospitably lawless TBA to fundraise, recruit, 
launder money, and traffic goods; equally alarmingly to the United States was the 
potential for other nefarious actors to do the same.398   
However, despite the United States’ concerns and security interests, Paraguay, by 
all accounts, did not seem pressed to do anything about it. Although Paraguay cooperates 
closely with the United States “on anti-drug, counterterrorism and anti-smuggling 
initiatives” the proof-positive is lacking.399  According to the U.S. State Department, 
“although Paraguay was generally cooperative on counterterrorism efforts, its judicial 
system is weak and politicized, the police force is widely viewed as ineffective and 
corrupt, and the country lacks strong anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
legislation.”400  The State Department reported similar findings again in 2013, noting 
Paraguay and the TBA remain “an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and 
human trafficking; counterfeiting; pirated goods; and money laundering—all potential 
funding sources of terrorist organizations.”401 This situation is in clear contrast to the 
turn-around experienced in Colombia during this period, and in part is explained by 
Paraguay’s domestic political scene. 
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b. Paraguay’s Domestic Political Situation 
The gravest threat Paraguay faced during this period was corruption and poverty, 
not an armed revolution, terrorist attacks, or external threats. As a result, Paraguay’s 
national security priorities had more to do with ending corruption, poverty, and agrarian 
reform than they did with national defense.   The United States’ perceived threat from 
nefarious actors and influencers was of little concern to the Paraguayan government, and 
certainly not a pressing matter, despite their support of the United States efforts.    Even if 
Paraguay shared the United States level of concern, the political situation in Paraguay 
would have made any sort of change difficult. Very simply, Paraguay was a state in 
political turmoil during this period. 
A recent report from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation “places Paraguay among 
the countries in the region that have suffered setbacks and reversals in its democracy.”402  
After 60 years of single-party rule, Fernando Lugo, in stark contrast to Colombia’s 
Álvaro Uribe, was completely unable to galvanize the nation and quickly lost popular 
support, falling well short of the hope the United States had placed in his administration, 
and further miring the political system in Paraguay. Additionally, as opposed to Uribe 
who spent significant effort to bolster Colombia’s national security apparatus, Lugo spent 
considerable effort shuffling around top brass in the Paraguayan military over alleged 
fears of a military coup. These deep-seated political issues left the nation rife with 
corruption, significantly challenged law enforcement, judicially weak on counterterrorism 
and trafficking, and with little traction or focus for the military.403  
3. Partnership Assessment 
Chapter II introduced two concepts to conceptually gauge the level of potential 
cooperation and effectiveness in a military partnership. The first was the “sweet spot;” 
the notional area where two states’ security interests overlap and partners tend to operate 
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most effectively.   The second was an illustrative function, ஼ܲ ൌ 	ܦ஼ ൅ ܯ஼ ൅ ܧ஼ ൅ ܺ஼ , 
that aided in understanding the overall level of cooperation between two states. 
a. The “Sweet Spot” 
Given the analysis above, Figure 11 illustrates the sweet spots between the United 
States and Colombia, and the United States and Paraguay.   
 
Figure 11.  Overlapping Security Interests between the United States and 
Colombia and Paraguay, respectively.  
A side-by-side comparison illustrates that there was a much larger sweet spot in 
the U.S.-Colombia partnership than there was in the U.S.-Paraguay relationship. In 
Paraguay, the sweet spot mainly consisted of counterterrorism and counter drug issues. 
The 9/11 attacks increased the United States security concerns with regards to Paraguay 
and the greater TBA, however, this research indicates Paraguay did not share the same 
level of concern about the 9/11 attacks and the threats similar acts of terrorism pose to the 
state; as a result 9/11 is depicted on the periphery of the sweet spot.  
In Colombia, the United States had long shared security interests on counter drugs 
and counter terrorism; the events of 9/11 opened the aperture on how the U.S. 
government could address the narcoterrorism threats that faced Colombia and the United 
States. The 2003 hostage crisis was another shared security interest between the two 
countries that served to galvanize the capacity-building effort in Colombia. Additionally, 
the United States and Colombia also share a similar vision for regional security in South 
America.   
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b. The Level of Political Cooperation 
While the sweet spot illustrates the areas of common interests, it does not 
implicitly account for the level of cooperation between two partners. As discussed in 
Chapter II, any and all military action is carried out in support of policy objectives; 
subsequently, military action requires the approval of policymakers. Therefore, the 
overall level of political cooperation between the two states ultimately limits the level of 
potential military cooperation. As discussed in Chapter II, states form partnerships for 
various reasons and along various lines of national power in order to achieve diplomatic, 
economic, and security objectives. The sum total of these efforts equates to the overall 
level of political cooperation between the two states. The following function was used to 
illustrate this relationship: 
஼ܲ ൌ 	ܦ஼ ൅ ܯ஼ ൅ ܧ஼ ൅ ܺ஼ 
where the overall level of political cooperation is expressed as ஼ܲ. 	ܦ஼,ܯ஼, 	ܧ஼, represents 
the levels of diplomatic, military and economic cooperation respectively, and ܺ஼ serves 
as a catch-all, for the sake of this argument, to represent the various other types of 
cooperation that states pursue. When considered in this manner, it is clear that the level of 
political cooperation between the United States and Paraguay was significantly lower that 
of the United States and Colombia. 
(1) Diplomatic Cooperation 
After Lugo’s election in 2008, President Bush made remarks that he supported 
Lugo and his “social justice agenda,” and efforts to curb corruption in Paraguay. After 
Lugo took office “Paraguay received a one-time increase in health and economic growth 
assistance from the United States of $10 million. The United States has supported anti-
corruption and democratization programs in Paraguay including providing more than $60 
million in funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation.”404  However, this 
support pales in comparison to the nearly $7 billion dollars the United States invested in 
Plan Colombia, and Colombia’s regular by-name mention in both of the Bush 
                                                 
404 Ibid., 7. 
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Administration’s National Security Strategies, recognition not paid to Paraguay in either 
document.405 
(2) Military Cooperation 
The level of military cooperation between the United States and Colombia, 
despite USSOF’s military-to-military hiatus in the 1990s, was noticeably higher than in 
Paraguay. First, Colombia’s military, as part of Plan Colombia under the Pastrana 
Administration, transitioned into a professional military oriented on combat operations; 
they were focused and ready to take-on and employ the United States’ military support. 
Additionally, the FARC, ELN and AUC posed a clear and present danger to the 
government of Colombia; this served to catalyze the Colombians, and made it easy for 
the United States to quantify its investments. Paraguay was a different story, however. 
The corruption, political uncertainty, and lack of a tangible threat made military 
cooperation difficult in Paraguay. Additionally, although the United States was concerned 
about the nefarious influence and activities in the TBA—they are very intangible 
concerns, and therefore difficult to assess, quantify, and justify.  
(3) Economic Cooperation 
The United States initiated a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Colombia in 
2006, one of only 20 such agreements he United States has entered in to.406 This FTA 
will “eventually eliminate tariffs and other barriers in bilateral trade in goods and 
services” and further the economic tie between the two countries.407   Additionally, the 
United States is Colombia’s number one trade partner.408  However, Paraguay does not 
                                                 
405 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002; Bush, The National 
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(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2014), 1. 
408 Ibid., i. 
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share a similar trade agreement with the United States, and as of 2013, it ranks 81 among 
U.S. trade partners as opposed to Colombia’s ranking of 21 among partners409   
The level of political cooperation that the United States shared with Colombia 
kept Colombia on the front burner of U.S. policy issues in the western hemisphere 
diplomatically, economically, and militarily. As a result, decision makers were more 
attune to matters concerning Colombia. Likewise, Colombia, particularly under President 
Uribe, was quick to act at the policy level to facilitate U.S. support for Plan Colombia. 
This was not the case in Paraguay. As a result, SOCSOUTH had to deal with the disparity 
in the level of political cooperation that limited their level of military cooperation in 
Paraguay. As Colonel Wilson recollects, “In the National Capital Region there were a lot 
more open ears on Colombia than there were on Paraguay,” as SOCSOUTH sought to 
attain authorities and resources for their efforts in the two countries.410 
c. Analysis 
The nature of the partnership between the United States and Colombia was more 
conducive to capacity building than the partnership between the United States and 
Paraguay. First, Colombia shared more security interests with the United States than 
Paraguay. This increased the latitude within the partnership and provided SOCSOUTH 
multiple different venues for partnership engagement. Second, the United States shared a 
higher level of political cooperation with Colombia than Paraguay; which increased the 
potential for military cooperation making it easier for SOCSOUTH to achieve its 
objectives in Colombia.   
It is true the United States had a longer-standing relationship with Colombia than 
Paraguay. However, the factor that really differentiates the level of cooperation with 
Colombia over that of Paraguay is that Colombia was in a position and willing to act and 
capitalize on U.S. assistance. Faced with a clear and present threat from the FARC, 
guided by a pointed national security strategy, and unified behind the dynamic leadership 
                                                 
409  “Office of the United States Trade Representative,” Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, accessed November 15, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/. 
410 Wilson, interview. 
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of Uribe, Colombia soaked-up every last drop of U.S. support and immediately put it to 
use. Almost the complete opposite, Paraguay was not galvanized by any sort of clear or 
present danger, lacked a coherent strategy, and was troubled by domestic political 
turmoil. As a result, Paraguay did not receive the same level of policy attention in the 
United States that Colombia did during this period, which served to limit SOCSOUTH’s 
capacity-building potential in Paraguay and increase the TSOC’s workload to achieve 
policy decisions in support of their efforts there.  
It is impossible to discern if SOCSOUTH’s BPC efforts in Paraguay would have 
been more successful had Paraguay faced a clear and present threat like the FARC. 
However, given the catalyzing effect the FARC threat had on the effort in Colombia, it 
should not be discounted either. In the Colombia example, the threat was necessary but 
not in and of itself sufficient to produce the BPC success that was ultimately realized.  
Likewise, had Paraguay perceived a similar threat, the government still would have 
required a coherent strategy to counter it, the political dynamics to ensure the strategy 
was supported and resourced, and the political will and commitment to carry it out. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that such a threat certainly would have helped to galvanize 
the collective effort. 
C. THE RULES AND TOOLS 
The section will examine the rules and tools of SOCSOUTH’s BPC enterprises in 
the two countries. The rules represent the authorities that empower and limit the capacity 
building enterprise; the tools encompass the assortment of programs and activities the 
enterprise has as their disposal.   Together they inform how the capacity building 
enterprise is able to function.   
1. The Tools 
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of the tools SOCSOUTH put to use in 
Colombia and Paraguay. At first glance, the tools employed appear very similar. Closer 
inspection, however, reveals that these tools were used to different effect in the two 
countries.   
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Table 1.   Side-by-Side Comparison of the Tools Employed by SOCSOUTH 
in Colombia and Paraguay411 
Colombia Paraguay 
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
Combined Exercises Combined Exercises 
Key Leader Engagements (KLE) 
Education (IMET and CTFP) 
Personnel Exchange Program (PEP)412 
Key Leader Engagements (KLE) 
Education (IMET and CTFP) 
 
Operationalization (OWS)  
 
The primary difference was in the number and nature of the events, particularly 
with regard to combined exercises and KLEs. Colombia hosted and participated in more 
combined exercises than Paraguay did, and they performed more complex tasks and 
missions during these exercises than their Paraguayan counterparts.413  Additionally, 
there was a clear-cut difference between the KLEs conducted in Colombia and the ones 
conducted in Paraguay. As Wilson recalls, KLE’s were conducted in Colombia 
“constantly,” whereas they were carried out much less frequently in Paraguay.414  
Additionally, SOUTHCOM and their four-star commanding officer were very personally 
involved in the KLEs in Colombia lending more weight to the engagement; however in 
Paraguay it was SOCSOUTH, a two-star headquarters, which was normally the primary-
lead for KLEs in country. This observation is also reflective of the disparity in the level 
of political cooperation between the two countries. 
Operationalization was introduced by the author in Chapter II as another tool that 
SOF can employ in support of capacity building. By operationalizing a partnership, SOF 
is able to capitalize on the hyper-focus that normally accompanies real-world operations 
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by building significant amounts of capacity in a much shorter period of time than would 
be possible under normal conditions. The impact of the operationalization of the BPC 
enterprise in Colombia will be addressed several more times in this chapter, but of 
particular note at this point is the impact OWS had on the KLEs in Colombia. The higher 
operational stakes appear to have increased the payoff potential for KLEs in the country. 
This is seen most clearly with then-Brigadier General Cleveland’s KLEs following the 
successful hostage rescue in 2008. It was through these back-to-back KLEs that 
Cleveland successfully planted the seed for Colombia’s own SOCOM-like headquarters. 
What Wilson estimated would have taken at least five more years before the SOCFWD in 
Colombia would have even mentioned the idea of such a headquarters, the opportunity 
Cleveland’s KLE presented put the matter to rest in a single meeting.415 
2. The Rules 
Table 2 provides a side-by-side comparison of the authorities that governed 
SOCSOUTH’s activities in the two countries. SOCSOUTH was able to operate within 
the same parameters with regards to CNT, Section 1207, and Section 1208 authorities; 
however, Section 1207 was only authorized in Paraguay in 2009 whereas it was 
authorized in Colombia from 2007 through 2009. Section 1208, as noted in Chapter II, is 
a SOF-specific provision in the NDAA that “provides authority and funds for U.S. SOF 
to train and equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations.”416  Although Section 1208 was authorized in both countries, SOCSOUTH 
had a much harder time lobbying for its approval in Paraguay.417  This is also reflective 
of the challenges faced at the policy-level when there is a smaller overlap of national 
interests and a lower level of political cooperation between partners, and how it increases 
the TSOC’s workload by requiring more energy to secure those approvals. 
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Table 2.   Side-by-Side Comparison of the Rules Employed by SOCSOUTH 








Operation Willing Spirit (OWS)  
 
 The biggest difference in rules between the two enterprises is the authorities 
granted to SOCSOUTH in support of OWS in Colombia. From 2005 until 2008 
SOCSOUTH received increased authorities and resourcing under OWS which eventually 
allowed them to increase their operational risk by first pushing U.S. sensitive site 
exploitation teams forward after FARC hostage camps were located and secured, and 
then ultimately to conduct combine U.S.-Colombian operations in support of the hostage 
rescue. These operational requirements increased the nature and urgency of the capacity 
building in Colombia.    Expanding the types of capacities that needed to be built while 
also capitalizing on the “rapid transformation effect” of operationalization noted 
previously. The urgency and political sensitivities associated with rescuing American 
hostages also made it easier to secure approvals in certain instances. As a result, the BPC 
enterprise in Colombia grew quickly and extensively from 2005 to 2008 and is directly 
attributable to Operation Willing Spirit.   
3. Analysis 
The BPC enterprises in Colombia and Paraguay shared a number of common 
rules and tools; however, the nature of the partnerships seems to have very clearly 
impacted how they were applied. Both enterprises utilized various events like JCETs and 
exercises to maintain a persistent presence in the countries, however, the breadth and 
level of training at those events varied greatly between the two countries. Although, the 
disparity could be easily attributed to the skill level of the respective militaries at the 
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outset of this period, and to the scale and scope of the two different enterprises, there are 
some additional factors that warrant consideration.   First, there was the lower level of 
military cooperation between Paraguay and the United States, which served to impede 
progress, which has already been addressed.   Secondly, as Wilson observes, “there was 
just a different level of focus in Paraguay than in Colombia.”419  This difference may be 
attributable the lack of political cohesion and direction in Paraguay as identified in the 
previous section. 
The single most significant difference in the rules and tools is Operation Willing 
Spirit in Colombia. OWS provided SOCSOUTH and their BPC enterprise in Colombia 
increased operational latitude, resourcing, political and military cooperation, and created 
the synergistic effect of increasing drive, focus, and commitment between the partners. 
These factors combined to allow SOCSOUTH to make capacity building gains in a 
fraction of the time they would have normally taken. However, this was not a planned 
component of SOCSOUTH’s BPC engagement. It was an unexpected event that changed 
the calculus in Colombia. The point here is less about what would have happened if a 
similar event occurred in Paraguay, and more about highlighting the dynamic nature 
partnerships and capacity building enterprises. It is also a tale of seizing and maximizing 
operational opportunities when they appear, as they possess the potential for significant 
capacity building gains. 
D. THE CHAIN OF ACTORS 
This section will examine and analyze the chain of actors that brought both of 
these BPC enterprises to life. As discussed in Chapter III, the chain of actors is a 
representation of USSOF posture in BPC enterprises. The nodes are hierarchical for 
command and control, but networked through a free-flow of ideas, opportunities, and 
influence. An examination of the BPC enterprise through this lens provides insight into 
the enterprise at the operational level, as well as illuminates the impact of the partnership 
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environment on the undertaking. Figure 12 provides a side-by-side depiction of the chain 
of actors that comprised both enterprises circa 2008. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Side-by-side Comparison of the Chain of Actors in Colombia and 
Paraguay 
1. Colombia 
In Colombia, SOCSOUTH employed Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) elements, and members of Naval 
Special Warfare at the tactical level. This allowed capacity building to occur with a wider 
range of Colombian tactical units, which included Colombia’s counter terrorism force, 
counter drug units, jungle, riverine, reconnaissance, and paramilitary formations.420  This 
broad level of engagement at the base of the chain provided both partners better access to 
each other at a tactical level, but also increased visibility and understanding up the chain. 
Together, this created the requirement for greater bandwidth at the operational and policy 
level in the form of awareness and decision making to support these tactical level 
engagements.   
As Colonel Wilson was quoted as saying earlier, there was a different level of 
focus in Colombia. This higher level of operational acuity is accredited to Colombia’s 
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internal drive to revamp their military and defeat the FARC, and also to Operation 
Willing Spirit, which drew the Department of State and the Department of Defense into 
very close alignment in Colombia, and helped to further focus the Colombian’s efforts.    
Additionally, the higher level of political and military cooperation between the two 
countries brought the partners closer together horizontally; increasing the likelihood of 
compromise and combined operational effectiveness.  
2. Paraguay 
In Paraguay, the scale and scope of the enterprise was much smaller than the 
effort in Colombia. However, there were also fewer opportunities to engage USSOF in 
Paraguay. While there were a number of units that SOCSOUTH was able to engage with 
in Colombia, SOCSOUTH in Paraguay had to build a unit from scratch. As a result, 
SOCSOUTH was only able to employ Army Special Forces, in a much smaller quantity, 
and very small slices of Civil Affairs and MISO teams.   
The smaller engagement at the tactical level did not require the same bandwidth 
up the chain, and therefore warranted less attention. This only exacerbated the challenges 
SOCSOUTH had to overcome with regards to the lower level of political and military 
cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, the actors in Paraguay did not 
benefit from the focusing and catalyzing effects of a clear and present threat and a crisis 
situation like in Colombia.   The result was a more vertically and horizontally dispersed 
chain of actors.   
3. Analysis  
The chain of actors that comprised the BPC enterprises in Colombia and Paraguay 
clearly look different when compared side by side. In Colombia, SOCSOUTH was able 
to engage with a greater number of tactical level units than in Paraguay. The nature of the 
threat in Colombia and the urgency of OWS brought the actors in the chain closer 
together, an effect that was not seen in Paraguay. Additionally, the level of cooperation 
between Colombia and the United States was higher than that of the United States and 
Paraguay, which drew the Colombians and Americans closer together than in Paraguay.   
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These factors resulted in a more resilient chain of actors in Colombia that was 
able to synchronize their efforts more efficiently, and could reach compromise more 
easily because both sides had less distance to travel to meet in the middle.   The chain 
was made more resilient by its broader base of engagement which not only increased 
capacity building opportunities, but also increased the demands for operational and policy 
support from the actors higher-up the chain. Thanks to the focusing effects of OWS and 
pitched battle against the FARC, the actors in the chain were brought closer together 
minimizing the distance between actors when it came to purpose, understanding, unity of 
effort, and synchronization. 
E. SUMMARY 
The results of SOCSOUTH’s BPC efforts in Colombia and Paraguay vary for a 
number of interrelated reasons. First, Colombia presented a better military partner for the 
United States than Paraguay did. The United States and Colombia shared a higher level 
of political cooperation and a proportionally higher level of military cooperation, than 
experienced in Paraguay during this period. Additionally, Colombia was a partner poised 
for action, whereas Paraguay was a partner hampered by domestic political issues. As 
depicted in Figure 13, Colombia and the United States also shared more security interests 
than Paraguay did, increasing the opportunities for engagement in Colombia.   
 
Figure 13.  Overlapping Security Interests between the United States and 
Colombia and Paraguay, respectively 
After 9/11 the United States became more focused on counterterrorism efforts 
around the globe, as a result, the U.S. Congress changed the rules for engagement making 
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it easier for SOCSOUTH to partner in South America. To achieve their objectives in both 
countries SOCSOUTH brought together a number of different authorities and employed a 
number of tools. Although SOCSOUTH applied essentially the same rules and tools in 
both Colombia and Paraguay, SOCSOUTH was able to accomplish more with them in 
Colombia than in Paraguay. A factor attributed partially to the fact Colombian forces 
were slightly more advanced than Paraguayan forces at the outset of this period, but also 
because Colombia was more willing and able to do more with the tools the United States 
offered than Paraguay was.   
Combined, these two broad factors informed the chain of actors that took part in 
the capacity building enterprises, and how they interacted with each other. The chain in 
Colombia was clearly more robust, but the links in the chain are also shorter, as 
illustrated in Figure 14. The actors were drawn closer together both horizontally and 
vertically through an operational focus not seen in Paraguay. This focus increased 
synchronization and cooperation in Colombia, whereas its absence hindered the 
enterprise in Paraguay.   
 
Figure 14.  Side-by-side Comparison of Chain of Actors in Colombia and 
Paraguay 
It is important to reiterate that the enterprise in Colombia also benefited from the 
positive effects of operationalization and the galvanizing effect of a clear and present 
threat. Whereas the Colombians and Americans were both given cause for accelerated 
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results due to the insurgent threat in Colombia and to rescue the American hostages, a 
similar situation did not exist in Paraguay. These intangibles complicate the comparison 
between the Colombian and Paraguayan case studies, but they also serve to highlight 
some important aspects of capacity building. First, catalyzing effects such as these 
present an opportunity for rapid transformation. In the case of Colombia, the threat of the 
FARC and the hostage crises increased focus, authorities, and resourcing; which resulted 
in more capacity built in a shorter period of time, and served to institutionalize the 
Colombian SOF capacity the United States had invested in. While it is impossible to 
know how the presence of a similar threat in Paraguay would have changed the 
partnership environment in that case, it is clear that the FARC energized the partnership 
environment in Colombia and it would not be unreasonable to assume that there would 
have been a similar effect in Paraguay. 
Second, these events create unique opportunities to be capitalized on. In this 
example, General Cleveland took advantage of the newly built capacity used to rescue the 
American hostages, and ears and minds that the spectacular rescue opened to plant the 
seed for a SOCOM-like headquarters for Colombian SOF. The results catapulted what 
was an O-6 position to a two-star general position with a seat at the table with the other 
service chiefs in Colombia.   
Third, these catalyzing effects are impossible to predict. It was impossible to 
know on February 12, 2003 that the following day three Americans would be taken 
hostage and a named operation would be created as a result. This point reinforces the 
observation that partnerships are dynamic and unpredictable. As a result, BPC enterprises 
need to be prepared to capitalize on opportunities as they emerge, and equally prepared to 
cope with or counter unforeseen and uncontrollable negative events.    
Chapter VI completes this research by drawing conclusions and implications 
about building partner capacity, and Special Operations Forces role in the process.  
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This research examines how USSOF builds partner capacity. It is an effort 
towards increasing the level of understanding of a core component of what U.S. Special 
Operations Forces do and a cornerstone of the post-9/11 American national security 
strategy. This research has drawn on interviews, conversations, and the written works of 
senior USSOF leaders, as well as national security documents, congressional and news 
reports, joint doctrine, historical and contemporary examples, and the author’s own 
operational experiences with capacity building. When aggregated, these sources indicate 
that BPC is far less nebulous, yet far more intricate then commonly recognized. Based on 
this research the following conclusions have been drawn.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Building Partner Capacity 
This research has led to several conclusions about BPC and how it is carried out 
by the United States. 
a. Defining BPC 
Building partner capacity is a whole-of-government approach employed by the 
United States to achieve national security objectives. At the macro level of policy and 
strategy BPC is a concept; it refers to and describes the act of helping others—partners—
to get better at something. Who the partners are, and what they are getting better at vary 
greatly, but they are all linked by the common theme of using one partner’s strengths to 
compensate for the other’s weakness in an effort to achieve a mutual security benefit.   
While a neat and tidy concept at the macro level, BPC is anything but neat and 
tidy at the micro level. Different government agencies understand and approach capacity 
building differently given their institutional predispositions. They use different—yet 
sometimes confusingly similar—terminology, programs, and authorities. Additionally, 
different partners—both U.S. agencies and departments, and international partners—may 
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have competing interests, which create situations where one agenda is advanced at the 
expense of the other.   
BPC is also challenged as a term. Taken separately, the words partner and 
capacity are vague and broad. When the gerund building is thrown into the mix the 
aggregate of building partner capacity can be applied in a myriad of ways, to a number of 
different actors. As a result BPC is predisposed to serve as a catchall phrase, making it 
difficult to pinpoint how exactly capacity with any given partner is built, and equally 
difficult to articulate success or failure in such endeavors.      
The challenge that contemporary threats pose require solutions that are beyond 
the ability of any one U.S. agency or department, which is why BPC is understood to be 
complete government approach. The primary U.S. BPC-leads are the DOD, DOS, and 
USAID, of which DOD has staked its claim as the primary stakeholder. Below the policy 
level at the DOD, BPC transforms from a clean, clear-cut concept into a system of gears, 
sprockets, and crisscrossing wires.   
Technically, according to U.S. joint doctrine, the military does not conduct 
Building Partner Capacity, because BPC is not a doctrinal term or task. What the military 
actually does is build partner capacity through various disaggregated operational tasks, 
programs, and activities, the aggregate total of which results in an increased partner 
capacity. The military carries these tasks out under various national authorities and with 
the approval of various, and often numerous, decision makers. The sum total of which is 
situationally dependent.      
The authorities that govern U.S. interaction with foreign governments, 
particularly military interactions, are old. The law that governs how U.S. foreign 
assistance, which a substantial number of U.S. BPC efforts fall under, was signed into 
law by President John F. Kennedy 40 years before the attacks on 9/11. Many of the 
programs and activities that the U.S. military uses to build capacity are equally 
antiquated, Cold War relics that remain on the books in an age of new threats and 
dynamics. Although the DOD BPC machine is a system of rusty gears, misaligned 
sprockets, and “jury-rigged” crisscrossing wires—it still works. Furthermore, it is the 
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only machine the joint force has to work with, so it is incumbent upon the military to 
make it work to the best of their ability.   
Progress to streamline these processes has been made, but only incrementally, and 
at a gruelingly slow pace. It is important for the military professional to remember that 
the purpose of the “A” Words—authorities, approvals and appropriations—is to protect 
the U.S. Constitution and the image and ideology of the United States. Although 
increasing the operational efficiency in the pursuit of national security is a priority, it 
takes, as the U.S. system of government is designed, a backseat to protecting the 
constitution. Therefore, the operational level planner and below is better served learning 
how to operate more efficiently within the system, than hoping or waiting for the system 
to change. 
b. The Partnership Environment 
Further complicating the efforts to build partner capacity is the partner and the 
nature of the partnership itself. With respect to the partner, each one is different. 
However, it is probably safe to assume that for all of the points of friction the U.S. 
military has to overcome to build capacity, that the partner military and their government 
share a similar level of friction. These points of friction serve to illuminate aspects of the 
partnership environment (Figure 15), the aggregate of factors and conditions that 
influence the partnership, but only partially. 
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Figure 15.  The Partnership Environment 
An international partnership is dynamic. A partnership is driven primarily by the 
states’ national interests, but is greatly influenced by world events and other phenomena 
that may cause those interests to change instantly, and without warning. The level of 
political cooperation between the two countries ultimately bounds the capacity building 
potential of any partnership. Since the partnership is inherently fluid, one can expect 
fluidity in how efficiently and effectively capacity can be built over any given period of 
time. This dynamic reality places greater tension on the already inefficient and 
programmatic gears and sprockets of the American BPC system. Compensating for and 
managing these incongruences, and articulating their operational impact, comprise an 
onerous burden that falls on the military formations and commands tasked with carrying 
these missions out.  
c. The BPC Enterprise 
To bring all of these disparate pieces together, to sustain them against the external 
influences of the partnership environment, and to maintain them for the long durations 
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necessary to build capacity, is beyond the ability of any one unit or command; it takes an 
entire enterprise. The nature of U.S. BPC requires assembling and managing an entire 
series of authorities, approvals, funding lines, activities, programs, and people to support 
the effort and accomplish complicated and interrelated tasks in support of the overall 
BPC objective. Every BPC enterprise will be different in form and function; but they will 
all serve the purpose of balancing the programmatics of government bureaucracy against 
the dynamic nature of partnerships, and will be required to synchronize efforts vertically 
from the policy to the tactical level, and horizontally with the partner nation.   
d. The Seven Principles of Capacity Building 
This research has identified seven principles that are critical to the success of 
capacity-building efforts. They are: common purpose, endurance, opportunism, 
resilience, synchronization, transparency, and unity of effort.   
1. Common purpose is what brings two partners together. This research 
advances that partners are more likely to share common purpose when 
their national security interests overlap. However, as the case in Colombia 
demonstrated with regard to the hostage rescue, common purpose can 
develop at any time during a capacity-building effort; conversely it can 
also degrade over time as well.  
2. Endurance is vital to sustain the enterprise for the extended periods of 
time necessary to build partner capacity. 
3. Opportunism is the mindset and practice of seizing the moment when 
unforeseen circumstances create an opportunity. The case in Colombia 
highlighted several examples when SOCSOUTH seized opportunities as 
they presented themselves. Although these opportunities are 
unpredictable, that is not an excuse for being unprepared. In-depth 
operational planning and understanding, and working towards the other six 
principles will increase the ability to rapidly identify and capitalize on 
these opportunities.  
4. Resilience is a necessary quality of any BPC enterprise to cope with and 
adapt to unforeseen events and changes in political cooperation or policies 
over time.    
5. Synchronization is required to bring together disparate programs, 
activities, and authorities, with their various programmatic timelines and 
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approvals, in order to get the right skills and resources in the right place at 
the right time. 
6. Transparency horizontally between partners and vertically between 
actors stifles distrust and increases the synergistic effects of the other 
principles, which results in a more efficient and effective enterprise. 
7. Unity of effort refers to the actors in the enterprise working together, over 
extended periods of time, towards a common goal. 
Combined, these principles serve to fortify the BPC enterprise and allow it to function in 
the otherwise inhospitable partnership environment (Figure 16).   
 
 
Figure 16.  The Seven Principles of Capacity Building 
2. USSOF: The United States Capacity-Building Force of Choice 
Building the capacity of foreign forces has always been a primary task of USSOF. 
From the earliest days of U.S. Army Special Forces in Europe and the highlands of South 
Vietnam, to Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan, USSOF, regardless of branch or 
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Service, has been building capacity in one way or another. BPC is an integral part of 
USSOF’s indirect approach, and something, according to the former SOCOM 
commander, “SOF focuses intently on.” 
 There are three factors that differentiate USSOF BPC efforts from conventional 
DOD efforts: USSOF’s operational history; how and where USSOF is applied 
operationally; and USSOF’s nimble and adaptive force structure. The first difference is 
USSOF’s long and dense history of capacity building that spans over 70 years. Over that 
time, USSOF has developed not only a reputation as abled and effective capacity 
builders, but also an institutional knowledge and understanding of how to build capacity 
at the tactical level.   
This BPC imprint can be seen on the core activities that USSOF conducts. Of the 
twelve core USSOF activities, eight of them, CWMD, CT, UW, FID, SFA, COIN, MISO, 
and CAO have BPC components or directly support BPC efforts. To the tactical level 
operator on the ground the tasks shared between these relational, and often-overlapping 
activities, look very similar. They mostly revolve around OTERA tasks—organizing, 
training, equipping, rebuilding/building, and advising—partner nation forces. They 
require skillsets such as indigenous languages, communications, weapons marksmanship, 
demolitions, construction, and increasingly a working knowledge of the rule of law and 
governance.  
Second, USSOF is most often applied in “gaps” and “seams” where political 
sensitivities are such that a large conventional presence is not politically feasible, but the 
mission requirements are beyond the abilities of the interagency partners on the ground. 
USSOF is trained and equipped to apply special techniques and technologies to achieve 
their missions. When properly supported, USSOF is capable of producing significant 
operational gains while maintaining a very low American profile. To that end, USSOF 
can be used to address national security concerns without requiring an irreversible, public 
policy decision, like the deployment of a conventional formation would. These qualities 
make USSOF suitable for a wide range of operations and mission profiles, and as a result 
USSOF often finds itself employed, and has grown very comfortable operating, in new 
and dynamic situations that require adaptive and creative solutions. 
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Third, USSOF has a nimble and flexible force structure that allows for the 
assembly of highly capable and geographically dispersed actors in an arranging chain. 
This chain allows USSOF to synchronize and maintain the SOF BPC enterprise and unity 
of effort over the long periods of time and distance that BPC requires. Additionally, when 
properly managed, the chain of actors provides the SOF BPC enterprise resiliency by 
capitalizing on the strengths of different actors along the chain to better weather the 
dynamic partnership environment. Combined, these attributes and qualities allow USSOF 
unique and effective ways to achieve the seven principles of capacity building. 
a. The Arranging Chain 
The arranging chain serves to illustrate and better understand how the actors that 
bring a BPC enterprise to life fit together. Examining the actors in a BPC enterprise 
through this lens aids in identifying the inherent strengths and weakness of different 
actors. It also serves to better understand the partner nation’s chain of actors, increasing 
transparency and allowing planners to identify potential sources of friction within the 
partner’s chain that might otherwise be overlooked.   
b. Operational and Strategic Capacity-Building Shortfalls 
These factors combine to imbue the USSOF institution and the service members 
that comprise it with a certain proclivity for BPC. This knowledge and understanding is 
immaterial and difficult to capture, but it permeates USSOF’s approach to BPC. The 
result is an exceedingly high level of comfort with the task, and a level of innovation and 
creativity in its tactical application, almost subconsciously, that is not seen in 
conventional BPC efforts. However, despite the expertise at the tactical level of capacity 
building, there is a gap of knowledge at the operational level, and a lack of articulation at 
the strategic level as to how USSOF goes about building partner capacity.   
The lack of articulation was addressed sufficiently in Linda Robinson’s special 
report to the Council on Foreign Relations as noted in Chapter III. Additionally, research 
in support of this thesis, and the author’s own operational experience clearly indicate that 
the new strategic focus on BPC, the nature of the security challenges, and the operational 
requirements they demand, have presented USSOCOM and the TSOCs with 
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unprecedented requirements that the commands are still trying to figure out how to best 
address. 
As a result TSOC-level commanders and their staffs are figuring out solutions and 
approaches on the fly. Case in point would be the creative application of command and 
control in the two SOCSOUTH case studies, where the TSOC created an in-country 
headquarters to better synchronize the efforts the TSOC needed to accomplish, but was 
not designed to conduct. It would also appear that the “second nature” familiarity USSOF 
has with the tactical application of BPC, the it is just something we do level of 
understanding, has left USSOF underprepared at the operational and strategic level. This 
shortfall is most clearly seen in the lack of institutionalized knowledge, planning, 
coordination, assessment, and articulation of capacity building requirements that USSOF 
is now being called upon to carryout.      
C. A NOTE ON THE CASE STUDIES 
There are several points that are worth highlighting or reiterating at this point with 
regards to the case studies presented in this work. First and foremost, USSOF were not 
the only DOD entities or formations operating in either country during this period. 
Therefore, this work is absolutely not trying to credit the gains in Colombia or Paraguay 
solely to USSOF and SOCSOUTH, or to the United States in general, as Colombia and 
Paraguay, as with any host nation, were the most integral components of these two cases.   
Second, the SOC-Forwards in Colombia and Paraguay were not solely focused on 
BPC; those headquarters were operating along several lines of effort.421  However, they 
did serve a very critical role as the in-country synchronizer for all USSOF BPC efforts, 
and maintained excellent balance between the strengths and weakness of the actors on the 
chain. This research indicates that the ability to provide that level of balance should be 
accredited to their persistent presence in the country, and of having the commensurate 
authority to demonstrate commitment and provide support horizontally and vertically 
                                                 
421 Averett, Cervantes, and O’Hara, An Analysis of Special Operations Command-South’s Distributive 
Command and Control Concept. 
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within the partnership. As mentioned in Chapter III, SOLOs and similar TSOC-specific 
positions such as SOFREPs can also fill this role as an in-country synchronizer.     
Third, this work advanced the concept of operationalization as a tool of SOF 
BPC. Operation Willing Spirit in Colombia presented an example of just such a case. 
However, it is important to note that the level at which operationalization occurs will 
determine how much of an impact the approach has. For example, in Colombia, OWS 
required action from all the actors on both sides of the chain. As a result both chains were 
galvanized from top to bottom, which in turn created a significant capacity building 
effect. However, in other examples mentioned in this work, specifically SOCEUR’s 
operationalization of its partnerships in Hungary in Romania, the effects of 
operationalization are really only seen at the tactical level. This is because USSOF teams 
and SOF teams from Hungary and Romania train, deploy, and operate together in 
Afghanistan at a tactical level, with little, in comparison to Colombia, interface at the 
operational and strategic level in Hungary and Romania.422 This operationalization 
definitely created the potential for additional capacity building opportunities in both 
countries, but it is important to note that that potential was not automatically realized 
solely because the partnership had become operationalized.    
D. COMMON THEMES 
Several common themes emerged during this research. They are outlined below. 
1. BPC is Rife with Frustration.  
For the USSOF planner and operator, the operational planning and execution of a 
BPC enterprise can seem like a futile Sisyphean task; like trying to build a house of cards 
outside on a windy day. The gears and sprockets of the American system do not align 
properly, the time horizons are endless, the political situation is always in flux, and your 
partner is dealing with the same exact problems. Also, everyone’s perspective on the 
chain is different; what may make sense at the top of the chain may not make sense at the 
                                                 
422 Author’s personal experience with 10th Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command 
Europe from 2009–2012.  
 143
bottom, this can also lead to more frustration. But since all actors influence the chain 
equally, these frustrations need to be kept in check as they could have an unintended 
negative impact on the entire partnership. 
2. Transparency is the Best Cure for Frustration.  
Open and frank lines of communication horizontally and vertically along both 
chains will increase overall understanding of the situation and serve to alleviate a large 
amount of undue frustration. It is important to note transparency must be maintained over 
time as well. As different units rotate in and out of theater they will require the same level 
of understanding to maintain the enterprises’ overall level of transparency.   
3. The Most Important Vote is the Partner’s.  
The partner has to be ready and willing to receive the capacity-building efforts. In 
the case of Colombia, the Colombians were more than ready; in Paraguay, it appears that 
the time was not right. The time in Colombia was right because the Government and 
People of Colombia had decided they were committed to securing their country.  It was 
from that commitment the other positive factors of the U.S.-Colombian partnership 
flowed.  The FARC and other insurgent groups served as a catalyst for this decision, 
other unforeseen events such as the hostage taking also served as accelerants to capacity 
building, but ultimately it was the commitment to change that made the time right for 
capacity-building efforts in Colombia.  The Government and People of Paraguay lacked 
this level of commitment to change, at least with respect Paraguayan security interests 
that were of mutual interest to the United States. Therefore, when considering their 
approach to BPC with a partner nation, planners must consider how much capacity 
building bandwidth the partner is ready for and can take on; keeping in mind that these 
are long-term endeavors, and that sometimes less is more. 
4. The Principles of BPC Apply to Persistent Engagement 
Persistent engagement is a keystone concept of SOCOM 2020 and the Global SOF 
Network. SOCOM 2020 states that “in support of Ambassadors and GCCs, aligned with 
our interagency partners, SOF will provide small unit, forward-based persistent presence 
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closely integrated with our partners to protect our interests and provide rapid 
response.”423  As indicated throughout this thesis, BPC is either the primary focus or a 
critical supporting element of the overwhelming majority of USSOF’s persistent 
engagements around the world. As a result, there is a high degree of transferability 
between the principles and components of USSOF BPC and USSOF persistent 
engagement writ large. 
E. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO PLANNING AND DESIGNING A 
SOF BPC ENTERPRISE 
The following is a recommended approach for TSOC planners to consider when 
designing and planning a SOF BPC enterprise.  As noted above, this model can also be 
applied to planning any type of persistent engagement enterprise. In some cases, national 
directives or world events will direct a TSOC to initiate a BPC endeavor with a partner 
nation. However, there are cases, where a TSOC may choose to pursue capacity building 
on their own accord as a means to achieving certain objectives within their AOR. In any 
case, there are certain considerations and assessments that the TSOC should consider 
before embarking on such an endeavor. This approach considers the partnership 
environment and applies the seven principles of BPC to help develop a suitable BPC 
enterprise to best meet the TSOC’s needs.   
Before beginning the planning process, it is important for the TSOC to recognize 
that they have varying degrees of control, as discussed above, over the effectiveness of 
the BPC enterprise. In terms of the seven principles, these varying degrees of control are 
depicted in Figure 17. By design, command climate, and approach the TSOC can increase 
the endurance, opportunism, transparency, and resilience of the enterprise fairly 
effectively. 
                                                 
423 U.S. Special Operations Command, “SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear,” 5. 
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Figure 17.  TSOC Level of Control over the Seven Principles of Capacity 
Building 
However, while a TSOC can pour additional energy into synchronization and 
unity of effort, which at times they may have to, actors outside of the TSOC’s span of 
control play a significant factor in the overall level of these two principles. Finally, 
common purpose cannot be manufactured. It either has to exist from the outset, or be 
identified and cultivated over time. The planning approach outlined below seeks to 
identify partners were the likelihood of common purpose is the highest. However, besides 
identifying these potential partners in the planning process, maintaining and cultivating 
that sense of common purpose will become the incumbent responsibility of the actors that 
comprise the enterprise.      
1. Conduct an Assessment of the Partnership Environment 
The partnership environment is the aggregate of factors and conditions that 
inform the partnership between two military partners.  This initial assessment is used to 
determine the overall potential of the partnership.  This work offered two methods for 
assessing the potential of a capacity building partnership: determining the “sweet spot” of 
national security interests; and assessing the level of political cooperation between the 
two countries using the ஼ܲ 	formula.   
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The “sweet spot” assessment helps to determine the amount of common ground 
that the TSOC will have to operate within the partner nation. (Figure 18)  The greater the 
overlap of interests, as was the case in Colombia, the greater the latitude the TSOC will 
have to connect with partner nation and the U.S. country team. It will also serve to 
identify potential engagement opportunities. Essentially, the assessment is rather simple: 
identify each partner’s national interests and where there is overlap; the greater the 
overlap, the greater the opportunity to engage with the partner, the greater the potential 
for success.  
 
Figure 18.  Aligning Common Interests424  
However, just because security interests overlap, does not necessarily mean that 
the level of political cooperation between the United States and the PN will be of a 
sufficient level to effectively build capacity. The ஼ܲ ൌ 	ܦ஼ ൅ ܯ஼ ൅ ܧ஼ ൅ ܺ஼  formula is a 
simple way to assess the level of political cooperation between two partners. It operates 
under the premise that the political cooperation between two countries is the sum of the 
diplomatic, military, economic, and other connections that exist between the two states.   
In short, the lower the level of political cooperation, as was the case in Paraguay, 
the lower the potential for military cooperation. Conversely, the greater the level of 
political cooperation, as was the case in Colombia, the greater the potential for military 
                                                 
424 Security Force Assistance Handbook, 2012, II-2. 
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cooperation. No matter how hard a TSOC may try, it is impossible, given the United 
States Code and the laws and policies that govern foreign engagement, for military 
cooperation to exceed the overall level of political cooperation between the two 
countries. To overcome the low-level of cooperation, the TSOC will either have to 
increase its efforts and resources in the enterprise, with no guarantee of return on the 
investment; or lower its expectations with regards to the amount of capacity that will be 
built or increase the duration of time that will be needed to build the desired capacity.    
This assessment should be frank, honest, and direct. The potential for friction and 
frustration in a BPC enterprise is inherently high; inaccurate assessments and 
misinformed expectations will only serve to increase those detracting factors. These 
assessments should include:  
 U.S. interests in the PN and region; 
 The GCC’s interests and theater campaign plan; 
 The resources the TSOC has available to it; 
 The political capital the TSOC and GCC have with the State Department 
regional desk and with the country team;425  
 The political situation in the PN, namely the PN’s domestic political scene;  
 PN civil-military relations; 
 The state and focus of the PN military; 
 And how easily the PN’s regional neighbors influence the PN, as was the case 
in Paraguay.   
The healthier all of these relationships are, the greater the potential for success.     
Assessing the level of political cooperation can be as in-depth or abbreviated as 
the commander requires or as time permits. In the end, the goal is an assessment of the 
                                                 
425 As observed by former Secretary Gates, and in the case studies of Colombia and Paraguay, most of 
these BPC enterprises will be established in countries where the United States is not at war, and the State 
Department is the lead agency.  Therefore the U.S. country teams and their higher authorities are integral 
parts of the capacity building enterprise.  
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partnership environment. This will provide the TSOC greater understanding of the 
limitations they may face, opportunities that may present themselves, and better inform 
how they should construct their BPC enterprise. Regardless if the BPC undertaking is 
directive or elective, the partnership assessment will assist commanders and staffs in 
determining when, where, and how to best apply the limited resources at their disposal. 
2. Define the BPC Objective 
Like any other military operation, BPC requires an objective. The BPC objective 
should not only serve as a desired end state, but it should also serve as the focal point for 
all actors involved in the BPC enterprise; providing a degree of transparency and unity to 
the enterprise over time and space. The objective should also serve as the “yardstick” to 
measure and articulate the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the enterprise. It is from this 
objective that the all milestones and measures of effectiveness should be derived. 
3. Identify the Rules and Tools Available 
Military engagement cannot occur without the authority and approval to do so. 
The nature of these authorities and the fidelity of the approvals will determine how the 
TSOC is able operate within the partnership environment. Commanders and their staffs 
should be well versed in the authorities available to them, and with whom the approval 
authority resides. 
The two case studies presented here indicate that there is no one-size-fits-all 
authority that will enable the TSOC to achieve all of its objectives. As result, it would be 
helpful for the command to think in terms of the effects they intend to achieve, and then 
reverse engineer what combination of authorities will best accomplish these objectives. 
This will serve to better focus the staff’s limited time and resources to pursuing 
authorities and approvals that will best meet the needs of the BPC enterprise.   
The tools are the mechanisms that turn the commander’s capacity building intent 
in to reality. These tools include programs, activities, funding, and resources; and they 
can be combined in a limitless number of ways to produce a myriad of different results 
and effects. In terms of engagement and resiliency, more is better; but the application of 
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these tools has to be planned, systematic, and controlled. The TSOC should begin 
identifying what tools it has at its disposal that can aid in achieving the BPC objective, 
and how to ensure there controlled application. 
This work listed only the most common tools used by USSOF in support or 
capacity building, but there are plenty of others. As with the authorities, planners should 
consider the effects they are trying to achieve and then stitch together existing tools to 
attain them.   Additionally, in many cases, TSOCs have sufficient authority and funding 
to fashion their own tools to meet their unique needs. As referenced earlier, perfect 
examples include SOCEUR’s Partnership Development Programs and SOFREP 
positions. These “in house” solutions offer the advantage of being quickly implemented 
and tailor-made to meet the TSOC’s needs.   
4. Construct the Chain of Actors 
The chain of actors is what brings the BPC enterprise to life. Like most things 
pertaining to SOF, there is no single solution to how the chain should look or be 
comprised. How the TSOC chooses to construct the chain should be informed by the 
nature of the partnership environment and the resources available to the TSOC. Although 
each chain of actors will be unique, there are several guiding principles that TSOC 
commanders and staffs should consider:  
(1) Consider the strengths and weakness of the actors on both sides of the 
partnership. As addressed earlier, each actor has their own inherent set of strengths and 
weakness given their position and responsibilities on the chain. (Figure 19) The nature of 
the enterprise may require more of one quality or skill than another; also, those 
requirements may change over time and therefore the chain may have to be modified. 
(2) Personalities do matter. This research did not delve into the interplay of 
personalities in a partnership, but they are a factor planners should consider. As Averett, 
Cervantes, and O’Hara conclude in their study of SOCSOUTH’s SOC-Forwards, getting 
the right personality matches are important, and failure to do so can serve as a significant 
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impediment to success.426  Given that observation, the seven principles of capacity 
building can be applied at the individual level as well, since all actors share equal 
influence over the enterprise and should act and interact with these principles in mind. 
These points are reflected in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19.  The Actors of the SOF BPC Enterprise 
(3) Determine the size of the footprint. There are several factors that 
determine the size of the USSOF footprint that a partner nation can handle. The most 
common considerations should include: 
 The size of the partner force;  
 Political sensitivities;  
 The security environment;   
                                                 
426 Averett, Cervantes, and O’Hara, An Analysis of Special Operations Command-South’s Distributive 
Command and Control Concept, 70. 
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 And how much presence the U.S. country team is willing to accept.   
From the American perspective, the country team’s assessment should be taken 
very seriously. Most activities like country clearances and other forms of support will 
have to go through the U.S. embassy, and not all country teams have the same size staff 
and physical space inside the embassy’s walls. SOSCOUTH was very cognizant of 
footprint limitations in both Colombia and Paraguay. As addressed earlier, part of the 
reason the enterprise in Colombia was so large, and the enterprise in Paraguay was 
significantly smaller, was because of capacity limits that the PN and the U.S. country 
team could handle. Oversized, forward deployed SOF packages can quickly find 
themselves unwelcomed guests, which will only serve to distance the actors in the chain.     
(4) Identify the in-country synchronizer. The SOCSOUTH case studies, recent 
literature, and other contemporary examples, all indicate that an in-country synchronizer 
is a key component to the increased likelihood of success in a SOF BPC enterprise. This 
synchronizer can be in the form of a SOCFWD, as was the case in Colombia and 
Paraguay, or they can be a permanently assigned single-SOF advisor, such as a SOLO or 
a SOFREP, or another actor or entity not identified here that possess the capability to fill 
this role. This actor’s presence provides the U.S. country team a resident SOF expert, 
facilitates communication horizontally and vertically which increases transparency, 
provides continuity as rotational units come and go, and is the TSOC commander’s eyes 
and ears, and sometimes mouth, in the country. When done correctly, by the right 
personality, the end result is a more synchronized, resilient SOF BPC enterprise. In the 
absence of an in-country synchronizer, a TSOC has to fulfill those roles as best as 
possible through periodic visits, in- and out-briefs from rotational units, and via long 
distance communication, which is simply not as effective.427   
(5) Identify ways to make the enterprise more resilient. 
Because the partnership environment is dynamic, a BPC enterprise is vulnerable 
to external influences beyond the TSOC’s control. One way to mitigate unforeseen 
                                                 
427 Ibid., 23–25. 
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threats to a BPC enterprise is to make it more resilient. In the case of Colombia and 
Paraguay, the enterprise in Colombia was more resilient for the following reasons: the 
level of political and military cooperation between the two countries was high; there was 
the catalyzing hostage crisis; and SOCSOUTH had a much broader base of engagement 
in Colombia than in Paraguay (Figure 20).   
There is not too much that a TSOC can do to increase the level of political 
cooperation between the United States and a PN, but it can take diligent steps to ensure 
the level of military cooperation is as high as possible. Likewise, catalyzing events such 
as OWS are unpredictable. Although commanders and staff should be prepared to 
capitalize on operational opportunities, they cannot be forecasted as part of the plan.   
 
Figure 20.  Side-by-side Comparison of Chain of Actors in Colombia and 
Paraguay 
The one factor that the TSOC can actively pursue is more engagement 
opportunities with the PN. In Colombia, SOCSOUTH forces worked with 
counterterrorism, counter drug, jungle, riverine, reconnaissance forces and paramilitary 
formations. Working with different entities increased the demand signal of the enterprise 
in Colombia, to both the Colombians and the Americans. It also provided multiple points 
of access to Colombia, should either country’s policy change. For example, if for some 
reason the United States decided to stop supporting Colombia’s CT efforts, SOCSOUTH 
was still in a position to engage with the other formations; whereas in Paraguay, if the 
 153
U.S. implemented the same policy, SOCSOUTH would be left without any engagement 
opportunities in the country, as they were engaged only with the country’s CT force.  
5. Continue to Reassess and Communicate 
Once the BPC enterprise is initiated reassessment is critical. As stressed time and 
again, the partnership environment is dynamic and changes over time; therefore a BPC 
enterprise cannot be run on autopilot. This is another reason having an in-country 
synchronizer is so important. They can manage day-to-day activities in country, and 
gauge and report changes and developments—the feel—back to the TSOC, freeing-up the 
TSOC to address its other myriad of responsibilities. Regular review of the BPC 
enterprise should be conducted, and adaptations made as required.   
During this phase, additional transparency between different actors, particularly 
rotational units will become critical to enterprise efficiency and unity of effort. 
Additional communication requirements may be necessary to better communicate with 
actors and partners. KLEs should be planned and executed when possible or required. 
Regular assessment and adjustments to the enterprise will provide the commander and 
staff a more comprehensive understanding of the partnership environment and position 
them to better capitalize on emergent capacity building opportunities.   
F. IMPLICATIONS 
To date, USSOF lacks any sort of coherent theory or doctrine on capacity 
building. Over the past decade, as illustrated by the SOCSOUTH case studies, TSOC 
staffs have been working diligently to figure out how to make operational ends meet in 
order to achieve these new capacity building objectives. Major changes in USSOCOM 
have occurred over the last several years, the full extent of which have yet to be felt, but 
the guiding principles and critical components of SOF capacity building have yet to be 
identified and institutionalized. Moving forward, as demands for BPC increase and 
resources decrease, the need for such a theory will become increasingly urgent.   
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G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To best empower the TSOCs, the operational arms of USSOCOM, this research 
recommends USSOCOM increase the level of professional development it provides to its 
officers and non-commissioned officers. These special operators possess an inherent 
knowledge of building partner capacity at the tactical level. Although such knowledge 
and experience is necessary, it is insufficient to fully engage in undertakings such as a 
BPC enterprise when these personnel are promoted into positions at the operational level 
such as a TSOC.   
Under USSOCOM’s campaign plan, SOCOM 2020, the command intends to 
empower the Global SOF Network by pursuing persistent engagement, and 
disaggregating the force to connect with more partners via smaller formations and even 
with single individuals.428   In these environments, a working knowledge of the 
intricacies and interplay of factors that influence BPC enterprises will be essential to 
achieving USSOCOM’s objectives. A basic understanding of these principles and factors 
will go a long way to reducing friction, while increasing adaptability, operational 
creativity and resiliency within the enterprise; whether serving as a single SOF advisor in 
a partner nation, or as a planner at the TSOC.  
H. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study focused solely on bilateral BPC enterprises, but as mentioned 
previously, multilateral SOF BPC enterprises are already in existence. One such example 
is SOCEUR’s sponsored Combined Special Operations Task Force-10 (CSOTF-10) in 
Afghanistan under the auspices of ISAF SOF. As national interests continue to overlap, 
and partner nation SOF capacities become projectable beyond their own borders—an 
intended outcome of on-going SFA missions—the likelihood of multilateral SOF 
partnerships and multilateral BPC enterprises will only increase. As the partners increase 
in number so too will the dynamics of the partnership environment. An in-depth study of 
                                                 
428 Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 89–95. 
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the factors at play in multilateral partnerships will be of much benefit to those charged 
with stewarding such enterprises.   
I. CLOSING REMARKS 
Building partner capacity remains a key tenet of the U.S. national security 
strategy, but it also remains a challenging endeavor, with broad objectives arrayed against 
diverse threats. The United States will continue to pursue capacity building as a principal 
approach to national defense for the foreseeable future, and SOF will remain the 
capacity-building force of choice. The threats are simply too diverse for the United States 
to face alone, and SOF has the experience, expertise, and ability to lead the way for the 
Department of Defense along this line of effort. Although USSOF has extensive 
experience building partner capacity at the tactical level, this new strategic emphasis and 
the operational requirements necessary to support long-term, persistent capacity building 
will require more of USSOF at the operational and strategic level, namely at the TSOC. 
This work by no means has come close to providing solutions to the challenges that lie 
ahead, but hopefully it has furthered the discussion and brought us a little bit closer. 
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APPENDIX. BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY PROGRAMS 
Program Purpose Program Authority Funds Cancel 
Sept. 30 
1203 Enhance the capacity of the national security forces 
of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and forces participating 
in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
to conduct counterterrorism operations 
 
Enhance the ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior 
Counterterrorism Forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations 
112-239 2019 
1206 Build the capacity of foreign military forces to 
conduct counterterrorism or to support military, 
stability and maritime security operations. 
109-163, as amended 2019 
1207 Enhance the capacity of the national security forces 
of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and forces participating 
in the African Union Mission in Somalia to conduct 
counterterrorism operations 
 
Enhance the capacity of the Yemen Ministry of 
Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations 
112-81 2017 
Afghan Train & Equip Provide assistance to the Afghan National Army to 
enhance its capability to combat terrorism and to 
support U.S. military operations 
108-106 N/A 
Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund (ASFF) 





Program Purpose Program Authority Funds Cancel 
Sept. 30 
Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund (ASFF)/CTRB 
Provide assistance to Afghanistan Security Forces. 
 
113-66 N/A 
Coalition Readiness Support 
Program (CRSP) 
Provide supplies, services, logistical support and non-
reimbursable loan of equipment to certain coalition 
forces supporting military and stability operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
Provide specialized training and procure supplies and 
specialized equipment; provide such supplies and 
loan such equipment on a non-reimbursable basis to 










DOD Counter Narcotics Provide support for security, law enforcement, drug 
detection and reconnaissance with provision of 
equipment, training, facilities and communications 
101-510 Section 1004, as 






Build international peacekeeping capacity and 
promote regional security operations. 
FAA Section 551 (22 U.S.C. 
Section 2348) and FAA Section 
551 for Peacekeeping Operations 
and the Global Peacekeeping 




Contingency Fund (GSCF) 
To enhance the capabilities of national military and 
security forces that conduct border and maritime 
security, internal defense, and counterterrorism 
operations; for security sector, rule of law programs, 
and stabilization efforts 
112-81, as amended N/A 
International Narcotics 
Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) 
Provide assistance for the control of narcotic and 
psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, 
or for other anti-crime purposes. 
 
FAA Section 481 (22 USC 
Section 2291 et seq.) 
2022 
 159
Program Purpose Program Authority Funds Cancel 
Sept. 30 
Iraq Security Forces Fund 
(ISFF) 




terrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs (NADR) 
Provide anti-terrorism training services; equipment 
and other commodities relating to the detection, 
deterrence, and prevention of acts of terrorism 
FAA Section 571 2022 
Pakistan Counterinsurgency 
Capability Fund (PCCF) 
Build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability 




Build the Counterinsurgency Capability of Pakistan 




Build international peacekeeping capacity and 
promote regional security operations. 
FAA Section 551 (22 U.S.C. 
Section 2348) 
2023 
PKO and GPOI Build international peacekeeping capacity and 
promote regional security operations 
FAA Section 551 (22 U.S.C. 
Section 2348) 
N/A 
Other non-DOD Programs Various (provided by the DSCA Program 
Manager) 
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